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Social Psychology of International Conduct

by

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To my friend

CHARLES HENRY RIEBER

IN GRATITUDE FOR HIS UNWITTING
CONTRIBUTION TO THIS STUDY

PREFACE

The endeavor to bring international conduct under the control of law and of justice is the most important of all the enterprises in which the nations are now engaged. And with this in mind, the present volume has grown out of the need of presenting to classes in college and university and to general audiences those aspects of international conduct which can best be understood with the help of social psychology. For although the nations may be regarded otherwise also, yet they are immense societies confronting one another and drawn to mutual injury or benefit by their desire, emotion, intelligence, and will.

There are many instructors in social psychology who, it is hoped, will wish to extend their students' work into this vital subject, as the author has been doing for many years. In political science, economics, and sociology, also, some will desire a survey of the international scene from the standpoint of psychology. The standpoint will of course differ from that of other social sciences, and this may give it value. The view from the new position may stimulate as well as supplement, and it may even offer occasion for pleasant glorying by each as he returns to his own preferred outlook. There is a town which may here be nameless, where the homes, now here now there upon the hillslope, face Bay and Golden Gate, and where men and women live by pride, less of birth or wealth, than of view; and happily each never doubts, *he knows,* that his own view is best. The sciences are not without trace of similar partialities, harmless and endearing.

But the book has its eager eye on the general reader also. With all due deference to the young and especially to young collegians, the future largely lies with those more mature who by self-directed studies are disciplining their judgment rightly to vote and legislate and write editorials and teach and preach. These are the men and women who by deciding the policies of to-day are shaping the world of to-morrow. The book has a shy hope of being admitted to some part of this great company.

The writer is indebted to Professor A. L. Kroeber and to Professor F. M. Russell for guidance past pitfalls where anthropology, political science, and psychology come together. But these generous friends must not be held to answer for any missteps which even they could not prevent. The chapter on "Unchanging Nature in War" is rewritten from an earlier form in the *Scientific Monthly,* even then prepared as a part of the present study, but published beforehand because of delay in completing the whole.

G. M. S.

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PART I

PREPARATION FOR INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT

CHAPTER I

THE MINDS OF THE BACKWARD RACES

ADMITTING heartily the need of a social psychology of international life, as stated in the Preface, one cannot begin with the nations merely. For are not nations what they are, one might say, largely because the races are what they are? Working in each nation are there not its racial blood and nerves and mind and culture helping to shape the present conduct?

And so to understand why nations act toward one another as they do, one must start behind them, and inquire into the facts of race and into the prejudices of race. It will not be a real delay, but will speed us toward our goal.

INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE

At once we enter a region where many things are said that are important if true—important even though not true, if many persons hold them true and act upon them: for example, that an unbridgeable mental gulf between the chief races of the East and West makes it impossible that they shall meet. And, on the other hand, it is held with equal confidence that men of the same race cannot fail to meet, cannot fail to understand one another; as when it is asserted that because they are of one race, England and America can never go to war with each other. Let us trust

confidently that they never can, while doubting whether race alone will assure this result. For if race by itself were so effectual, how could England and America already have gone to war twice with each other and at a time when racially they were even more alike than they are to-day? Further, a solidarity is urged of all the white races because of their psychic as well as their physical kinship.

Indeed, even within the Caucasian races we are urged to look to the purity of the particular strain, for dire consequences come of intermixture. France, it is said, is internally unstable because her population is of three different races of the Caucasian group. The decline of all peoples, it appears to some, is from no other cause than that races have not held themselves sharply marked off from one another, but have permitted fusion until they became "mongrels." Such, in part or in whole, is the thought once held by de Gobineau and still regarded with a certain sympathy by McDougall, Osborne, Giddings, and others of our contemporaries.

But whatever be true of all this, we may be certain that the existence of different races complicates the international situation. If all the nations were of one race, were Caucasian or, narrower still, were Nordic, their intercourse would have a hundred difficulties. But with the Caucasians facing alien races—Mongolian, Negro, and the rest—and with all of these confronting one another and the Caucasians, the hundred difficulties become a thousand. The nations of Europe alone or of Europe and America alone find trouble enough with one another. But as we pass beyond this circle of kindred, and have Europe dealing with Africa, or have Europe or America treating with Asia, then the contrast of race is never for a moment out of mind but gives light and shadow to the entire political view.

Thus in part it is that the relations of the United States

with Mexico, with Japan, and with the Philippines are very different from those of the United States with Canada, Australia, or Great Britain. And likewise in Russia, the Balkans, and Asia Minor; in Egypt and other parts of northern Africa; in the East Indies, China, and India—in all these lands and in many more the fact of race adds its tone to national feeling and conduct.

But if we look deeper than skin into the qualities of the mind, some believe we shall find the human races essentially alike. The Negro or the American Indian is held to be as well-endowed mentally as is the white man; if the Negro has learned less, he has at least an equal ability to learn; his inferiority is but apparent and accidental, due to circumstance; for were he given the same outer advantages as those which the white man has so long enjoyed, he would in time come to the white man's attainments in science, engineering, politics, and culture generally. This or something not far from this has been held by Finot, Boas, Ward, and others.

But the very opposite is also held: that in mind as well as in body the races are deeply different. Nor is it thought merely that there is a difference without superiority or inferiority—as an orange, though different from an apple, is not clearly a better fruit. On the contrary, the white races, it is held, are manifestly superior to all others; while of the white races themselves, one in particular, the fair, tall, and long-headed Northern European, is best of all, best by native endowment and not by training merely; best not alone in physique but also in mind, by which it is his right to rule the world. Thoughts like these, which have been held by Chamberlain and others, do not remain in books, but appear in public office and there bend the policy of nations. The sense of superiority of race has buttressed German nationalism against the French, has supported the

Russian attachment to the Serbs, and has fed the hatred between Greek and Turk. It is important, therefore, that we try to see in what direction the facts themselves will lead—whether to believe in racial equality of mind or in racial inequality.

And let us remember, as we compare race with race, that mind is more than intelligence; that the mind includes, not merely the power to know, but the power to feel, to have emotion, to act, and to act purposely. *The important question for us first of all is whether there is an essential likeness or difference in the minds of different races.* The origin or explanation of this likeness or difference, the decision whether the likeness or difference is inborn or is due to environment, this is a second question, to be distinguished from the other. We must first see the mental features, whatever be their origin, which the races show as we bring them rapidly before us. The explanation, the theorizing as to the manner in which these features came to be, is of scientific interest, and in the end may be significant for practice; but for our present international conduct the actual resemblance and contrast, and the quality and amount of these, regardless of their origin, is of prime importance.

Forthwith, then, let us look sharply to the mental qualities of the chief human strains in the world, as something of grave international significance.

NEGRO AND NEGROID PEOPLES

We have some knowledge of the Negro and Negroid peoples. Rivers found that in ability to give sustained attention to certain objects which were in the field of vision but which were not easy to observe in the way he required, Papuans—a Melanesian people of New Guinea near Aus-

tralia—were quite equal to the average European. And Woodworth found that with simple form-tests which touch the borders of intelligence, the American Indians, Eskimo, Filipinos, Singhalese, and Ainus were not importantly different from the Caucasians; while all of these were quite different from Igorots and Negritos of the Philippines, and from a few Pigmies of the Congo.

Beyond fragments like these, we are dependent almost wholly upon evidence from experiments on children and adults of different races resident in the United States. As to the caution with which the evidence should be accepted, more will be said later; but taken at their face value, the experiments indicate that the average Negro is less intelligent than the average white man. Negro children, in their average intelligence, fall below white children. The difference, doubtless, is not wholly innate; it is probably due in part to circumstances which affect unfavorably the blacks and favorably the whites. Nor is the Negro child inferior to the white child upon all sides of understanding; he is not inferior in certain forms of perception, for example. But in many or most features of intelligence, the difference between black children and white children by the tests is fairly large and constant.

And when we pass from children to adults, the tests used in the American Army during the World War showed that, while the average mental level for the white men drafted was that of a normal person of 13.08 years of age, the average mental level for the Negroes drafted was that of a normal person of 10.37 years of age. Eight out of every ten white soldiers were more intelligent than the average Negro soldier. But this, of course, does not mean that every Negro is inferior in intelligence to every white man. On the contrary, a considerable proportion of the Negroes were superior to the average white man; and nearly all of

the Negroes were of a higher order of intelligence than were the lowest of the whites.

It has been thought by some (who are perhaps influenced by the faith that there is a compensation such as Emerson described) that the Negro has powers of sense exceeding those of the Caucasian, which are partly indeed the cause of his intellectual inferiority. Travelers have been impressed by what they believed to be, in the blacks, a marvelous sensitiveness to external impressions. But for this claim we have no clear experimental evidence. Papuans can perhaps detect a slightly weaker odor of camphor than can Europeans similarly tested. But some experiments on certain Sudanese indicate that their sense of smell is less acute than ours. And as for their sense of taste, we know only that the chief kinds of savor which we recognize—sweet, sour, saline, and bitter—are recognized also by such of the black peoples as have been tested. But in sensitiveness of skin a clear peculiarity is found in at least some of the Negroids. Papuans, in certain tests of their skin sensations, showed that they possessed a power of discrimination fully double that of Englishmen. And in Africans a superiority of this kind has been discovered. But pain did not seem to be quite as readily caused in some of the Negroids as in Europeans.

With regard to hearing, actual tests show that Papuans are probably less sensitive to faint sounds than are Europeans. And in keeping with this indication, a small group of Pigmies from the Congo were found to be somewhat inferior to the whites in their power to hear very faint sounds, but were quite equal to the whites in detecting tones of very high pitch. Papuans have about the same upper limit of tone-sensation as have Europeans.

The vision of some of the blacks is probably better than ours. The late Dr. Rivers—although he inclined to at-

tribute their success largely to training—found the Papuans of the Torres Straits astonishingly quick in discerning, say, a boat afar off. While the European might barely see the boat when it was pointed out to him, the natives might correctly describe its rig, and tell what particular boat it was. And in actual tests of their eyesight where training would not enter, these Papuans as a whole were considerably better than an ordinary group of Europeans: where the average in Heligoland, for example, would be expressed by 1.77, the average of the Papuans would be 2.12—that is, better by 20 per cent. Other Melanesians, natives of the Solomon Islands, have shown a superiority of about 10 per cent over English laboring men. And while the Negro in the United States and the Negrito in the Philippines seem to have vision no better than ours, yet the natives along the Congo appear to have an eyesight whose average is above that of the European. And not only is the average in these cases higher, but more frequently than with us we find individuals of extraordinarily keen vision. Thus while of 200 Germans, 100 of whom were in the German navy and were doubtless so selected as to exclude many individuals of defective vision, only one person had a visual acuteness exceeding three times the European "normal"; yet among about the same number of Papuans, no less than eleven had eyesight better than three times the European "normal." Among the 100 natives along the Congo who were tested, several had vision four times as good as the European "normal," and the vision of one of them was five times as good. Vision four times the "normal" could doubtless be found in Europe, but it did not occur even once in 100 men of Heligoland, nor once in the 100 men of the German navy. Further, when we consider color blindness which is usually innate, this is less frequent among several of the Negro and kindred peoples than among Caucasians—less

frequent, for example, in the Papuans and in the Negroes of the United States.

But there are important mental fields beyond the senses and intelligence, with regard to which we have at least the beginnings of experimentation—such as inhibition, suggestion, distraction, persistence, and resistance—in some of which the blacks have appeared worse than the whites; and in some, better. In tests whose interpretation is still obscure but which aim to lay bare certain qualities of the will and temperament, the Negroes obtained worse scores than did the whites with respect to five of the twelve qualities involved; in four they obtained scores equal to those of the whites, and in three they received higher scores. In their "work curve" in school the Negroes exceeded the whites in the work done during the first half of the period over which the test lasted, and fell behind the whites in the second half. So far as the test goes it gives a certain evidence that the blacks enter upon a task with vigor, but do not maintain their pace; that the average Negro has not the persistence of the average white in this kind of work. But we should not judge any entire group by its average, nor by its effort in any single direction; we need to remember, in the case of the blacks, the persistence of the "boys" devoted to Livingstone, who for months after his death continued at their self-imposed task of carrying the Englishman's body from the heart of Africa down to his own people at the coast, a distance of some 1,500 miles, battling all the while against severest difficulties that included their own sickness and the armed resistance offered them by superstitious and hostile tribes.

Concerning the emotions of the Negro, we are without exact and experimental evidence, and yet we are not wholly in the dark. The gayety of manner, the imaginative humor of such folk tales as those of "Uncle Remus," the love of

music, the haunting quality of their "spirituals" and of their secular melodies in the America of the slave days, their interest in a passionate religion—these make clear the rich emotions of the Negro. With the Negro these emotions seem to assume less readily than with the Caucasian or with the American Indian an egoistic or self-assertive tone. Unless he were able to take injury more lightly, were readier to adjust himself to trespass upon his personal rights, how should we explain his emotional accommodation to slavery? With all the pathos expressed in his music, the Negro actually flourished in a bondage which others would not or could not endure. Probably far more from poor training than from intrinsic quality of his emotions and impulses, the Negro in the United States inclines to delinquency and crime, giving us more than twice as much lawlessness as we should expect from his number in our population. The frequency with which he has been charged, truly or falsely, with endangering the safety of white women seems to be due to local conditions; for in Jamaica, where a different spirit enters into the relations between whites and blacks, there is no fear of this unbridling of the Negro's passion. But even in the United States he is less given than is the white to suicide; he also is far less liable than the average of our population to feeble-mindedness, insanity, and epilepsy. It must correspond to some important emotional or other difference in his psychic constitution that no such important civilizations have ever come from the blacks as have arisen even among the American Indians.

POLYNESIANS

The Polynesian has even less been studied in his intelligence than has the Negro. In Hawaii, of the school chil-

dren tested, the native Polynesians were far below the Anglo-Saxons and the Chinese; and although the Polynesians were below, they were not far below the Portuguese; while they were appreciably above the Filipinos and the Porto Ricans. Of their senses, we know most about their eyesight, and this "most" is little indeed. Their vision is not subnormal; such is the clear outcome of tests upon nearly 200 Hawaiians. Among four Hawaiians tested in Germany, one had a sharpness of vision twice that of the European "normal," and one had two and a half times that of this "normal." Of five Samoans tested, the average was somewhat less than twice the European normal. But we must remember that the *average* vision in Europe is itself somewhere between one and a half and two times this measure that is called "normal." The average eyesight of the Polynesians is probably not far, then, from the average of Europeans.

Their impulses and emotions are almost unknown to us in any accurate way. The enjoyment and skill in rendering music—although they have no excellence in pitch discrimination—and the character of the music which they present, indicate their readiness for this form of expression and stimulation of the joyous emotions. In my own quite inadequate observation in Honolulu, I have been impressed by their instant and humorous improvisation of words for melodies already familiar to them, and their enjoyment of it. Children and adults also, I observed, threw themselves swiftly into a passionate form of public address. And we know from early sources that oratory was an important part of the preparation and actual conduct of battle among Polynesians.

Along with their joyousness has gone their happy avoidance of quarreling with their associates.

ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIANS

With regard to the intelligence of native Australians, whose racial affinities are still obscure, we have even less knowledge than of the other divisions of mankind. Darwin judged them to be less intelligent than the American Indians of Tierra del Fuego; although these Fuegians, Darwin thought, were "in a lower state of improvement." But Wissler has recently spoken a word for the Australians, saying that it would be a mistake to set them down as having low intelligence, since a stupid people could not develop the elaborate social code of the Australians, nor show their almost uncanny ability to track game. Of eighteen natives of Queensland tested for their color vision, none showed red-green color blindness, although there was perhaps some degree of insensitiveness to blues and greens, compared with other colors.

AMERICAN INDIANS

As for the American Indians, the tests of their intelligence have hardly been carried to a point which gives us a basis for decision. So far as they go, these tests indicate some intellectual inferiority in the redskin compared with the white. But we do not know which tribes are the most intelligent—for the living descendants of the Maya and other peoples that attained a high culture have not been carefully studied by psychologists—and we may for this reason be unfair to the best of the redskin race.

In their powers of sense, the American Indians are better and worse than the Caucasian, and equal to him. Of their smell, taste, and sense of temperature we have no accurate knowledge. Their tactile discrimination seems not to differ from ours; while their sense of pain is perhaps not quite as acute as our own. Their hearing is generally not so good

as ours, either in their power to detect faint sounds ("keenness"), or in their power to catch tones of very high pitch ("range"). The hearing of the Indians in our government schools was about 25 per cent less keen than that of the whites tested; and its range was less by about 1,000 double vibrations a second. But Indian stocks differ also among themselves, the "keenness" of some groups being nearly twice that of others; while the "range" of hearing in the Indians of Tiburon Island off the Coast of Mexico was as much as 4,000 double vibrations a second above that of the Indians of Vancouver Island.

With some of them, average vision by actual test is found to be sharper than with us by about 10 per cent; in many tribes, however, it is near that of Europeans. W. H. Hudson, from intimate acquaintance but without careful experiments, felt that the reputation of the native South American for sharp eyesight was not due to a better native visual power but to a better use of such native power as he had. And Ranke was astonished to find that in sharpness his own eyes were equal to the best of the Brazilian natives he tested. In some of the peoples of the American continent there seems a more delicate sensing of faint colors, and with less of actual color blindness than with us; in others, however, color blindness is about as frequent as with Europeans.

As to their reactions, right-handedness seems to be about as frequent as with us; while the quite inadequate experiments on the time it takes to respond to a signal suggest that some Indian tribes may be somewhat quicker in their muscular action than either whites or Negroes. Quite on another psychic level, Belt, observing them in Nicaragua, judged them to be "industrious by nature," and quite ready to work steadily and well when working for themselves. And certain Indians in the United States, tested by Garth,

were found to be the more capable of maintaining a steady pace and effort in certain forms of intellectual work: whereas Negroes worked at first with vigor and later slowed up, the Indians were readier to sustain their effort, so that in the closing period of the work they were exceeding even the whites in the accuracy of their performance.

Their feelings and emotions have been the subject of no careful experiments. We are, therefore, dependent on the impression made upon careful observers and upon the evidence of their manners and customs and the product of their arts.

Their music, at least in certain stocks, as for example the Omahas, may display an ability, found also among other primitive peoples, to construct and enjoy a complex rhythm which is quite beyond our own common power of appreciation, but of which we are gaining some slight and let us hope transient hint through "jazz." We know also their power to endure pain unflinchingly—due in large measure, if not entirely, to a schooling from early youth in fortitude for war. But that the Indian was not utterly without emotion, not utterly impassive, we know by his excited preparations for warfare and by his rejoicing after victory, and his depression from defeat. His readiness to take revenge for injuries received, his long waiting, even for years, until he might find a favorable opportunity for vengeance—all these things indicate the strength and persistence of certain of his emotions. And this undertone of passion in peoples usually thought to be so stolid is indicated also by the mystical features in their religion and by their readiness to conceive the spiritual forces of the universe to be in continual conflict—in this respect so signally unlike the African Negro, whose conceptions run so characteristically toward a Great Spirit careless and at ease.

The Indians also are highly responsive to the attitude of

their fellows. Disapproval and ridicule are of an unusual force with them, so that they often placed their main reliance upon this, instead of upon physical restraint or punishment, for bringing to order the unruly child or adult. This personal sensitiveness to their social *milieu* probably underlay their strong desire for vengeance and their depression under defeat, and their dejection and death when enslaved—in the West Indies, for example, by the early Spaniards. Here the Indians are said to have lost heart and pined away until the whole native population had utterly disappeared. And when other redskin slaves were brought from the American mainland, these too died, although the Negroes who were then introduced into the West Indies were well able to endure the slavery. The Indian's emotional response to the present socially inferior place of his people, compared with what it was before the coming of the Caucasian, may be only a minor factor joining with many others to make him relatively regardless of the law of the white man in the United States. If we regard the Mexican immigrants to the United States as mainly of American Indian stock, and the immigration itself as involving a practical test of readiness to adapt oneself to new social surroundings, then it is significant that whereas the Mexicans show little more than a quarter of the amount of feeblemindedness and epilepsy which we should expect from the number of Mexicans in our population, they show one and a third times the amount of insanity to be expected, and five and a half times the amount of crime. The civilization which the aboriginal Americans maintained in Mexico, Central America, and Peru until it was destroyed by Europeans is proof, however, that some of the Indian stocks possessed mental qualities of a high order. We do not yet know what are the mental qualities which, added to the physical, are indispensable for the attainment of an advanced civilization

such as the Spaniards found in these countries. But high intelligence is certainly necessary, together with a wide range of emotions and impulses active and yet not too violent or untamed for daily use.

CHAPTER II

THE ADVANCED RACES

MONGOLIANS

AS with the other races, our knowledge of the mind of the Mongolian is at its mere beginning, and is hardly at its beginning with other than the Chinese and Japanese.

In native intelligence these two important peoples are probably no less than the equals of the Caucasians. Of their children in the United States, it should be remembered that the parents are largely manual laborers and artisans in the less skilled employments, employments that in our white population attract the less intelligent individuals. It may, therefore, well be that the Chinese and Japanese in the United States are below the average of the general population in their Asiatic homelands. And the Asiatic children in America are under the further disadvantage that in testing them use is often made of a language in which they are not at home, and of ideas which are not always assimilated to their culture. But even in these circumstances the Chinese and Japanese children in California are very little below the average of the Caucasians and are well within the limits of what is deemed normal for their age. In Tokyo—with use of tests virtually the same as some of our own, but now in the Japanese language—the findings indicate that so far as such evidence now reaches, the Japanese are not a whit inferior in general intelligence to the Caucasian.

What we know of the senses of this group can be stated briefly. At least one Mongolian people has extraordinary

sharpness of vision. Among the Kalmuks—they being a western division of the Mongols proper—a test of thirty-eight individuals revealed three who had an acuteness of sight more than four times that of the European standard of "normal" vision, and one individual had an acuteness more than six times the European "normal." Their astonishing eyesight made it possible for them, upon one occasion, to discern an object on the horizon that others could not detect even with their field glasses. In contrast to these Kalmuks, a group of Finns were found to have about half their number not above the European "normal"; and the average visual power of a group of the natives of Borneo was one and a half times this normal, which would bring them to a level near that of the average European.

As for the color sense of the Mongolians, the Japanese and some of the Chinese seem to have color blindness about as often as we: 3.17 per cent of 600 male Chinese were color-blind; and 2.6 per cent of over 2,000 Japanese males. Yet in large numbers of other Chinese, almost no cases of color blindness have been found. Some strains of the Chinese would therefore appear to be superior to ourselves in color vision; as would also—to speak only of those of whom large numbers have been tested—the Koreans, Annamese, Siamese, and Malays. But with respect to color vision, nature carefully guards against indicting or exonerating an entire race; for there is some evidence that the Lapps, a Mongoloid people of northwestern Europe, and also the Chukchis, a Mongoloid people of northeasterly Asia, exceed the Europeans in the frequency either of color blindness itself or of some less complete form of color defect.

The hearing of a considerable group of Filipinos—selected young men of the Constabulary, belonging to various strains, including the Tagalog, Ilocano, Visayan, and Pangasinan—proved to be only about one-fourth as acute as that of

European whites. And their upper limit of detecting tones was below that of European whites.

Our meager evidence concerning quickness of muscular reaction indicates some lack of uniformity in different branches of the stock. The few Japanese tested are said to have reacted more slowly, and a few Javans more quickly than Europeans. A well-developed feeling for rhythm, which doubtless is connected with muscular behavior, is evident from the music of the Javans, Siamese, and Japanese, and from experiments on Malays of Borneo. Indeed among these peoples, there has been a use of complicated musical rhythm, with only the borders of which we are beginning to be generally familiar.

Rhythm brings one to speak of impulse, sentiment, and emotion. And here it is evident that even the less cultured of the Mongoloid peoples can show persistence, can hold a steady purpose through an extended time, as is shown by the long-held grudges, the delayed revenge, for example, to be found among the head-hunters of the Malays. Certain Malays are subject also to strange depression and murderous excitement, known as *latah* and *amok*. Vengeance, moreover, is found in the highly cultured peoples of China and Japan. But joy seems far oftener to mark the simpler folk of both the Chinese and Japanese; this has been my impression of them in the Orient and the Occident, and especially from watching laborers in Japan. Indeed one might be tempted to believe that it is the "plain people" in almost every land—as in Italy—who retain more fully the child's joy of life. Observations of the Chinese and Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands, where their numbers are large, indicate that they possess in a high degree certain admirable moral qualities—doubtless a result of natural endowment combined with parental training.

Contrasts in endowment are also indicated by the mark-

edly different success of the various strains of this race in attaining high culture. To the Mongolians belong peoples, *e.g.* some of the Indo-Chinese, that are uncivilized, that live to-day in utter savagery. The blood of a particular race is therefore no guarantee that a people will live up to the better levels of that race.

But on the other hand, from the Mongolian race have come the civilized peoples of the East—the Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Siamese, Burmese, and others—many of whom have maintained a high culture for hundreds or thousands of years, some indeed for a longer period than has any other living people. This maintenance, this tenacity, of civilization is of itself an achievement additional to the attainment of civilization and to all those special cultural products in which the Far East has been so rich—in agriculture and commerce, in communal order, in literature, painting, sculpture, architecture, philosophy, and religion.

THE THREE CAUCASIAN RACES

Over the qualities of the different "races" among the Caucasians a battle has long been hotly raging. Before we attempt to come to any conclusion regarding the race as a whole, we might well observe this special conflict from some near-by eminence; for with its outcome is connected all manner of proposals as to the policy of the nations in Europe and America toward one another.

But first let us recall the physical appearance and characteristic places of habitation of these particular races over which there is this lively controversy. That the three here given are all there are of the Caucasians—upon this the authorities are by no means of one mind.

1. The Nordic Race, the blond whites, tall, with narrow heads, having light hair and blue or gray eyes; who are

present in large proportion in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, northwestern Germany, England, Scotland, and Ireland.

2. The Alpine Race, of medium height and stocky build, round-headed, with light-brown hair and hazel-brown eyes or eyes of mixed color; who are well represented in southern Germany, France, Switzerland, and the Tyrol, as well as in Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Poland, and Russia.

3. The Mediterranean Race, the brunet whites, of medium height and slender, with narrow heads and brown to dark-brown hair and eyes; who are present in large proportion among the Arabs; and within Europe, in such countries as Italy, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, Spain, and Portugal.

Of the relative intelligence of these three races our knowledge is meager. It has been claimed that the psychological tests of recruits in the United States during the World War established the superior intelligence of the Nordic stock. It is clear that the immigrants into the United States from different parts of Europe are different in an important degree, and that those who came from the countries where either the Alpine or the Mediterranean preponderates are in general the less intelligent. And while the intelligence of immigrants from the more northwesterly European peoples is not in proportion to the amount of the Nordic blood in these peoples, yet generally the immigrants from Nordic Europe stand well above those from the peoples which are predominantly of Alpine or Mediterranean stock. The evidence from the recruits is to some extent supported by the evidence from the examination of American children of foreign parents, where those whose descent is from southern and southeastern Europe are found to be less intelligent than those from northwestern Europe.

Now while this finding is of great practical value for Americans, it must not be misused scientifically. The policy

of the United States regarding immigration from the different parts of Europe may well be affected by the facts revealed, since some parts of Europe are sending superior men and women, and some, inferior; and, guided by this knowledge, it may be well to encourage or restrict immigration from these different lands. But we are not yet certain what the findings mean in the large; we do not know that the different races are sending to America equally representative samples of their people. By an unintended and purely economic sifting, some are perhaps giving of their best; and others of their worst. And not until we know more about those who do not emigrate but stay in the homeland can we be sure that the races are like the samples of their emigrants. It may well be that the peoples from whom there continually come relatively unintelligent men and women are themselves unintelligent; and that those from whom there regularly come the more intelligent are themselves more intelligent. But we must remember that the ablest of a race in our day are less apt to go to distant shores to find a home; that for decades America has been attracting mainly the peasantry and unskilled laborers—those who are less successful financially and are less alert than those who have prospered in the old country and feel on this account a less strong impulse to pull themselves and their family from the soil and to attempt to take root in a strange land.

More than this, we must not forget—what every psychologist knows, but which some do not always remember—that the intelligence tests are aimed to report only of native intelligence; and that men's minds, the minds of a race, are to be judged by more than their native intelligence.

Now the difference among the three chief races of Europe is usually stated in terms other than of intellectual qualities. Indeed the claim for the northwestern European has been

less that he is intelligent than that he is possessed of "moral" traits which the other Caucasians lack. Listen to the description of these peoples, and see how far beyond the horizon of intelligence tests goes the account of their mental constitution!

1. The Nordic Race: earnest, energetic, and enterprising; steadfast, solid, or stolid; outwardly reserved, thoughtful, and deeply religious, humane, firm, but not normally cruel; restless, strong in curiosity, inclined to "introversion," given to domination especially in military and political affairs rather than in purely intellectual matters; possessed of a migratory energy which has carried its people over all Europe; sailors, adventurers, individualists, lovers of personal freedom, aristocrats.

2. The Alpine Race: conservative; strongly attached to its own locality, little given to migration; ordinarily a negative factor in politics, always socially resigned and peaceful subjects; patient, submissive to authority, democratic, agricultural and never maritime; perfect slaves, ideal serfs, model subjects; less introvert than the Nordic.

3. The Mediterranean Race: innately impulsive, perhaps politically radical; perhaps weak in curiosity, gregarious, strong in the herd instinct, constitutionally extravert.

The Alpine and the Mediterranean races have also been alike described as brilliant, quick-witted, excitable and impulsive; sociable and courteous, but fickle, untrustworthy and even treacherous; often atrociously cruel; esthetic sense highly, ethic slightly developed; brave, imaginative, musical, and richly endowed intellectually.

Some of these descriptions, the truth is, are to be taken a bit lightly. They represent not an unbiased scientific judgment by detached investigators, but rather the impressions received not from all things of human value, but chiefly from matters of State. Greater weight has been given to

qualities which appear in governmental success, in political lordship over others, and less weight to matters more widely cultural, such as literature, music, sculpture, architecture, morals, and the happiness of the individual, of the family, and of the local community. The power to go forth conquering and to conquer is, by some of the describers, taken as almost the sole criterion of excellence; and in consequence nearly all virtue is declared to have come from the frozen loins of the North. But were one to judge the facts by other standards, with heed given not only to aggressive political strength but to the abilities needed for the advancement of science, law, art, urbanity, loyal respect for one's kind, and a reserve of mystical appreciation for what lies beyond the ken of man, then the score would not be so ill-balanced. In such an estimate not all the northwestern Caucasians would be approved, nor would all those Caucasians to the south and east be under condemnation.

The estimate of these three Caucasian races is unduly influenced not only by political and nationalistic ideals, but by events comparatively recent in history. Races are to be judged by centuries and many centuries. If the standing of the races had been decided when Spain was the political mistress of the world, or when Italy was the great center of the revival of learning, with its creative impulse in the arts and in scientific discovery, the more southerly races could have held their heads high, claiming a large share in the achievements of Marco Polo, Henry the Navigator, Columbus, Vasco da Gama, Magellan, Galileo, Bruno, Michelangelo, da Vinci, Velazquez, Cervantes, and all the rest. And if ancient times also were taken into our account and we reckoned with Rome, Greece, the Phœnicians, Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, and Persia, we would be scientifically venturesome indeed if we ascribed their political and other cultural achievements wholly to an infusion of blood from

the north. China and India and Egypt and Palestine were cradles of great cultures which only by wildest racial chauvinism could be attributed to the blood now best represented in northwestern Europe. The Nordics when left to themselves and until they absorbed the high culture of the south, were the admirable savages described by Tacitus and Cæsar. They could assimilate and invigorate the southern culture, but they lacked the courtesy and precision of judgment needed to disclaim its actual creation.

THE CAUCASIANS GENERALLY

Turning, then, from the Nordic controversy to other concerns of the Caucasian race, we find that different parts of the race stand on very different levels, here high, there low. And the same people who stand high in some respects stand low in others.

In acuteness of vision, for example, Europeans are inferior to certain peoples who belong to their own race: to the Todas of India who are probably a primitive Caucasian group; and to the Arabs and the Egyptians. But in the power to see colors, Europeans stand above the Todas, while standing below the Ossets of the Caucasus, of Caucasian stock, in a considerable number of whom there was found not a single case of color blindness.

In the discrimination of positions by touch, certain European Caucasians are inferior to the Todas, but are superior to them in sensitiveness to pain.

As for general intelligence, if we were to take seriously some of the alarmist statements about the American sample of the Caucasians, of whom we know most from actual experiment, we should believe that this sample was indeed in a sorry state. I have before me a serious declaration that *75 per cent* of the American people are in the upper

ranks of the feeble-minded. The truth is that about *1 per cent* of the American population is in all ranks of the feeble-minded. Such is the vagrant use to which have been put the returns from the psychological examination of over a million and a half men in the United States Army during the World War!

But passing on to the comparison of Caucasians, not with one another, but with those of other races, it has been found that in the power to hear faint sounds the Caucasians tested are superior to any of the non-Caucasians tested in the same way—superior to American Indians, of whose hearing we have had such impressive tales; and superior to African Pigmies and Filipinos. The mysterious Ainus of Japan, whom some have classed with the Caucasians—a classification by no means accepted by all—a few of these Ainus were nearly the least sensitive of those tested. Upon that other side of hearing—the power to hear tones of high pitch—Caucasians were perhaps not quite at the top, but were exceeded possibly by the African Pigmies.

Regarding the other senses our evidence is meager. Caucasians seem to have a sense of smell a little better for certain odors than have the Papuans, who are of Negroid stock. In discriminating localities upon the skin, Caucasians were less sensitive than the Papuans; and were less sensitive than Dyaks of Borneo, of Mongoloid stock. As to pain, the Caucasians were more sensitive than the Papuans, and more sensitive than were several other primitive non-Caucasians who were tested under like conditions.

More important than the senses, however, is innate intelligence; and in this the Caucasians of the European branches, at least, are probably superior to the Negro, the Negroid, the American Indian, the Polynesian, and the native Australian. These Caucasians find their only intellectual equals among the Mongolians.

From these things connected with the power to know, let us turn to those connected with the power to do. Here we find that Caucasians are probably slower in performing the simplest voluntary movements than are certain natives of Borneo, and slower than Javans and certain American Indians, although quicker than Papuans in reacting to a signal given by light. There is also some slight evidence that Caucasians react more quickly than Andamanese. In speed and accuracy of certain movements the Caucasians were inferior to Filipinos and Eskimo, and superior to certain American Indians.

And farther in the same direction, children of Caucasians, Negroes, and American Indians have been tested as to their readiness to attempt and accurately to continue intellectual work within their power. The Caucasians in the early stages of the sitting attempted less and were less accurate than the Negroes, but later, as the sitting continued, they overtook and excelled the Negroes. The Caucasians, however, at first attempted no more than did the American Indians, although they were more accurate than the Indians at first and for a considerable time; but before the end of the sitting the Indians had overtaken the Caucasians. The American white children apparently had more persistence, more stamina, than the Negro, but less than had the redskin. We greatly need further scientific work in this attractive field, as well as in that of experiments which have aimed to reveal in whites and Negroes greater or less amount of each of a round dozen of qualities connected with the will and the temperament. So far as these experiments go, the whites made higher scores in speed of movement, "resistance to opposition," and in coördination of impulses; and made lower scores in "motor impulsion" and "reaction to contradiction." Contrary to the popular belief of whites, the American Caucasian has not displayed a motor inhibi-

tion far superior to that of the American Negro. In America, at least, the Caucasian is more inclined than either the Negro or the Mongolian to feeble-mindedness, and more inclined than the Negro to insanity, and less inclined than the Negro to crime.

THE EVIDENCE OF HISTORY

Yet the more revealing proofs of the qualities of a race are to be found in the world's history. The great rôle which the Caucasian has played in the civilization past and present of Europe, America, Africa, Asia, Australia, and the scattered isles of the seven seas—upon this the Caucasian would rest his case. The story of Persia, Assyria, Babylonia, Egypt, Palestine, Phœnicia, Greece, Rome, the Europe of the Middle Ages, and the Europe and America of the modern centuries—this great story, any one must agree, ought to be used for scientific conclusions, as well as for literature, history, and racial pride. It demonstrates, so the Caucasian feels, the right of his people to a uniquely high place.

This claim could well be disputed only in favor of the Mongolian, who has maintained a high civilization in more people at once, and over a longer time in any single people, than has even the Caucasian. To the Caucasian along with the Mongolian, then, must be ascribed whatever psychological abilities are necessary for so great an achievement in culture. The historic pageant offered to our eyes both by Caucasian and by Mongolian culture is indeed proof of abilities, although no one as yet knows with psychological exactness what these abilities may be. In how far there enters into the result a superior native endowment, or a favorable environment; in how far, besides discipline, the impressive movement of culture in these two races is due to inborn

qualities of emotion and of will—the answer to these questions will not be free from dispute for decades yet to come.

A favorable habitat is important, but is not enough. Desert, pole, and tropic have hitherto not beckoned into them a superior culture. And yet in the temperate and fertile zone, lands exist in South America, in North America, and in Africa where the aboriginal peoples remained savage, while the Caucasian is now building there an advanced civilization.

A high order of native intelligence is important, but is not enough. It is significant that even our present meager knowledge already points directly to the possession by the Caucasian and the Mongolian, and to the lack by the other chief races, of the highest ability to know, to understand, to learn. But in almost every race there are considerable groups of individuals who have this ability, without great attainment of culture. And there is the loss of civilization while native intelligence remains. The flowering time of ancient Jewish or Greek or Roman culture was past, before the passing away of the native intelligence of these peoples.

Not only the physical surrounding and the native intelligence but also the social situation must be favorable. And this depends upon many things additional to intelligence and physical conditions and the number of people who can subsist in the given area. It rests upon more than the exceptional ability of the few who may act as leaders. It requires a certain delicate combination of liveliness and moderation in the emotions and impulses of the plain men and women who form the community and of others who are neighbors to the community; for a civilization can be prevented from without, as well as from within. Moral and not intellectual qualities only are needed to give the stability, the duration, and the breadth of communal life wherein many thousands of persons coöperate, generation after gen-

eration, in order gradually to accumulate the knowledge and the manual and psychic skill, the invisible social wealth which is a civilization. As the cutting of gems, and their setting in gold, and the rearing of pillared temples require generations accustomed to stored physical wealth, so it is with the psychic stores of a race. The people must not only be sharp and shrewd of wit, but they must be patient and provident and emotionally ready to compromise; ready to lead and to accept leadership and to be not only eager and energetic and fearful and resentful but temperate in these things. For in civilization there is needed a balance and proper interaction of high abilities, intellectual, emotional, and impulsive. The Caucasian and the Mongolian have probably differed from any less successful race in that they have had the power both to feel and to curb resentments. Justice, if it is to develop highly, requires not thought alone, but also indignation. But if there is hottest indignation at every wrong in sight, there springs up a wild crop of personal quarrels, family feuds, tribal animosities, and all the mad particularism which has marked so many of the backward peoples. The Caucasian and the Mongolian have succeeded probably because of a narrow margin by which they have escaped from this particularism and have been ready for the energetic compromises which are so necessary in any large community that endures. Civilization can be maintained only in those peoples that have moderated their violent and fatal animosities. Unintelligence has been no greater obstacle to cultural attainment and its lasting maintenance than has immoderate contentiousness; than has a rank insistence on the particular rights of self and family and tribe. It may well have been this that has prevented whole groups of intelligent men, such as are found in large parts of aboriginal America, from ever advancing beyond petty tribal organization. Civilization was offended by such

narrowness, and refused to join with men who themselves refused to coöperate on a large scale and over a great extent of time. The Caucasian has on this account gone to destruction in seat after seat of his civilization. Nor has he even yet solved the problem of *maintaining* a civilization in a people. But in so far as he has succeeded, it has been by tempering his resentments and effecting compromise and coöperation. A slight increment to his intransigeance and he would never have become civilized; his people would have remained like early Scottish clans. The Mongolian has escaped by a slightly wider margin of moderation.

CHAPTER III

THE MENTAL LIKENESS AND CONTRASTS IN THE RACES

HAVING gone out among great divisions of the human kind, can anything be brought back bound in a sheaf? Of the warring statements by de Gobineau, Giddings, Mill, Finot, and others, which are true, and which false?

PSYCHIC TRAITS COMMON TO ALL RACES

In certain respects it is true that all races are mentally equal, and it is possible to point confidently to some of the important traits which they possess in common.

Men of every race have the same senses: they can see, hear, smell, taste, and have sensations of touch, warmth, and cold; these serve all men as avenues for their knowledge of the world about them, of the inanimate world and the world of living things—plants, animals, and men. From the deeper parts of their bodies come the sensations which report the body's well-being or fatigue and pain; report hunger and thirst; report also of strain, friction, pressure, and tension in the muscles, tendons, and joints. Here the mental and the bodily, some would feel, are almost or quite indistinguishable. Likeness of mind appears clearer, however, in the universal human power to perceive, to interpret the sensations which come to us, to obtain from them knowledge of the objects which affect our senses—not merely to see colors, but to see them as trees and animals; not merely to hear sounds, but to hear them as voices and wind and storm. All races, too, can remember, can retain and

recall what is past and gone; as they also have imagination, have in some degree the power to represent to themselves what has not yet come to pass. All races, also, in spite of Lévy-Bruhl, form and use concepts of things concrete, such as men, bears, and clouds; and of things less concrete, like ghosts and spirits, and of still less concrete objects such as that vague energy designated among even primitive peoples by terms like *mana* or *wakonda*. In all races there is the power, also, to think, to conjoin ideas, to report to one another their observations, to describe and to pass judgment upon things and men, upon demons or divinities, and to reason about them.

The men and women of every race, moreover, show indubitably that they have certain selfsame emotions—they grow excited, become joyous or sad, become angry or afraid. They have also certain selfsame impulses—to mate, to care for their children, to have companions, to eat, drink, walk, talk, play, dominate, to peer curiously, to be startled and take to flight, to be aroused and ready to fight. In every race there is also the power to form habits, to learn and unlearn, to receive suggestions as well as to give them. In all races, men furthermore are sensitive to one another: they think, feel, and are impelled to action, to a large extent, according to the ways of the group with which they are closely and long associated; men accommodate themselves to one another to form communities, of the family or of some larger circle, whose store of experience and ideas and aims and antipathies are held in common. So there are found in all races, also, stout sympathies and aversions, preference for some men above others within the community, preference for the community itself above its rivals and enemies. Strong attachments, more than strong enough to counterbalance the emotionally centrifugal forces in men, are found in every people, whether its skin be black, brown,

yellow, red, or white, attachments which are the foundation for the social structure, simple or elaborate, which is the common characteristic of all the races.

These traits of human nature, variously modified by experience and training, are doubtless of different strength and proportion in different peoples; but the evidence is clear that these fundamental human powers are in no one race alone, are in no few races, but are in every race—in the aboriginal Australian as truly as in the Mongolian; in the Negro as really as in the white.

Further, all races are alike in that the race as a whole is not uniform; its own members markedly vary from one another. Each race shows a wide difference of ability as we compare individual with individual within the race itself. However high the endowment of some persons of the race, there will be found in that same race other persons of the lowest endowment. However low may be the average of the race, there will be found individuals of extraordinary ability. In the Caucasian race, ability ranges from Shakespeare's to that of the veriest idiot. In the Negro and Negroid race there are not only imbeciles but men of true genius. Each race, then, has individuals who depart widely from the average; some being far below while others are far above. In this respect all races are alike: excellence rubs elbows with profound defect. The blood, then, gives no assurance whatever as to what will be the mental endowment of any particular individual in whom that racial blood flows.

But each race is like every other race also in a further respect, that not only its individuals but its *peoples* differ among themselves. Certain whole strains stand in contrast with other strains of the same race. Whether it is because they are differently endowed or not, some peoples are far less advanced than others whom we group racially with them.

Among the American Indians, for example, the level of the Fuegians and the Botocudos is strikingly different from that of the Mayas and the Aztecs. And the Mongoloid race includes not only such intelligent and cultured stocks as the Chinese and Japanese but also the aborigines of Formosa and the Dyaks of Borneo; even as the Caucasian race includes not only the English and the French but also the Todas of India and perhaps the Ainus of Japan. A given racial blood does not give the same mental level, whether native or acquired, to all the peoples of that blood.

Every race is like every other race, then, in three important respects: in having the mass of its members reveal the fundamental powers which other races possess; in having its own individuals differ from one another, so that there is a wide range of abilities available in the race as a whole; and in having large strains of the race unlike one another in their accomplishment so that the grades of public cultural advancement or of backwardness in different communities within the race are by no means all alike.

PSYCHIC DIFFERENCES OF RACE

And yet races are also different from one another; and not in body and appearance only. Taking each race as a whole, to the neglect of its inner diversity, the *aboriginal Australians and the blacks, in all likelihood, are less intelligent than the aboriginal Americans and the Polynesians; and these in turn are somewhat less intelligent than the Mongolians and Caucasians.* In their sensory power, vision among the more characteristic Caucasians is not the most acute, either for perceiving form or for detecting some of the colors; their touch is less delicate than that of some of the blacks; their hearing is exceedingly acute, as is probably their sense of pain. As to simple muscular movements,

some of the blacks and some of the American Indians are probably quicker than the Caucasians, as these are probably quicker than some of the Mongolians. *The American Indians and the Caucasians are probably more ready for sustained planning and effort to attain their ends, and are emotionally less joyous than the Polynesians and the Negroes.*

The differences in sensory power and in intelligence come nearer to being scientifically ascertained than do those in any other mental field. The sensory differences, while of themselves quite unimportant for international behavior—for no people becomes friendly with another, or hostile, because of its special power of hearing or sight—are significant indirectly in this, that in all probability they are innate; and if these, then perhaps others also are innate—differences less near the borders of cognition, which would really be important in racial or national intercourse. So our thought is made ready for higher contrasts—in the desires, the pleasures, the purposefulness, the emotions, as well as in various aspects of intelligence—contrasts which may also in large measure rest on native endowment and not be due to the training or lack of training of recent generations. And the knowledge of the sensory power also knocks away whatever props there may ever have been for the thought that the inferior intelligence of some of the backward races was due to their superior senses, upon which they relied to the cost of their higher powers. It is now fairly clear that the backward peoples have no general advantage in their senses; in some senses they excel, in others they fall distinctly to the rear. Theory here has rested on knowing what is not true.

But it is well to confess our ignorance. We have no *knowledge as yet of the precise limits between a race's mental endowment and its culture, between its inborn mental*

ability and its mental acquisitions. An innate difference among races, as we have seen, doubtless exists and may be far more important than we have yet discovered. But the difference which strikes the eye is a difference of culture, and we are quite unable to decide the degree in which this is due to happy or unhappy externals or to psychic constitution.

And yet we must not belittle these contrasts that strike the eye, whatever may be their cause. The antithesis between the peoples rich in civilization and those who possess only a pennyworth of it is of immense importance not for the psychologist only but also for the statesman. *While all races are alike in having backward stocks,* yet *they differ greatly in the proportion of their backward to their advanced strains.* Some of the races—the aboriginal Australians, the Polynesians, and the blacks of Africa and elsewhere—have no peoples of advanced culture; while others—the Mongolians and the Caucasians—include many peoples of high civilization. *The advanced culture of so many peoples of the Caucasian and Mongolian races means that they have had a psychic endowment sufficient, both in the needed qualities and in their amount and in their organization, to maintain a large communal life,* with its unbroken social inheritance through many centuries. There has been in the individuals of these races the skill, the eagerness, and the power to understand, which is indispensable for civilization. But also there has been the persistence of purpose and the happy emotional mean between doglike attachment and sour antipathy, without which there cannot be the extended coöperation required to create and maintain a high civilization.

CHAPTER IV

THE RANGE OF RACIAL PREJUDICE

BESIDES the actual likeness and difference among races, which we have just been considering, there is the *feeling* of difference among them, there is the *antipathy* with which they are apt to regard one another. The dislike which races thus show, whether it be baseless or well founded, is a grave fact about which we must ask question upon question, until its character becomes less obscure.

And first: How widespread is it in the world? Is it peculiar to Caucasians? Is it found only among the civilized? Is it of recent appearance? The answer to these matters will be of help toward other answers that bear directly upon treaties and war and peace.

PREJUDICE IN CIVILIZED LANDS TO-DAY

Racial antipathy is observed in many lands. The British who have been thought by some to be least subject to this feeling are not free from it. In England, Gypsies have been persecuted, even executed, because they were Gypsies; in Australia the Japanese and Chinese are not welcome, even as Japanese are unwelcome in Canada; in British Africa there is feeling against immigrants from India. And going beyond the British, the different racial stocks in eastern Europe have felt strongly against one another—the Magyar, Slavic, and Germanic peoples, for example. In the Near East there is persistent antagonism between Turks and Armenians, and between Turks and Greeks. In the Philip-

pines there is a growing irritation and opposition between Americans and Filipinos; even as there was irritation and opposition between the Filipinos and the Spaniards who ruled and abused them, and as the Filipinos have felt antipathy toward the Chinese and Japanese who live in the Philippines.

The Chinese, with their Boxer uprising against Europeans, feel to-day, especially in the great cities of eastern China, a dislike of the Caucasian.

The Japanese have for long felt antipathy toward Koreans, a display of which occurred in the troublous times which followed the earthquake of 1923, when there was a panic of fear and hatred of Koreans, and many of them were killed by Japanese. Furthermore, Japan has a strange population of outcasts, numbering several million, known as the Eta, who are ill-treated. In 1922, for example, there were riots against the Eta in the Prefecture of Nara, like the riots which occur at times against Negroes in the United States. Some believe that this caste consisted originally of Koreans and Chinese who have been joined by outcasts from the Japanese themselves. Nothing in their appearance reveals them assuredly even to the Japanese, so my informants among the Japanese have told me; and if they are educated, nothing even in their speech reveals that they are Eta. In California there are said to be many of them, whom the Japanese themselves recognize only by the testimony of those who already know them to be Eta.

In the Hawaiian Islands, where there is contact of diverse races—of Caucasians with the native race of the Islands, and with Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, and Filipinos—it has seemed to some that racial prejudice does not exist. And indeed a remarkable softening of its effects has been attained. Yet it would be idle to deny its presence; an anxiety, a tension, cannot but be noticed, with here and there

some actual occurrence which reveals the forces which are so nearly overcome.

Coming to the mainland of the United States, the Negroes, numbering over ten millions, awaken antagonism. The South does not know how to live with or without the Negro. I still remember my surprise in New Orleans when in an electric car I was not permitted by the conductor to sit, I being so ignorant, in an empty part of the car which I found later was reserved for blacks. The creed of the whites with reference to the Negroes, as stated by a southern white is, in part, this: that there can be no racial equality; no political equality; no interference with the prestige of the whites; the status of peasantry is all that the Negro may hope for if the races are to live together in peace; the lowest white counts for more than the highest Negro. And all such expressions, it is held, indicate the leadings of Providence. Nor is such feeling confined to the South; for when the Negro comes in numbers into the North, trouble comes with him; Chicago and other cities have had riots against the Negroes. Only in New York City, so Du Bois has said, does the Negro in any large way find nearly decent housing. In California there has been a notorious antipathy toward the Japanese and also toward the Chinese, the Hindus, and in some places toward the Armenians.

And in many places there is feeling against the Jews; merchants, hotels, social clubs, even colleges and universities, have their anxious moments because of the Jews. Russia has been a seat of their persecution. The *Merchant of Venice* shows that the feeling was understood in the England of Elizabeth's time. The old sad hatred of this people may be traced back through the isolation and expulsion and murders of the Middles Ages to a period long before Christianity. The Jew himself also has been an ancient racial despiser; his feeling against the alien was

expressed in his own pre-Christian literature, in some of the Psalms which show a hot hatred of those not Jews.

PREJUDICE IN ANCIENT AND IN PRIMITIVE PEOPLES

Beyond the Jews in the ancient world, the Greek gave us for all time the word "barbarian" as an index of his attitude toward others, a term applied by him not only to the uncivilized, but also to highly cultured peoples like the Persians. The Aryans are the twiceborn, declare the Institutes of Vishnu; all others are barbarous. A Brahmin must do penance who has served a man of "the black race," say the Sacred Laws of Aryas. The ancient Persian, so the Avesta shows us, had to combat a feeling in himself against the Turanian; even as the Koran reveals a difficulty in believing that high worth lay outside the Arab tribes which Islam brought to union. Likewise the ancient Egyptian, as we learn from Herodotus, despised Jew and Greek and all others not of Egypt.

Nor is racial prejudice confined to the great of the earth. It is found among those who, we might think, would be humble. Von Humboldt, visiting certain of the Caribs early in the nineteenth century, heard talk befitting some Pan-German of the old régime: "We alone are a nation," they declared; "the rest of mankind are made to serve us." And the Jesuits coming from France to Canada in the seventeenth century found the redskins there quite ready to deny that any people could be superior to themselves; they laughed at the thought that Paris could excel their own villages. A contempt for those not of their own blood is perhaps characteristic of primitive peoples in many lands.

THE ACTS TO WHICH IT HAS LED

I shall not attempt to state, much less to describe, the variety of action to which this attitude leads. Persecution because of religion or politics is well known; and often mingling with it, but often independent of it, and equally cruel, there has been persecution because of race. Out of this antipathy has come racial segregation within the one community, as in the "pale," the *ghetto;* or there has come caste, as in India chiefly, but to some extent also in Japan and in the United States; or exclusion, as of Chinese and Japanese from the United States; or expulsion, as of the Moors from Spain; or but yesterday, the expulsion of the Greeks from Smyrna; or massacre, as in the pogroms of the Jews in Russia; or warfare in the ancient world between Greeks and Persians, between Romans and Carthaginians; warfare also between Christians and Turks in medieval and modern times; or it has led to slavery in all times and in many lands, including our own. Slaves, though they often have been of the same color and the same religion as their masters, have with greater satisfaction been taken from those of an alien race.

May we not, then, have this as our first point of arrival, that *racial prejudice is widespread, perhaps nearly or quite universal? It is found among peoples ancient and modern; great and small; savage, barbarian, and civilized.* A survey might disclose peoples who have never felt it, who feel only sympathy with all aliens or at least no aversion; but this seems improbable. Instances of the cordial reception of small parties of aliens, and instances of prestige must be considered, where some peoples have looked up to others; but one may doubt that this indicates all absence of aversion; for individuals may not always feel nor always display such aversion, and a race may dislike those whose power

and position must be acknowledged and even envied. Aversion, then, seems general, and brings heartless things in its train, so that men have driven those of the hated race from their homes, have plundered them, killed them, or sold them to labor until they died on the plantation, in the galley, or in the mine.

CHAPTER V

WHAT IS RACIAL PREJUDICE?

SHALL we not look at once to the origin of this antipathy and ask particularly whether it is something innate, something in our very constitution? Does nature cause men to feel what Bryce called "a certain instinctive aversion to aliens"?

For it is often thought that kin are drawn toward kin by nature. And this has had as its counterpart the belief that in man there is an instinct by which he feels antipathy toward those not of his own blood. Some of the reasons for doubting this it might be well to set forth.

EVIDENCE THAT THE ANTIPATHY IS NOT INNATE

The first fragment of evidence which causes one to doubt is that racial antipathy is usually absent from very young children. White children, if undirected, play freely with Negro children, or with those of other distant races. "Our little girl, four years old," writes a student of mine who has lived some years in the Philippines, "preferred the company of Filipino children to that of whites when we were in Manila. She had been born in the Philippine Islands, had been taken care of by a Filipino nurse, had played with Filipino children, had gone to school with them in kindergarten and had not cultivated race antipathy. In fact she asked her mother once if she might have a new *black* skin."

Certain adults, also, seem to feel themselves free from

antipathy toward those of a distant stock. And however rigid may be the social barriers, there are always illicit intimacies between individual Caucasians and Negroes or Asiatics. And in the group as a whole, the antipathy appears and fails to appear in a far less regular way than is to be expected from a true instinct, from an inherited tendency fairly common in all the species. Thus in Europe and America there fails to arise spontaneously that aversion between the Nordic, Alpine, and Mediterranean races which certain writers of the day would have us cultivate. There is commonly a free fusion of these stocks, and quite without antipathy; so that the Nordic, the "Great Race," to the dismay of some, is in danger of passing away. Instinctive repugnance between these particular races either never existed, or, unlike most instincts, is now of little or no effect and seems almost to have disappeared.

Furthermore, if racial prejudice were a true instinct, were part of the endowment from Nature herself, we should expect to find in human beings a definite degree of blood-difference which could be relied upon to excite racial antipathy. But such is not the case. In certain circumstances mere difference of family excites the deepest antipathy—as in the family feuds within a common stock in the backwaters of our South. At another time clan differences or tribal differences excite antipathy, as in the Scottish Highlands, or in Arabia before and after Mohammed had brought to unity the warring tribes. Von Humboldt found Indians of America who detested all who were not of their family or tribe; these Indians hunted the neighboring tribes as we might hunt game. At other times or places this supposed instinct is not stirred until one crosses the national border; or finally it is awakened only by the extremes of blood difference, as of Caucasian and Mongoloid or Negroid. The antipathy seems then to be awakened by no fixed

amount of natural difference; nor does it vary with the amount of such natural difference. Thus the Japanese feel strongly against the Koreans, who are their near kindred; and the mysterious millions of the outcast Eta in Japan are thought by some to be either of Korean or of Chinese descent. In a like way the feeling in the European stocks toward the higher classes of the Hindus seems little affected by their being of our own race. Other things being equal, our antipathies are no less toward them than toward those peoples of India which are not of our stock. The Semitic Arabs in the time of Mohammed seem to have had as strong feeling against their kindred Semites, the Jews, as against the non-Semitic Christians. So with the Jews themselves racial feeling seems to have run as strong against those Semites who were not Jews as against those wholly without Semitic blood: there was no less bitter feeling toward Canaanites than toward Persians or Romans. All this is behavior not easily to be reconciled with the guidance of instinct, of a native "sense" of blood contrast. The assumed instinct is so variable, so errant in announcing who are kin and who are not, that the only safe course for us is a continued doubt, if not a denial, that we human beings have any instinct which warns us of racial difference.

And this doubt is hardly removed by what we know of animals. The human "races" that dislike one another, it must be remembered, are all of one and the same human species. The analogy of animals, were there racial prejudice with them, would not be the dislike felt by dogs toward cats or by mice toward cats, but by dogs toward another strain of their own species, or by one strain of cats toward other strains of cats. Now dogs show hostility toward stranger-dogs generally, rather than hostility merely toward dogs of a strongly contrasted strain. And so it seems to be with cattle, whose dislikes are based on un-

familiarity, and on the nonmembership in the herd, and on insubordination, rather than upon difference of breed. The antipathies of ants and of bees seem to have a like basis, of rejecting with stinging animosity all strangers indiscriminately, all who bear another nest odor regardless of kinship or racial difference. Indeed the "prejudice" even in animals seems much affected by early experience; passenger pigeons reared among ringdoves will later mate with those of their foster-kind, in preference to those of their own breed present in equal number. It is as with human beings: in scores of instances, white children early taken captive and reared among American Indians were later unwilling to be "freed" by the whites, but preferred their foster-people to their own flesh and blood.

Nor can we find refuge in the thought that there is in man and animals an instinct to fear or hate the strange. At least if such an instinct exists in animals it is not universal. Darwin in the South Pacific found birds that showed no fear of man or gun, which to these birds were wholly strange. And Amundsen on the unvisited ice barrier of the Antarctic found penguins ready to approach men as though moved by curiosity rather than by fear; and seals so unalarmed at dogs or men that they could easily be approached and killed.

We shall do well, then, not to acknowledge a special instinct which drives toward racial antipathy. Indeed we should have as good ground for assuming a special instinct for each of several main group antipathies: besides an instinct of racial antipathy, we should on equal grounds recognize an instinct of religious antagonism, another instinct of economic antagonism, and still another instinct directed against all rival nations. *There is no sufficient reason to believe that nature has endowed us with a repugnance specifically aimed against those who are not of*

our blood. The facts can be explained without so expensive an hypothesis.

OTHER SUGGESTED EXPLANATIONS

Having found reason, I believe, for thinking that there is no *innate* antipathy toward those who are of another blood, shall we not ask: What then is the source of this feeling? The antipathy itself is real and forcible enough, even when we deny that it comes direct from nature. To arrive at its origin we must look to several things which are said to call it out and quiet it. From consideration of them we can gradually close in upon its true character and source.

What must be said of the effect of acquaintance upon racial aversion? Carelessly it is said that the aversion is due to unacquaintance and dies with familiarity, remembering that the Negro body servants in our southern states are often held in great affection, to which the servants themselves respond. But this is to be distinguished from the effect of familiarity upon the relations of racial groups as a whole. The southern white, long knowing the Negro and loving certain individual Negroes, does not lose his antipathy toward the Negro as a race. The German, the Russian, long knowing the Jew, has not thereby lost nor even abated his dislike of the Jew. It is where the acquaintance is long and full, that the antipathy often is intensified and expresses itself in violence. In California, as contact and acquaintance multiply, there is no welling up of sympathy with the Orientals. The Japanese who know the Eta best, treat them worst. And so it is between Japanese and Koreans, Japanese and Chinese, Greeks and Turks, Turks and Armenians. To think that these antipathies are due wholly to strangeness and that they will disappear by mere ac-

quaintance, even acquaintance long continued, is to build upon sand.

Nor is racial prejudice a matter merely of economics, of profit and loss. Such things are of importance, as we shall see. Economic interest, if great and if the alien brings clear gain and only gain, may—as in Hawaii—prevent racial prejudice from displaying itself in violence. But the ebb and flow of emotion is not to be understood as due to monetary gain alone.

For in Africa economics alone would tend to make the Hindu welcome; his labor adds to the white man's wealth; and yet the British in Africa wish only indentured Hindus, so that these can in due time be sent back to India. In California millions of dollars are being spent to invite into the state a larger population; there is a welcome for laborers, artisans, farmers, shopkeepers and professors. Although every one who comes is an economic competitor with those already there, yet no aversion is felt toward such competition; the gain from their coming is chiefly thought of and not the loss. But this holds only for those whom we regard as of our race. With the Caucasians coming among Caucasians the relation is regarded as one of economic coöperation. With Mongolians coming among Caucasians the relation is soon viewed as one of economic rivalry; the difference here is not wholly in the ledger; it is not to be described by the difference in sheer economics. It is rather in the mental attitude behind the profit or loss; there has entered into the account another psychic factor. Whether a given number of persons shall be regarded as economic rivals depends not wholly or chiefly on whether they add to our wealth or subtract from it, but upon our wider feeling toward them. Portuguese in California raising vegetables for the local market stir no angry passions; an equal number of Japanese raising and selling vegetables at the same

price as do the Portuguese arouse resentment. What makes the difference? I believe we shall more easily find the answer if we take a moment to review the rise and decline in California of the feeling toward different groups of Asiatics.

California, where West meets East, has been like a favored laboratory for the study of racial aversion. Instructive are the changes in attitude there toward the Chinese and Japanese.

In the middle of the nineteenth century the Chinese appeared in the gold mines and in the towns of California. Early there was some but no strong feeling against them. But later, when there was need of laborers for building the first transcontinental railway, and great numbers of Chinese came, their increase gradually affected public feeling until in the seventh decade of the last century there was violent outcry against them, with "sand-lot" meetings and angry repetition, not wholly unlike Scipio's declaration against Carthage, that "the Chinese must go!" It was common, I remember, for Chinese to be insulted and stoned; no window of theirs at night was safe without solid board shutters. The movement against the Chinese waxed until their numbers were limited by a legal prohibition of their further coming. And although they never were compelled to "go," yet now there is no general and violent feeling against them, but rather a quiet aloofness with appreciation of their many excellent qualities.

In the meanwhile California experienced a rise of feeling against the Japanese which ran a similar course. The Japanese, when first they came, aroused no strong antipathy. They made a welcome addition to the manual labor and other services so greatly needed in a new land. But as their number increased they came to be viewed as offensive competitors of Caucasian laborers and shopkeepers and

farmers, and the opposition to them became so intense that there was prohibited not only their immigration but their free purchase of land. And still other means have been put into effect to prevent an increase in their number and power. As a result the rise of feeling has been stayed, and there has been a partial subsidence like that of the feeling toward the Chinese.

ITS REAL SOURCES

That the flare and subsidence of racial prejudice is decided by a combination of facts, most important among which are the size of the blood groups confronting each other, their solidarity, the support they are conceived to be able to expect from the rear, and the important interests endangered by their confronting—is a thought which can be strengthened by further evidence. The Chinese and Japanese who go to the Atlantic states of America experience a very different response there from that which they receive from the Americans in California, a difference not due to any special virtue either of the Americans of the Atlantic coast or of the Orientals who go there. Similarly the Negro awakens in England far less antipathy than in the United States; nor can this be explained wholly by the difference in character between Americans and English. The American of the Atlantic states feels no group menace from a few scattered Japanese; the Englishman, from a few scattered Negroes. The American outside of a narrow region has not been vexed by the Hindus who have come to the United States; but in British Africa where in some places—in Natal, for example—they exceed the European population, there has been active opposition to these East Indians. The Americans in Hawaii, having felt no menace from the weak and unaggressive Polynesians there, have intermarried with them and have not lost caste; indeed in

the "first families" of the Caucasians in Hawaii a racial mixture may be found. Feeling thus waxes and wanes with the circumstances which touch and awaken group anxiety.

And we may recall the changed feeling toward the Negro in our South since emancipation. Slavery, while it lasted, defined the relations between white and black so completely that the whites did not feel called upon to fear or hate the blacks. But when the whites were confronted with the Negroes freed and enfranchised, the whites of the South at once became anxious and resentful, their self-protective passions were aflame, their defenses bristled far beyond what mere race would evoke were no interests in need of jealous guarding. Emancipation disturbed the old adjustment between the races and gave no new stability in its place. It took from the white man his legally instituted defenses and threw him back upon the primitive defenses found in suspicion, in assertion of superiority, in social withdrawal, in exaggerated attention to the defects and vices of his antagonist.

That the aversion of races is deeply affected by the manner in which large groups confront each other, is seen also in the Philippines. The feeling between Americans and Filipinos, so I found when there, is distinctly less cordial than in the earlier days of the American occupation. And this change springs, I venture to think, less from a truer perception of the defects of the Filipino, than from the fact that the Americans at home and in those islands now have different desires from those of the earlier Americans; and these desires cannot easily be harmonized with those of the Filipinos themselves. The Americans, having become interested in the strength of American business and of the American military and political interests in the Islands and on the Asiatic mainland, see these interests threatened by the very aspirations of the Filipinos which the American

policy earlier had encouraged. In consequence social distinctions between Americans and Filipinos are becoming sharpened, the shortcomings of the Filipino are emphasized by Americans, his personal and national aspirations are ridiculed, and there gradually is developing a social solidarity against the Filipino distantly resembling that of the white against the Negro in the South. Racial prejudice increases there, and with time may be expected to attain a disturbing strength.

The manner in which the racial groups confront each other is, then, most important. If there are difficulties of adjustment, with stout claims which either party is urging against the other, emotion boils. Where accommodation has been reached, with a working plan accepted so that there is no need of struggle to protect one's own, and no promise of gain by aggression, then antipathies may not wholly disappear, but they grow quiet and unperilous. In Hawaii there confront one another with no serious inconvenience men of every kindred and tribe and tongue. Those who have emigrated to Hawaii doubtless are natively as pugnacious as are those who have remained in their quarrelsome homelands. But the antipathies in Hawaii are eased by the thought that the alien races are needed by those in power. Over them all, furthermore, is a system of law and government; the more important interests of the several groups are assured by a strong common government of them all, without need of their own private alarms and violence. And although social distinctions are made, yet the Caucasians still confront no strong and dangerous rivals. There is no inner urging to paint the opposite party black and one's own party white, for mere purposes of group protection. The difficulties foreseen in the near future appear to the leading men there not to be beyond their powers of adjustment, provided only, as I was told in

Honolulu, that America has no war with a nation whose immigrants are in a large number in the Islands. As things now stand, we see in Hawaii how inert is racial prejudice when not inflamed by the seeming need of protecting large interests imperiled.

Racial prejudice, then, is roughly proportioned to the social injury which the one racial group believes may be done it by the other. This accounts for the effect which we have seen to come from numbers and from their solidarity and supposed support from still larger numbers in the distance. When many are confronted by few, and these few are weak and unaggressive and without powerful kindred at their back—as in the case of the whites facing the Polynesians in Honolulu—an immense racial gulf causes little or no revulsion in the many. Where the conditions are opposite to all this or where the sheer numbers and their ignorance or their cultural tenacity seem a threat to institutions and other forms of the treasured civilization, there the prejudice flames forth.

And this will help us to see the true importance to be attached to the physical and cultural contrasts such as are found in skin color, hair, odor, language, and custom, and which are often thought to call forth antipathy direct. *These physical and cultural contrasts arouse the strong antipathy which here interests us, not direct but only in so far as they are understood to be signs and badges of an opposing group.* Where bodily contrasts are not such signs, they affect us in a wholly different way—the contrasts, for example, between tall and short, or slim and stout persons of our own community, or between the usual person and one who is disfigured by smallpox, or is bald, one-eyed, or birth-marked. The physical difference may affect us, it is true, but with a sentiment and thought and impulse quite different from what is awakened by far smaller differences

which betoken an alien group. And the same is true of cultural contrasts. Within our own community are found great differences of posture and speech and costume, in rustic and metropolitan, sailor and cowboy, plumber and professor, which excite humor rather than hostility.

ITS FELLOWS

The antipathy felt by those within a blood group toward those without is not unique. It is an emotional reaction felt by all groups that are strong rivals, whatever be the basis of the group's formation, whether it be blood or something other than blood. Merchant guilds were not formed by consanguinity, nor were villages or cities, and yet their members were bound together and often had interests that were endangered by rival organizations which were hated even to the point of attack by force. And other groups, united and separated by different bonds from those of race, have had their violent antipathies—groups such as the employers and the employed, or the North and the South in the United States, during the trouble over slavery and secession. Nor can one forget those animosities within one religion, with persecution to the death—sect against sect not only in Christianity but in Islam and even in so pacific a religion as Buddhism. And to-day a fierce antipathy is felt by nations against rival nations that are of their own race.

Indeed any desire, any purpose, any interest which brings men together and is strong enough to be at the very core of their will and their affection does to some extent withdraw them from those who are thought to oppose, are thought to endanger this desire and interest. The antipathy toward those outside the blood bond, then, is kindred to the antipathies felt in other intense group rivalries—economic,

political, and religious. These, too, foster group solidarity and defensive misjudgment, injustice, and animosity.

In fact, what we call racial prejudice is really a protective response, a defensive aversion stirred usually by a sense of danger to several interests at once.

Thus the antipathy to the Japanese which is felt particularly on the Pacific coast of America is not aroused wholly by the Mongoloid blood of the Japanese. To the blood difference is added the important fact that their numbers and their industry make them a powerful economic rival at the white man's door. And beyond these racial and economic stimulants to aversion there is a certain religious estrangement of which neither side may be fully conscious: the symbols and pattern of their ideals are different from ours; their loyalty to Shinto, to the Mikado, to Buddhism, leaves us cold and perplexed. Finally and most full of force, the Japanese who come to the Caucasian shore are not thought of merely by themselves and for what they can do of themselves, but as one with the Japanese in Japan, as part of a nation, with a nation's aspirations and power of action, and known to us to be aiming, like any nation of our own race, to defend and perhaps enlarge its own life. There is thus the distrust and antipathy which would be felt toward any powerful rival, even were it Christian and Caucasian, whose prime activity is in the very region which is becoming more and more a chief theater of national competition.

So it is apparent that what is called racial prejudice may arise from at least four forms of rivalry—racial, economic, religious, and political—and gives a blended effect in which it is quite impossible to say how much is due to each of these four sources. Our intelligence, then, is assisted if what is often ascribed to race alone is seen to be a union of group antipathies of varied origin, of which but one

is really racial. And the effect of the racial factor itself, after making due allowance for the aversions stirred by economic, religious, and political interests, is probably slight.

Indeed if all danger and all echo of *danger to cultural interests* of any kind were subtracted, it is highly probable that a negligible antipathy would remain; a negligible ill will would be called out by race pure and simple. When an organization can expect no loss to come to it from those without, it ceases its defense reactions toward those without. A family in our civilized world, however strong may be its inner affection, does not for that reason feel animosity toward other families. It does not need to feel this; others are not at feud with it as in parts of the earlier South of the United States, and in Italy of other days, and in Arabia to-day. The Scottish clans, for all their display of tartan and rallying pipes and the burr of good old names on St. Andrew's Day, love their own without hating others; the need of protection has gone, and with it the need of protective emotion. And so it is with the Nordic, Alpine, and Mediterranean races in the various lands where they do not seem in anywise to endanger one another—as in France or in Germany or in England where in the one country all these races mingle without harm and hatred.

We may from this let our minds go to the extreme. If white and Negro, or white and Mongolian, or white and American Indian can ever construct a world order where any one race shall actually bring no danger to the others, then the whites may still prefer whites for their more intimate companions; and Mongolians, Mongolians; but the current animosity will have passed away with the passing away of its need as a weapon of defense.

For racial prejudice is a passing outcome of a need of defense, an attitude of emotional guardedness of race toward

race, because races are still dangerous to one another. It is a group reaction to losses threatened or experienced; a response not inborn, but continued by tradition and by the fresh impressions from harm received.

CHAPTER VI

THE VALUE OF DISLIKING PEOPLE OF ALIEN BLOOD

RACIAL distrust, it is perhaps clear from all this, has not been an unmixed evil; it has rendered a rough service to mankind.

But its worth has been but partly in the direction commonly pictured. Biologists are apt to think that the chief and perhaps only use of this prejudice has been that it tended toward racial blood-purity. The actual impurities reveal how imperfect has been its work in this respect. Nor is it clear that intermixture has been biologically harmful in the main; that it has resulted chiefly in loss. But although intermixture has probably helped the coming of better strains; yet when once the better strain has appeared, an aversion to mixing it protects this superior blood from being lowered by dilution.

CULTURAL BENEFITS

Even more important, however, has been the service of racial dislike in protecting not blood, but *culture*. The interfusion of cultures has been frequent, like the mixing of blood; and, like the mixing of blood, it has not always brought loss. But there has also been a useful antipathy against alien customs, against alien civilization generally. To protect the cultural heritage—including the communal life and the institutions of the family and of the wider government—it is well that there have arisen emotions of self-appreciation and of contempt of others. Thus it would

have been a world disaster had Jew and Greek intermingled before their full flowering time. Even should we assume that the biological fusion would have been quite acceptable, nevertheless the cultural development of each would have been checked. For attainment of a high culture, a people needs some psychic self-absorption, some insulation. The Greeks, the Jews, the Egyptians, were protected by the contempt in which, quite irrationally, they held their gifted neighbors. If we value the higher levels of culture, then we must not spurn the base degrees by which it did ascend.

There may well be a continued aversion to a surrender of certain of our cultural ideals to those of the Orient, and of certain of their ideals to ours. And we may not forget how greatly a nation's difficulties, already nearly disheartening, are multiplied by the presence of a large population permanently marked off from the prevailing race of the land. This is evident from the Negroes and to some extent also the Chinese and Japanese in the United States; from the racial "minorities" in eastern and southern Europe, and from the troubles which accompany an alien body of Caucasians in China.

Although separation brings its own injustice and danger and is withal unideal, yet international relations will be eased if there be boundaries, and if the more contrasted races avoid so far as possible a permanent and extensive commingling in the same territory. France cannot afford to bring Africans in great numbers and for long into France. But the knife has two edges; Caucasians should not go to remain in large numbers in Asia; America would do well to question sharply her motives—economic, military, and political—and the outcome to herself, before entrenching her interests permanently in the Philippines.

DISADVANTAGES

We may well respect racial prejudice to this extent, and yet be on our guard against its evils. For antipathy of this and of kindred sorts *has often brought grave political disadvantage, in that it has been summoned to resist a wider governmental union and the more effective means of defense which are to be had by a wider union.* At nearly every forward step blood prejudice, or its brother, local prejudice, has worked breathlessly to block the way. It would have kept families apart everywhere, as it has kept them apart in many places, because the rival families, with all their real blood ties, were not of precisely one parentage. It would everywhere have kept tribes apart and kept all still larger groups apart. If blood prejudice had always had the last word, England and Scotland and Wales would never have become Great Britain; Ireland would not be within the Commonwealth; the American South with its feelings of superior blood would now be outside the Union. At the present moment blood prejudice increases the difficulties of decent coöperation of America with Japan, with China, with Mexico, and the rest of Latin America. Where there is clear racial difference, prejudice is on its feet with finger pointing at it; and when racial difference does not exist or is doubtful, up jumps prejudice to give it illusory proportions.

And we must be alert against a dangerous illusion it creates, that a war between Occident and Orient, because of difference of race, is inevitable. Such a conflict can be avoided by patient study and an unbroken will to avoid it.

In fact, we can easily overstate the importance of race antipathy in causing the international conflicts of to-day. For we do not find the great nations quarreling most with those who are racially farthest from themselves, and quar-

reling least with the nations closest of kin. The United States has never fought China and Japan, for all the supposed feeling against these Mongolian peoples; but it has quarreled twice with the England of its own flesh and blood, and twice with other nations of its own Caucasian stock. And other nations close of kin have been historic enemies—England and France, and France and Germany. With neighbors of her own nearer race England has had more trouble than with those less close of blood, such as Turkey and Russia; has had more trouble with these than with racially still more remote Japan. The China of our time has had as bitter war with her own kinsmen, the Japanese, as with any European. And when Japan fought Russia, the trouble was not primarily because Russian and Japanese were of different races, but because Russia by a definite policy menaced Japan's security and expansion. Nations have never been nice in choosing their adversaries; they had as lief fight kinsfolk as any other. In general, a nation is loved least by those geographically nearest; and these, naturally enough, are by rule not farthest away in blood. A nation's foes, then, are they of its own racial household.

DRAWING ITS STING

The problems of international society will be simplified when we cease to attribute to racial prejudice all manner of group antipathies not due to race. When allowance is made for economic and political rivalries, what remains, as we have seen, is relatively weak and is not innate. To escape its danger we do not have to change our nature. But it is of the first importance that we seek by every means to separate racial antipathy from its economic and political stimulants. And how can this be done?

The way, in any detail, can be suggested only later. But

in general it will be by taking step after step to diminish the danger of economic and political aggression. *If we can quiet the dread of economic and political defeat, we make these fears no longer available as allies to racial hatred; this antipathy then will be reduced to its own intrinsic weakness.* Imagine the United States and Japan each confident that, whatever might be the *feeling* of the other, each was safe from attack by the other; each was safe from economic and military and political aggression from the other; each was confident that its relations with the other were defined by law supported by the judgment and the power of the world community, then we might not be wholly free from racial prejudice, but the prejudice would have lost its sting. At present it is unsleeping because they and we feel the need of keeping it awake; because there are interests whose guarding must be left to this crude emotional device. But once there were no probability that race-feeling could express itself through political and economic enginery unchecked by law, then the nations would not lie awake at night because of it.

Diverse races indeed have shown that they can coöperate effectively when coöperation seems to them important. They can work together freely when they perceive a common emergency. The Germans, French, British, Americans, and Japanese marched shoulder to shoulder upon Peking; the Chinese and Japanese joined with Caucasians in the World War. Given the incentive, given the recognized interests to be served by joint action, then racial feeling makes no effective resistance. At the Washington conference for naval limitation the obstacle to a fuller success lay less in the feeling between East and West than between parts of the West, in the distrust felt by England, France, and Italy toward one another and toward Caucasians beyond their group. And at the Geneva conferences for limitation of

armament, the chief division has been not between race and race, but between nations of the same race. *The main problem to be solved in the world at large, then, is not that of racial antipathy, but of national antipathy.* If nations of the same race can be brought to just conduct toward one another, there seems to be nothing inherently dismaying in the difficulties caused by feeling between nations of different race.

CHAPTER VII

RACE, NATION, AND NATIONALITY

THE NATION-BEGETTING RACES

WE have just seen what powerful national influences come from race. And we must now add to what has been seen. For coming closer to the nation, is it not true that to belong to certain races almost predestines a people to nationhood; while membership in other races decides, almost as though a Fate had snipped the thread, that the people shall never be a nation? The aboriginal Australians, the Polynesians, the oceanic and the continental blacks have produced no nations. The American Indians have produced a few. It is from the Mongolians and the Caucasians, and from them alone, that we have nearly all the many nations of the ancient and the modern world.

And each of these two nation-begetting races shows its potency by shaping its nations peculiarly. With the stock, although not necessarily because of the stock, there go subtle influences which give a special tone to each race's own great political bodies, making those of the Caucasians like and yet unlike those of the Mongolians. The racial culture, whatever may be its origin, the culture common to so many of the nations of a race, helps to mark them off from the nations of another race. The northern Caucasians, for example, have in general a somewhat more intense or less restrained feeling of the importance of the individual, a feeling which has given its own color to the nations of that blood.

But not all the stocks even of the Caucasian or the Mongolian race arrive at nationhood. Some of them remain mere tribes or at most "nationalities" and never form an independent State. In Formosa, the Philippines, the East Indies, in Indo-China and many other parts of continental Asia are Mongolians in this condition; as there are Caucasians in a like condition in India, perhaps in eastern Asia, in western Asia, eastern Europe, and northern Africa. Membership even in the races politically most favored gives no assurance that a people will attain this special degree of political success.

No race, then, gives national organization to all its people. The racial bond, after all, is relatively weak. Every Caucasian nation feels itself alien to many of its own race who are politically as competent as itself; and it has no desire to cast in its lot on equal terms with these kinsmen. The Greeks politically withdrew not only from Persians but also from many of their fellow-Greeks. The people of the United States do not yearn for political union with Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, or Germany. These others are not invited to form with the United States a single nation of all the whites. Nor does any one of these other nations, even the most ambitious, imagine cordially a single national union with more than some fragment of the whites. There is not even the more restricted desire to organize into one nation all of the Nordic race, or all of the Alpine or the Mediterranean. Nor is there any reason to believe that a single State is desired in Asia, to include on equal terms the Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Siamese and Burmese. Nations are exclusive social bodies, a bit like clubs. Far more is needed than racial kinship before men are ready to risk their political fortunes with one another.

But while membership in the same race is not enough to

bring two peoples into one nation, membership in different races is usually enough to keep them out. For a nation characteristically draws its mass of people from a single race, and does not cordially include others. Minor contrasts of blood may be overlooked, as between Scots and English, Fleming and Walloon, French-Canadian and English-Canadian, where all are still Caucasian. The racial bond is often not only too weak to bring peoples together, but it is too weak to hold them when they have long lived and worked together. The American colonists first flee the motherland, and then reject the government of the mother nation. Norwegians and Swedes, kindred and in political union, prefer to separate. In practice, moreover, this feeling for kin is too weak to keep stragglers from departing to those who are not of their blood. Into America, for example, have come men from the four quarters of the earth. The English are far from being of pure blood. In France, in Germany, everywhere in Europe, although in varying degree, one finds mixture. And probably it is so throughout the world. No Caucasian nation shudders at the difference within itself between Nordic and other Caucasian stocks, indeed no nation belongs wholly to any one of them. But a Caucasian people finds difficulty in establishing a common nationhood with Mongolians or Negroes; as they with us. The United States has not yet succeeded in such an attempt, nor have the countries of eastern Europe, where Caucasians and Mongolians are on the same soil.

Identity of race, then, does not bring political union, but it smooths the way for union; it lessens the obstacles. Difference of race adds an obstacle, and makes a common nationhood more difficult. And yet two nations, each differing from the other in race—as we have just seen—*find no fatal hindrance to coöperation.* Coöperation is never easy; nations of like race, we know, find difficulties enough. But

Japan and England, China and the United States, and others on opposite sides racially, have found it possible to work together in matters of clear mutual advantage. And no nations, whatever their race, work together in any other way.

NATION: THE TERM DEFINED

In the universities of Europe in the Middle Ages it was not unusual for the students, coming as they did from many distant lands, to organize themselves at each seat of learning into what were called "nations." And the "minorities" in the many countries of Europe to-day are sometimes called "nations." But the stronger connection of the word, as when we speak of the law of nations or the League of Nations, is now with States, to mean *a great body of men politically organized, politically functioning, possessed of independent government*. And this use we may well follow, although not blindly. The political form alone should not suffice, but there should also be a certain spirit to animate this form. For clearly the national spirit may lag behind the national organization or may outdistance it; but the two must be within call of each other to make a nation indeed. Let a nation then for us be a sufficiently large body of persons sufficiently united by sympathy and interest to cooperate in the many ways required for a common government, and who are actually organized as an independent State. The people of France, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Japan, Great Britain, the United States, and many more, are nations.

But we could hardly recognize as a nation those who, although under one government, are hopelessly at loggerheads with one another, being held together more by force than by choice, as were Austria and Hungary and some seven different peoples who were neither Austrians nor Hun-

garians, in the Dual Empire before the treaties of 1919 and 1920; or those who, while not at loggerheads, have no deep sense of unity, such as the Filipinos and the Americans, or the people of India and of England.

Nor should we unhesitatingly regard as a nation the people of some microscopic sovereignty, like Andorra, or the Free City of Danzig. These in a sense are States, as ancient Athens was a State, but whatever their inner unity and substantial independence, yet their diminutive size hardly permits them to be full members of the society of nations. Luxemburg would doubtfully give us a nation; while Switzerland, Belgium, Portugal, Denmark, and Holland would clearly come within the sphere of nationhood.

WHAT IS A NATIONALITY?

With these as *nations,* possessed of nationhood, what are *nationalities,* which so often to-day are like fat in the fire of the international world? Usage here also differs; but let us understand by nationality, not an abstraction, but something concrete, *a considerable body of people with ties of blood and the sympathy and sense of spiritual union which go with a common culture, but who have not necessarily attained political independence and statehood.* The Catalans, the Basques, the French-Canadians, the Walloons, the Flemings, the Welsh, the Scots, the Jews, and many more, as well as the English, Germans, Italians, Hungarians and all the rest who are grouped by blood and culture and not by political boundaries merely—these would be nationalities.

There may or may not be in a nationality an effort to become a nation. With the Irish, the Catalans, and others, there has been this striving; as also with the modern Greeks, and the Dutch under Spanish rule, and the Basques of the nineteenth and earlier centuries. But the Bretons, the

German Swiss, the French Swiss, the Italian Swiss, the Welsh, the American Negroes, and many others seem to-day to have no intense and general longing for separate nationhood. Or only a part may be looking to some reattainment, as with the Jews of Zionist Palestine. Or a people may once have had it and have become content to forego it, as with the Scots now long reconciled to political union with the once-hated Sassenach. The degree of contrast in culture, the tolerance and sense of justice of the nation within which the nationality lives, the temperament of the nationality itself, its readiness to gain practical wisdom from its own experience and others', the presence or absence of able leaders bent upon independence—these and more are among the forces which decide whether a nationality will be restless for an independent political life or will be indifferent toward nationhood while still perhaps cherishing the social ties of nationality.

But no nationality *succeeds in bringing under one flag all its own people and none but its own.* The political boundary of Denmark does not include all the Danes, many of whom are in territory held by Germany. Germany before the World War included nearly four million who were not of German nationality—included French, Danes, and Poles in large numbers. Germany after the War saw assigned to other nations about four million who counted themselves Germans. The German nationality, by spreading into Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, France, and even into Italy, creates its own international problem. Likewise the waters of Europe and the Near East have been troubled by other "minorities" in various countries: of Ukrainians and Jews as well as Germans, in Poland; of Jews in Hungary; of Poles in Lithuania; of Hungarians in Rumania; of Albanians and Bulgarians in Greece; of Greeks in Constantinople; of Turks in western Thrace.

But though eastern and southeastern Europe is the very seat where governments fret by day and cry out in their dreams by night over problems of nationality, such things are found the world over. They seem inseparable from nations and nationhood—in the United States with its many millions of Negroes and its far smaller number of Chinese, Japanese, and Red Indians; in the Union of South Africa with its Boers, Asiatics, and native Africans; in Mexico with its English, Germans, Americans, and aboriginal redskins; in China, with its Japanese, British, French, Americans, and many more. In no place are the borders of nationality and of nation identical. No nation includes all who are of its prevailing nationality, nor excludes all who are of other nationalities. In the nations whose unity is strongest, some one nationality is predominant. But if the nations severally have as their chief concern the political union of all those of one nationality and of none but these, then the nations at best but roughly approximate their proper membership, and at worst do not approximate it at all. In Rumania over a quarter of the population is not Rumanian. In Czechoslovakia the eight million Czechs and Slovaks are in political union with five million who are neither Czechs nor Slovaks. In Poland the fifteen million Poles are yoked with an almost equal number of those who are not Poles.

As with race, so with nationality, the blood kinship does not of itself give a sense of unity; this has to come of common aims and a common culture, and differs greatly in strength in different peoples. Certainly the Filipinos, even those who are of the Malayan stock, have not in earlier days and from blood alone been drawn to unity. All those of the same stock in Luzon have not sympathized with one another; and less have those of Luzon and Mindanao. But under the influence of the Spaniards and Americans and

now of their own leaders some sense of unity is beginning to permeate considerable regions of the archipelago. The Chinese have felt their common nationality less intensely than the Japanese; have felt more the restricted tie of family and village and district; as the Japanese have until recent times felt strongly the bonds of clan and the feudal lord. These narrower ties have been part of a schooling for nationality and nationhood, although they have also put obstacles in the way.

We often think of the nation as bringing a stronger bond among its people than does nationality. But the very opposite may be true. For a nationality includes none who are really alien, while a nation includes many. Besides the common culture and blood and something like a family union, the members of a nationality may be still further united by laboring together, often against deadly odds, for a common political cause and with a common aspiration. The compromises and disappointments which actual government entails have not yet come upon them, and they are still free to observe only their own bright virtues against the dark background of the power which blocks their hope. Their leaders seem but to illustrate more fully the substance which is in every humblest member of the brotherhood. This grateful passion for one another is sure to be moderated in the light of the political common day. But later when nationhood has been attained, those early enthusiasts are long beheld by their nation in something of the warm glow in which they saw one another; so that there is the belief partly true and partly mythical that the early patriots were of purer flame than is seen in the later generations.

But as was said, the nation being a working organization never can draw the lines of separation which a nationality can; the economic, geographic, and ethnic facts are too stubborn and intermixed for that. A nationality cannot in

practice disentangle all of its own people and bring them over into a nation pure and unmixed. For this and other reasons *the tragic air does not befit every nationality that is not a nation or is not joined to the nation of its choice.* Where the conditions make the preferred rearrangement impossible, the important thing is that the minority be treated with the utmost consideration that is in harmony with the wise interests of the nation with which its lot is cast. The frequent instances where a minority lives happily with those of a different blood and culture might be a light both to troubling nationalities and to troubled nations. Governments especially might study whether greater strength would not be gained by refusing to accept territory whose inhabitants are chiefly of a contrasting nationality. Denmark after the World War could have had a part of Schleswig beyond what she actually received, but she refused to extend her border into a region where the Germans outnumbered the Danes.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FORCES WHICH MAKE THE NATION

IT was not long ago a fashion among some, influenced no doubt by Le Bon, to regard the nation as a crowd and to find all national conduct perfectly understood in the light of "crowd psychology." A later style was to count the nation a herd, owing its origin to a herd instinct, an instinct of gregariousness. Trotter's book dwells upon the pervasive and dominating effect of gregariousness in human life. With a proper query whether such simple accounts really explain, let us now look rapidly but with care at some of the forces which create the nation. We shall tread on ground already trodden by Mancini, Renan, and many a foot of a later day.

IMPORTANT BUT INSUFFICIENT FACTORS

First and obviously there is *geography*. There must be land upon which the nation may dwell, land many of whose parts touch one another, and which have natural resources. This is so important a factor that it alone has been thought almost to suffice, as though geography itself made nations.

But important as are territorial conditions, a nation is never called into life merely by geographic unity nor prevented from living merely by its lack. The Philippine Islands have much of the geographic singleness which marks the archipelago of Japan, but have never had, in strength and quality, the impulse toward nationhood shown by the

Japanese. And again, Luzon itself is a single island like Great Britain or the main island of Japan, and with the natural resources for a great population; but its inhabitants have never by their island's singleness been forced to form a single State. Switzerland on the other hand is geographically dismembered by the Alps; its terrain is as though contrived expressly to prevent union; yet Switzerland politically is one. Norway and Sweden, upon a single great peninsula not wholly unlike Italy, have thought it well to be politically two. And for all their land connections, so it is also with Holland and Belgium. The Greek peninsula, even in its diversification, was as though built for a unified people; and while ancient Greeks were bound together by many ties, yet their circumscribed seat never brought them to a common nationhood.

And the same must be said of *economic* conditions, which unquestionably have a weighty voice in saying where a nation shall begin and end. But they do not say the last word. For peoples that are economically dependent upon one another stand apart politically; and those that in economics are fairly independent unite. The causes of nationhood evidently include the increased subsistence and other wealth which comes of political union; but they include much more, include forces which may agree with and fortify, or may resist and nullify, the advantages of wealth. Canada and the United States are economically drawn together, and yet stay politically apart. Notoriously the Balkan nations are politically divided in fair disregard of economic boundaries.

Indeed the Balkans are but an extreme of what occurs throughout the world. Not only is Austria politically cut off from lands and peoples that would assist her material prosperity and whom she would assist, but Holland and Germany, and Germany and Switzerland have strong eco-

nomic interests in common. Indeed does any country to-day extend to the line where her economic interests end? Does France? Does Denmark? Does the United States? Canada and Mexico, Europe and the Orient are part of the very life of America's trade, yet this does not make the United States join in nationhood with them. Nor, on the other hand, does the economic gulf between New Zealand and Wales or between Scotland and Australia snap the political tie between these countries only to reunite it at some other point where trade happens at the moment to be more brisk.

Is it a common *language?* This is of help, but it is not necessary. Nations hold together in spite of diversity of speech; the Scots do not all speak the same language; nor do the Belgians. Switzerland has a population separately using French, German, Italian, and Romansch. China also, in so far as she is a nation, is not knit together because her people can understand one another's spoken words. And while a contrast of language does not prevent peoples uniting in one nation, neither does a common language give assurance that peoples will not be apart politically. Thus a common language has not overcome the political divergence between Prussia and Austria, between Portugal and Brazil, or between Spain and Argentina and all the other Hispanic countries.

Geography and monetary gain and speech are important, and also some *community of blood* is important. Great portions of a nation's people do not usually belong to races that are on opposite sides of the principal dividing lines of mankind—that belong to races as far apart, that is, as the Caucasian, Mongolian, and Negro. Were America to annex the Philippines, these Islands and the United States might come under one government, but they would with extreme difficulty become one nation. Within her own con-

tinental border the United States is attempting with no clear prospect of success a union of Caucasian and black. But while these greater contrasts offer nearly insuperable barriers to national unity, yet the lesser contrasts—as of Nordic, Alpine, and Mediterranean—are easily spanned. All of these three races are combined in France, and again in Germany, and in other countries of Europe and America. But we may not despise even the lesser differences of blood, unless there is present no other difference whatever; for nationality, which makes such a stir in the political world to-day, is connected with kinship, although other factors also enter in. The importance of close biological affinity, then, is not always the same; it varies at different times and according to current political ideas and the number of the contrasting race to be incorporated. Thus the Chinese were welcomed to America and were later stoned in California's streets. And the Jews have sometimes been invited into a country such as Poland, and again they have been expelled or massacred.

INNATE PSYCHIC REQUISITES

Besides the facts just named, there must also be present the *innate psychic requisites* for nationhood; and since some races produce no nations, and some produce few, and others produce many, these psychic requisites either are not universally present or are at times dormant or are so counterweighted that they come to nothing. The facts in any case are against both the mob theory and the herd theory of nationhood. For the innate qualities which make the mob are present in all races. And if any race has a herd instinct, all races have it; and there certainly is no good reason to say that Caucasians and Mongolians, who make true nations, possess this instinct, and others do not. A human

instinct is something possessed in common by all human beings.

But for nationhood more is necessary than some one instinct, or than all the instincts combined. There must, it is true, be the native trend, the innate tendency to companionship, a hunger for human association of some kind. And there must also be a native tendency to withdraw violently from certain forms of menace, and to withstand violently certain other forms of menace. All these reactions are probably instinctive.

But in addition to the instincts, we must regard the emotions also as important—the emotions, some of which are connected with the instincts so intimately that they have sometimes been thought to be necessary accompaniments of the instincts. But such emotions as friendly affection, fear, and anger do not, in fact, merely accompany our muscular reactions; they drive and invigorate and diversify these reactions. And they probably play their full part in creating nations. And the same is true of excitement, joy, and sorrow. It is not true, then, as a recent writer holds, that social life originates wholly in fear; indeed fear does not here have even a preëminent place. Both fear and anger, as I have elsewhere tried to show, are always handmaids to other impulses, and the creative leadership which brings men to any great social achievement always comes from other emotions and particularly from the passionate attachment to certain other persons and things, as well as from love of oneself. A human being has first to *care* for some one or something, has to take satisfaction in its presence or possession. This attachment must first be there. And then this valued thing must be menaced if one is to have fear or is to become enraged. The positive likings are the original and basic facts; while fear and anger are henchmen who rush in to their support. It is

idle to attribute the main creative work to these low-browed ruffians.

Moreover, if a nation is to be formed, men in large numbers must not only have this native endowment of instincts and emotions, but they must be endowed for the novel and noninstinctive impulses which settle into habits. Habits themselves are not instincts, even as emotions are not.

Nor can we overlook the need of intelligence for national life; and intelligence is not an instinct, though Graham Wallas would persuade us that it is. Intelligence is required in the individual not only to maintain himself and his family, but to perceive and recognize, in peace and war, men far beyond the family and the tribe, and to understand and use the institutions of their culture.

And so elemental that one hardly needs to name it, and yet so indispensable for national life that it must be named, is the unique human endowment which makes language. Elaborate and distant communication is of the essence of nationhood, which requires not only speech but recorded speech. Families and clans can, but nations cannot, live by oral communication merely and without records. The fabric of a State requires the intelligence and other traits which go with speech and its writing. Herds and mobs have no such need.

Accordingly there is necessary a remarkable constellation of native aptitudes. Morons, imbeciles, and idiots, the congenitally blind-and-deaf, the utterly apathetic, the constitutional psychopathic, the individuals who may be emotionally lively but are indifferent or unfavorable to almost all other human beings, the utterly impulsive and erratic—these, we know, cannot enter fully into a large and continued social life. They are the extremes; but in so far as a population goes a short distance along any of the ways which end at

these extremes, it departs by so much from the opportunity for nationhood.

But with the necessary endowment at a general level which gives creative leaders and appreciative followers, it is clear that there is no need of identity of endowment. The nation lives by diversity; like a body with different tissues and different organs—bone, blood, muscle, nerve, gland, and all the rest—specialized for differing service. An assortment of native abilities and of degrees of ability is of advantage for selection, for lawgivers, artists, mechanics, unskilled laborers, men in the ranks, and captains in war. Where races cannot unite into one nation, the chief difficulty is not that they are differently endowed. Within any effective nation the upper half and the lower half of its population have a far greater difference of endowment than is found between any race as a whole and any other race as a whole. The national unity and morale thrive on psychic differences that exceed all these racial contrasts. The unfriendliness, the repulsion of race and race, which as we have seen is hardly innate but is due to their long and unfavorable experience, is at the root of this strange refusal in politics to join hands heartily and nationally across the line of racial differences in psychic endowment that may really be of small amount.

THE PSYCHIC UNION

All these things give an opportunity for union, but do not give the union itself, which comes only by a special psychic welding, by a cultural union long in the making. For there must be generations of common discipline, by which the men become accustomed to the same ways of hunting, planting, trading, and fighting; there must be submission to like institutions of marriage and family order, of the

adjustment of disputes over injury to life or property or other rights, there must be accepted common leaders in battle, in religion, and in government wider than that of the family or the village and less wide than of the State. There must grow a familiarity and sympathy with one another's outlook upon the mystery of birth and death and conscience and the overarching sky. These sympathies do not come in a day; they may come in the centuries of intercourse preceding nationhood, in a life under headmen, priests, chieftains, dukes, petty kings. The tent, the hut, the village, the town, the city, the fair, the guild, the hunting party, the expedition for revenge, the shipping venture, the merchant caravan, the pilgrimage, the religious festival, the church—these all have contributed to the schooling in humanity, the discipline in fellowship and coöperation, which is indispensable for the larger enterprise of nationhood. Men who have the same lore and habits and affections are still further welded by the passionate hammer and fire of alarms, rage, terror, and triumphant rejoicing, which come with unsurpassed intensity in time of war.

Indeed war plays its large part in the cultural struggle by which the State is built, enlarged, defended, and destroyed. In warfare men work for a common cause and are schooled in coöperation that otherwise might remain strange to them. But we must not stray into the uncouth belief that war is the actual source of all coöperation. No thought could well have a flimsier scientific footing than that men without war would never have cared for human companionship. And yet we must put to war's credit that by force of arms strange peoples may be compelled to live under one government, and becoming accustomed to the association, may finally prefer it freely. And yet even here the unity, if it comes, is something added. As when a tree is grafted, the forcible transfer and reconnection may or may

not lead to a vital and fruitful union. Some racial scions refuse to grow and flower with certain stocks, being without sufficient affinity and consent.

FACTORS REVIEWED IN THIS LIGHT

Since the end to be attained and the process by which it is attained are now perhaps somewhat clearer, we can look back and see the true place and connection of some of these factors already considered. Unceasing communication, sympathetic communication, is at the heart of the entire process.

The character of the territory is thus important, not simply to give food and drink and the means of trade, but that it shall be without impassable barriers to free intercourse, so that the common social heritage may be sustained and enriched. To-day by printing, mails, telegraph, telephone, airplanes, and radio messages the older obstacles of mountain range, desert, sea, and ocean are being leveled, narrowed and bridged; so that the laws of the geographic limits of nationhood are virtually repealed. Communication now passes freely between the ends of the earth; and a unified feeling is no longer prevented merely by mountains and salt water.

If the old unity of territory is no longer necessary and Alaska may feel with Florida, likewise peoples can communicate and feel at one without a common language. The Scots, we have seen, speak no one language; the Belgians speak two; and the Swiss, three or four. But language counts importantly as a means of partaking together of literature, law, marriage, and trade; and of itself it brings a sense of common living.

Contrast of race, setting limits to nationality and nationhood, is probably less important for men's bodies than

for their minds. It calls forth an emotional response which is opposed, not so much to communication, as to sympathetic communication, to an easy entrance into another's spiritual stores.

But a nation is not created merely by a common culture. In a large measure all western Europe has this, and yet is not a single nation. All Christendom has possessions which men share with one another and transmit from generation to generation; and likewise all Islam, and likewise again the Buddhist Orient. Much depends on particular constellations of language, kinship, geography, and local tasks; these may assist or counteract the uniting effect of sharing in one religion or in a like ideal with regard to women and the family, or with regard to political government.

INTENDED AND UNINTENDED UNIFYING

Nor in our time may we overlook the direct and intentional schooling for nationhood, with special appeal to a common heritage and interests and foes to face, and a common glory for the present and the future, through writing and address and by such symbols as the flag, the coat of arms and uniform, the national anthem, and the recurring festivals to commemorate great men and great events. Not only in war but in peace, there is thus an intended nationalizing. Various nations each require that its children shall learn the national tongue; so it was long ago required in Prussia, and in Italy to-day in the Tyrol, and in many other countries. The "minorities" of Europe are especially concerned to resist the threat to themselves in this movement to unite the nation's feelings. Switzerland has been concerned with the number of immigrants into the land who are not Swiss. The discovery during the World War that many thousands in the United States could not speak or

understand the language of the land and who were otherwise out of touch with the lore and institutions of the nation has led to a work of "Americanization." Any one who rides in a subway in New York or lives for a while in Chicago will see a need to assimilate a babel of tongues and races and cultures to the national life and ideals. The limits now placed upon immigration are intended to assist this process.

But the unintended assimilation also is a main reliance. There comes a physical resemblance among those who live under like conditions, apart from intermarriage. In friends who have returned from long living in China or Siam, I have seemed to catch some hint of this, not in speech and dress only, but in the expression of the face. The change does, in fact, go deep into the body, affecting some of the dimensions which we thought were most stable. Boas' well-known measurement of European emigrants to the United States would mean that by living in America and without admixture of other blood the head takes on a slightly different shape. Marked changes in the shape of the face and in the color of hair and eyes, wholly without racial intermixture, have been observed also in those Germans who over a century ago went to Georgia in the Caucasus. And yet more important by far is the mental assimilation. Immigrants to America, if they do not utterly isolate themselves, breathe another atmosphere and accommodate themselves to new purposes and new modes of thought and feeling; and often this is with a fuller appreciation of the institutions novel to them than is felt by those native to the land. The autobiographies of Pupin, Rihbany, Schurz, Antin, and others give evidence of this. The very children of the newcomers are subjected to an unplanned and unofficial pressure, as Pillsbury has admirably shown in pointing to the conformities produced by the ridicule of the strangers by the children who are to the manner born.

The foreigner, and especially the young and impressionable foreigner, wishes to escape the quizzical attention or open jibes caused by his strange dress, language, manners, and ideas; and he therefore adapts himself to his new surroundings. One can illustrate this in a special way; the foreign-born population of the United States, so the Census shows, is only about half as law-abiding as the native population; and of those native to the land and who partly by that fact have become better disciplined to our social way, those whose parents also were native to the land are far more law-abiding than those natives whose parents were foreign-born. The process of nation-making is thus gradual and proceeds from generation to generation.

THE PROCESS ILLUSTRATED

The beginning of the United States would illustrate still better the forces which make a nation. The colonists were of one race, were Caucasian, and were mainly of the northern, the Germanic, strain of that great stock. They were well endowed in body and in mind, and their new situation had set their hands, their wills, their intelligence, to like tasks—of erecting houses, clearing lands, building roads and bridges; of bringing themselves into social, religious, and political order; of urging forward their own interests in spite of red men, Frenchmen, and their own king and Parliament in far-off England. To these tasks they brought from the homeland a similar, and often an identical, training in the things of the spirit: they had read the same books in the same tongue and had drawn the same lessons from the history of the Jews, the Greeks, the Romans, and of the English up to the time of Milton, Cromwell, and King Charles. The religion, if not always the Church, of England came with them; and there came also the common

law and a contempt for cowards, liars, and of shiftiness generally, which was and still is the heritage of English-speaking boys and English-speaking men.

Then came grave offenses from across the sea which called forth protest and a growing sense of what would be gained by making a common resistance to the distant rule. All this made them partakers in a "cause" and finally brought them to a point where, for all their differences of place and principle, there could be discovered a single purpose and an agreed method of attaining that purpose, by arms, counsel, and finally the Constitution with its unique provisions for civil government.

The nation which was thus created was prepared and schooled in the local meeting, the separate colony, in a weaker confederation of colonies, and in the years of most difficult and disheartening coöperation during the War of Independence, before men were ready for the Constitution and the Union. Even after independence and when Washington had been for eight years at the head of the national government, he felt the powerful forces still opposed to nationhood, and in his Farewell Address we may observe in their active reality what he felt were the forces both of generous sentiment and of self-regard which must be appealed to for sustenance of the nation's life. He reminds the citizens that there is on the side of union "every inducement of sympathy and interest"; he recalls to their attention that they have in common the pride of patriotism in the name America; that they are all, by birth or choice, citizens of one country; with only slight shades of difference, they have the "same religion, manners, habits, and political principles." "You have, in a common cause," he continues, "fought and triumphed together; the independence and liberty you possess are the work of joint counsels and joint efforts, of common dangers, sufferings and successes."

Yet even these ties, strong as they are, he recounts merely as a prelude to what in his judgment were still stronger ties, those of interest. These to his mind outbind all others. Here, he tells his countrymen, are the master-motives for union, namely, the advantages which the union gives to the opposing sections of the United States, to the North, the South, the East, and the West, he showing them that through political union they will attain—in a far higher measure than in seeking, each section by itself—greater strength, resource, inner tranquillity, and external peace. If, in the loose custom of the day, men are to be called psychologists who have an intuition into motives and have the art of molding the will of others, then we must call Washington a political psychologist. He saw and drew together the psychic cords of a nation's unity.

HOW COMMON INTERESTS WORK

A word must be said, beyond what will be said later, of the influence which interest exerts to bind men together. For there are those who think that interest works almost mechanically toward nationhood. Oaksmith, for example, says that nationality is founded on community of interest. And with proper reservation, this is true. But it will later appear that common interests must be recognized, indeed often must be created, before they bring men to union. Interest does not work upon men's minds as gravitation works upon their bodies, whether recognized and accepted or not. Mutual advantages unrecognized or rejected strew every coast. Things against interest are everywhere given haven and the freedom of the State. It was not to Germany's interest to take the Rhenish provinces from France in 1871; yet Germany took them. It was not to the interest of the American colonies to admit slavery or to con-

tinue it under the Federal Union or to be so obdurate for and against it that years of war were the only acceptable answer to the political and moral problems which it brought. It is to the interest of the United States, of France, of Italy, of Japan, and later they will *see* that it is to their interest, to do a score of things that now are stared at with filmy eyes. Nations do not attract, like black sand to magnet, what is to their advantage. They have to discover, to recognize many a thing, to rid themselves of misgivings and antipathy, to change habits, to pluck up courage, to become inattentive to the loss every gain entails. Advantage is not an external compelling force; it is a discovery, an invitation, often difficult to interpret and appraise, for men to draw together and become coworkers.

NATURE AND ENGINEERING MUST COMBINE

The evidence, which is thus to be had for the asking, offers some steadiness to our judgment, so that this need no longer veer with every wind that blows.

For it appears certain that while nations clearly grow out of Nature, they are also products of human art. The innate qualities of the individual which are of Nature clearly enter into these great political bodies—the innate readiness of muscle, sense organ, nerve, brain, impulse, feeling, emotion, thought, and purpose. The geographic situation which is of Nature—the land, sea, rivers, plains, mountains, sunshine, and rain—these, too, contribute to the nation's making: as does also the surrounding or neighboring human population, whose presence threatens, prevents, assists the movement toward nationhood.

But the natural materials have to be wrought into a peculiar cultural form if a nation is to arise. The individuals, the groups, have specially to be disciplined, have

to be brought to work together for political ends, have to become united mentally, not for a moment merely, nor necessarily forever, but enduringly enough to outlive the years. Nor is this attained simply by a biologic breeding and selection of bodies and minds, so that these all are more or less alike. Union is something different from resemblance; and indeed a union politically successful requires some want of resemblance, some diversity of talent. The assembly of persons must be unified, not by making them alike but by inducing the unlike to work together, so that they contribute their varied powers to the common enterprise of living. The human elements of the nation are given a like experience and—more important—a mutual confidence and sympathy and a will to work for themselves through one another.

The nation, it is true, resembles a herd of sheep, a pack of wolves, a crowd, a mob. It resembles also a sand dune, or a forest. But the resemblance to any of these is superficial and must not be taken seriously. For the nation differs from all these things more profoundly by far than it resembles them. In the herd, for example, there are nine parts of instinct to one of training. In the nation there are nine parts of training—and of very special training impossible for the herd—to one of instinct. And as for a nation's being like a mob, it is far more like a court of law or a veteran army, either of which is at a pole opposite to a chaotic, impulse-ridden, human aggregate. The nation is highly organized, is ruled by a complex and enduring system of sentiments, memories, and purposes; its members have—most of them from infancy—undergone a discipline based upon habits and lore to which many generations have contributed. By trial and error, by recollection of sad or gratifying experience, by insight, by public leadership, by traditional wisdom and by political experiment reckless or

timid—by all of these and more, the members of the nation have come into the psychic inheritance of elaborate institutions; these have in part unconsciously molded their mind; to these they have become adapted; these have invisibly coerced their will, and these they have learned to use freely and with skill. A remnant of persons always remains unconfirmed in the national purpose; but apart from these who may bring upon themselves some physical compulsion, no nation endures whose ties are chiefly those of force.

This training has begun in the family and village and tribe, and is continued after nationhood itself is attained. The national education goes on by an enthusiastic respect for its own past, present, and future; by an improvement of its traditional institutions partly by social inventiveness outright and partly by the impact of other nations and cultures. Japan, for example, is continuing much of her past, but at the same time is deeply affected by a wholly alien culture.

In the nation, then, Nature's rough materials are subjected to engineering. In this respect it is like any other great monument of creative imagination, such as *Lear* or the Suez Canal, although it is unlike these in its elements, its purpose, and in its perpetual incompletion. A nation is always retouching, remodeling its great work of political art. With all the solid resistance to fact, the nation is usually busied in readapting its own character to new conditions.

To many it will seem impossible to reshape the nations' behavior toward one another. But the difficulty is far less than it would be if nations really were—as they are so often thought to be—products wholly of biological inheritance, aggregates ruled wholly by instinct or other unintelligent impulses. On the contrary, in nations and their

intercourse, with all their native and natural substance, we are dealing with unfinished forms of human culture. And it is not absurd to expect them to be made better, to be more intelligently remolded to meet human needs, under the pressure of very many forces among which will be definite human contriving. But whatever may be the suitable enthusiasm for purely biological means of national advancement, we may not with impunity forget other means. A nation, it is true, may fall to the rear because of the degradation of its blood, but oftener and more rapidly because of something that eats into the nation's morale, and leaves no joy in the great social enterprise. *A nation is made and kept by an emotionally sustained education in nationhood. We may not forget blood and race and intelligence-quotients and natural selection and differential birth rates and all the rest; nor may we forget the weightier things of the spirit.* A nation is a moral achievement as well as a physical achievement, and has its life in the forces of discipline which make the family, the court of law, the city, and every other social institution.

CHAPTER IX

WHAT IS THE NATIONAL SPIRIT?

BY the process of assimilation just sketched men are made into a nation. And we must now see something of the mind and ways of this new creature, once it is created.

ITS RELATION TO THE MINDS OF ITS CITIZENS

And first, as to the very existence of the nation's mind, which many affirm and many deny. Nation or no nation, it is held, the only realities are the individual men and women and what they severally think and feel. According to this view, there is no national spirit to possess and direct the nation's citizens; such a spirit is at best a happy fiction, it is but our collective name for the individuals who are the nation.

And sound judgment may in the end give us a liking for this way of thought, and yet not a whole-hearted liking for it; nor will we rejoice in the opposite way of thinking, held to by political mystics like Bluntschli who believe in a transcendental national mind.

In truth the nation has a novel something—let us call it a mind or spirit—which is real, but not apart from the minds of its citizens. The British Empire, the United States, exists only in and through plain men and women: it cannot think except by their thinking; it has no purpose unless they bend their wills toward a common goal. It is not separate from them.

And yet it is something quite different from the aggregate of their minds. *It is, rather, their many minds organized in a special way for special purposes.* The same individuals disheartened, or become incorrigible separatists, refusing to coöperate politically, given over to panic and chaos, would be a nation by courtesy, even as a watch is still a watch by courtesy when its works are taken out and laid confusedly in a dish by its repairer. The substance, the material is still there, but the reality, whatever it may be which includes the peculiar union and form and interaction of its parts, is missing. To be a watch indeed, the parts must be put together, be wound, and set to the hour and the minute. The nation is not the sum nor the average of its population; nor is it separate from the sum or average.

We can easily see that the organized behavior, visible and invisible, which is the national life includes so much of the infinite variety of thought, emotion, and purpose in its citizens as these actually give and make useful for their corporate political life. And this leaves out much that occurs in the minds of citizens. Much of our conduct is relatively disconnected from the corporate action; is relatively too private to enter into the organization. Jones prefers to have his evening's coffee with his dessert; Smith takes a nap every Sunday afternoon; Brown abhors whist. Millions of such particular forms of behavior are relatively disconnected from the organized life of these same individuals as members of the nation. Jones' preference for a high tariff on sugar for his coffee; Smith's readiness to vote taxes for a navy to protect his Sabbath slumber—these are inside the organized national life. Moreover, the nation's mind lacks not only some of the more private forms of action of its citizens, but some of the most powerful springs of conduct in its citizens. A nation does not mate; its reveries are the reveries neither of a bachelor nor of a husband. In the

sense in which we speak of the love between men and women, a nation never falls in love; it enters upon none of those ways which, in the ancient writing, were said to be past finding out. Only by a metaphor can it regard its colonies, its mother country, as members of its family. It thinks of its own existence, of its continuance beyond the span of any individual's life or the life of many generations. Its thoughts are long, long thoughts. Its mood and purpose usually fluctuate less rapidly than do those of its present citizens; the most equable of the nation's individual members will hardly be as steady as the national mind; and still less steady will be the mind of the average citizen. The nation's conduct, then, is made from its citizens' conduct by a special incorporation, or organizing of what they think and feel and aim to do.

But the nation's mind is not just a *selection* of what would occur to its citizens' minds whether there were a national life or not. It *stimulates them to think and feel and act in new ways, so that out of their minds and bodies comes a whole system of acts which would never come were it not for the nation.* So in this sense the national mind is added to their old homely unnational animation. To illustrate great things by small, what the nation's mind adds to the minds of its members might be imaged by a dance upon the village green where the villagers join hand and head and heart for merrymaking. The dance does not ask for all that is in the dancers, nor does it leave them with only what they had before. It stirs them to venture forth from their workaday selves into novelty, into freedom and gay good will. The happy company here is, in a sense, nothing but the postman and the schoolmistress and the tinsmith and the innkeeper's daughter, and some few others like them. No mystical spirit of the dance, no unseen individual reality apart from their own spirits descends upon them. And yet something

real has arisen to control them. Their friendly consent and abandonment to the merrymaking has taken their crude and unused powers, and, awakening and encouraging these, has formed them into a lovable design that expels the last remnant of moroseness and shy restraint, surprising them into unwonted laughter and grace.

COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL MIND

But now let us move forward to discern the particular qualities and happenings in the national spirit. Here we shall see light and shadow not found in the twilight glow upon the village green.

Every nation has powers of intelligence. It has an elaborate system of knowing what occurs, both civil and military, at home and in foreign lands. And it has its national memories and traditions. Its legislature and judiciary, moreover, are among its formal organs of imagination, judgment, and reasoning. Nor is its thought confined to its officials, to its government proper. Its people as a mass and its able unofficial publicists are part of the national judgment. For in a democracy there is no sharp distinction between those who take part in government and those who do not. Every voter is by the very franchise given a real office in the State. And those who cannot vote do nevertheless influence the nation's perception, memory, imagination, and picturing of its goal.

Every nation has impulses and a will. The country's purpose is expressed in part through its administration, through men selected and schooled to work concertedly to carry out the nation's decisions. But behind these men is the national will which they express—in part embodied in the system of common law which, with us and the English, guides them, and also in the statutes, treaties, declarations

of policy, and the constitution. All these the nation has willed; and new impulses are not to be counted as entering into the nation's will until these fresh impulses are somehow fitted into this older body of intention, or until the older body is reshaped to admit the new. It is hardly correct to say that the new impulse is, in a more important sense, the national will; or to say that the constitution thwarts the national will. Its will includes all of these; the national purpose of the United States is to do new things and also to hold to the Constitution. Until the adjustment of new and old is effected, the nation is not of clear purpose, its will is not yet fully formed as to this issue; the impulse is a mere impulse, is a wish, and is not a real national purpose. The proper will of a nation is that core of its desires that have been brought into order and are given the support of the nation's energy. But around this core is a wide region of will-in-the-making. America's policy of detachment from the political affairs of Europe, for example, is having a brave struggle with the rival policy which carried the nation into the World War and which continues to live because of self-interest and of something more humane.

Every nation is pleased and displeased, is stirred to emotion, and has its steady dynamic sentiments. It is pleased with the enlargement, is displeased with the diminishing, of what it values; and these feelings readily pass over into emotion. When things upon which the nation's heart is fixed are in the balance, when vague fatalities are suddenly becoming clear, then there is excitement or anger or fear. These are emotions of suspense. And while anger and fear are not the most powerful emotions of national life, yet they are everywhere portentous. They perhaps rarely come alone; anger is perhaps never without a tinge of fear; the two are cousins and companions. And in general a nation is angry when it sees a threat to its interests, a threat not

from tornado, drought, or flood, but from a fellow nation. Japan does not grow angry at its loss of wealth and life by earthquake, but at some loss of prestige by the treatment of her people in foreign lands. Nations incline to mix more fear with their anger whenever a loss impends which they feel relatively helpless to avert, as when a small nation is threatened by an overwhelming neighbor. Denmark is more apt to fear Germany; France is more apt to be angered by her. The United States can more easily cause fear in Nicaragua, and anger in Mexico, Chile, or the Argentine. And when with nations the event drops its uncertainty and shows itself as clear gain or loss, then there is joy or sorrow.

Further, within a small international circle there may also be something of companionableness. Germany and Austria; Denmark, Sweden, and Norway; America and England—these several groups perhaps come nearest to experiencing this. But Damon and Pythias have few national analogues, although for the moment war-time allies may embrace and feel genuine affection.

THE FORCE OF NATIONAL SENTIMENTS

The mind of nations, however, will never be described unless we go beyond feeling and emotion and enter the region of sentiment. States seem to many the most matter-of-fact, the most soulless of corporations, observant only of tariff and trade-balance and the elevation and bore of naval guns. The truth is, that nations are bathed in sentiment—in sentiment which plays around material things, it is true, but which dwells fondly also with what cannot be lowered through the hatchway of merchant ships—with honor and the name of patriots long departed, and the feeling for the flag. Thoughts may be unenergetic; and emotions may be gusty; but persisting and of driving power are the senti-

ments, the steady lines of force, the polar attractions and aversions. How the plain heart warms toward the appreciator, and freezes toward the detractor of what the heart itself loves! And so it is with nations. Each country is held together not only by habits of muscular and intellectual response to interests, but by habits of emotional response channeled into sentiments so constant that they seem inborn and inevitable. Such is the prejudice, the suspicion, the distrust, with which every nation—its eye half open even in the most comfortable doze by the hearth—is aware of its neighbors' conduct, and especially the conduct of its "hereditary" foe. So Mexico watches the United States; so France watches Germany and England; so Austria and Italy have in other years eyed each other; so Poland may not for an instant lose sight of those whose substance she now holds. Sentiments, then, include the habits of appreciation and dislike which are ingrained in every nation's life. These sentiments are good and bad, and are of different grades of toughness; but, such as they are, they form the nation's bone and sinew.

Among the most important of these sentiments by which the nation lives is its members' loyalty to the nation. They are schooled to regard the organized body not only as a means to many benefits—an instrument of protection and enlargement to life, property, and many another prize—but also as something of intrinsic worth. In this there is nothing unique; indeed all bodies that have morale cultivate this spirit, and become valued not alone for what they can confer, but for what they are. So the family, the army, the navy, the legal profession, the college, the church, become objects of devotion. These, to the devotees of each, are centers around which there is a play of excited fancy, of tendencies to respond to what is vaguely felt as the interest and "honor" of the beloved object.

Patriotism, the special form of this loyalty to the nation, takes many forms of beauty and of ugliness, and many degrees of warmth. It has its own "weather"; at one season it blows steady and beneficent, like the "trades"; at another it is as destructive as the typhoon. But its excesses need not hide the essential rightness of attachment to the commonwealth. If the communal welfare which the nation serves is of worth, then its great servant, the State, may rightly be held in honor. No nation can exist without this honoring, and each must look to the means of loyalty in its people.

But patriotism both illuminates and darkens their minds. It helps to reveal to them the true qualities of State and nation. Quite in addition to any details of knowledge, to any fresh items of fact that can be described and catalogued, through patriotism the country imprints its features upon its members' minds emotionally and indescribably. The effect here is not wholly unlike that in religious mysticism, where men like St. Paul come to a knowledge which cannot be uttered; or in romantic love, where the lover is sensitized to the beauty of his beloved. In all these forms of experience there is a dimension of truth which cannot be set forth in terms merely of the senses and of intellect. We shall soon see some of the blinding which too often comes of patriotism. It is true that when one falls in love with a nation, one runs a certain risk to one's intelligence and sentiments and purposes; but it is an adventure in which the gain, for most of us, far exceeds the loss.

But to recall in brief what we have just been viewing, each nation has its national mind or spirit, not as a myth or metaphor but as a fact. Its mind, however, is not something apart from the minds of its people, but is their minds organized in a special way for special ends. Nor is the na-

tional mind made of instinct merely, or of brute passion. It has the wealth of operation found in a mind far advanced, with impulses and habits, with knowledge, moved by many desires, affected deeply by sentiment and emotion, and having its own complexities of purpose. *National minds are not inherently brutal, nor are they of an entirely different order from those of their own plain men and women. Their conduct is intelligible and is subject to control when understood,* but only by doing full justice to the varied forces in their psychic life.

CHAPTER X

DELUSIONS IN THE NATIONAL MIND

WE have now seen the nation established in its nationhood, and we have seen in outline the character of the nation's mind. But there are particular ways of thinking by that mind which are too important to be left undescribed; for they are present in nearly or quite all nations, and they powerfully affect all foreign policy.

SELF-APPRECIATION AND ITS EFFECTS

Everywhere in national life there are mental abnormalities, even as in every normal individual there are mental aberrations easily demonstrated in the laboratory. By its very enterprise of becoming a nation and maintaining its morale, it tends to illusions, if not at times to mental disease and to actual insanity.

For a nation remains a nation on condition that it has an impulse to live, that it believes in itself, rejoicing in its own significance. In one of Conrad's stories the downfall of the principal character is complete when the awakened dreamer loses the last shred of faith in himself. Self-appreciation, self-confidence, and much else that enters into patriotism must feed a nation's vitality. Even in your relatively unemotional peoples, even in your stolid Englishman, it flows forth unexpectedly, warm, irrepressible springs of it, in the great popular poets from Shakespeare to Wordsworth and on through Browning to Kipling and Noyes; from

This precious stone set in the silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall,
Or as a moat defensive to a house,
Against the envy of less happier lands;
This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England,—

through

Oh, to be in England—

to *Drake,* with

Mother and love, fair England, hear my prayer;

and

How shall we sing of thy beauty,
England, mother of men.

But self-appreciation, life-giving and revealing as it is, so readily loses its just ratio to what should go with it! In no nation as a whole to-day is it rightly proportioned and compensated. It rather runs with depreciation of fellow-nations, with aversion from them, with an antipathy which speaks in a tone unfriendly to coöperation.

And these emotions—or more accurately, these sentiments—touch the intelligence. They help to decide what will be partly or wholly forgotten, and what will be in the fore-front of recollection. Nations do not suffer frequently from a sense of inferiority; this is not their besetting "complex." They do not dwell upon their failure, their inadequacy. By habit they see rather their own intrinsic greatness, their historic success. Annually and oftener they recall their heroes, their days of achievement. No State takes care to keep green the memory of its misadventures, or what might give occasion for shame. In many respects this is by a sound intuition of what makes for health and strength. So the United States does not contrive that its youth shall

never forget how far the nation's conduct has fallen short of Penn's standards with the Indians, of Woolman's with the blacks; or fallen short of our own best traditions in other ways. There is a tendency to amnesia of all these, and to regard Boss Tweed and Guiteau as less suitable objects of attention than Washington, Hamilton, Garrison, and Lincoln. The resistance to tyranny, the emancipation of the slaves, the refusal to annex Cuba, the unfortified boundary with Canada, the participation in the World War without promise of territorial gain—these are more frequently recalled, and illustrate how well designed both for pleasure and for practical use are a nation's memories.

THE RESULTING MISJUDGMENT OF NATIONS

Moreover, in so far as the emotions and sentiments are unbalanced and are not adapted to a just social order they may seriously mislead. The nation, governed by its uncompensated self-esteem, easily comes to a delusion, mild or severe, of grandeur or persecution. The nation's very sense of its own superiority runs smoothly into the assurance that other nations are contriving serious loss if not ruin to the nation. The United States with her immense control of oil fields, far greater than is possessed by all the other nations combined, can view this control as a perfectly unobjectionable activity; but an effort of the British to increase their holdings may at once be proclaimed to be an attempt to have a monopoly and to get America into her power. A strong navy belonging to the United States is clearly for defense only; belonging to any other nation it is easily thought to be a means of aggression. America sees dark designs in Japan; Japan sees things sinister in America. A country fails to recognize its own ill-doings, or finds excuse for what it recognizes. Or more often it projects into others its own

faults; it sees the beam in its own eye, but refers it to other eyes than its own. Like a sour schoolboy, it finds others responsible for all that goes awry. Germany in 1870, as reflected in the private conversations of Bismarck, seemed to herself to be devoted to peace; while France seemed to Germany to have a lust of conquest, to be the sole disturber of the peace, a people that must be crippled in order to relieve Europe of military burdens. So America finds little difficulty in regarding other nations as more quarrelsome than herself, more rapacious, and of inferior political morals. It is because of them and not because of herself that she cannot enter fully into their plans of mutual assistance and mutual protection; they, in a manner that would never be followed by herself, would take advantage of her faith and unguardedness; she is guileless compared with them; she, but not they, may well pursue a solitary and uncovenanted way; for she, but not they, can be trusted in any international emergency to do the right. And in broad outline, changing what should be changed, such is the picture in the mind of nations generally. Each would gladly be less severe, less ready to use terror and compulsion, but alas it is dealing with those who understand no other argument; because of its associates in a wicked world, it is forced to be bloody, bold, and resolute.

So in support of national policy, there is an unintended hugging of error, and a black use of truth itself. Each nation, according to what it considers to be its need, here gropes about for handy implements. The belief that the white race is in all respects superior to every other race, that an armed conflict between the white race and the yellow race is inevitable, that human nature will always require that nations fight—these are examples of the delusions which nations unwittingly bring upon themselves by their undisciplined impulses and emotions. Nor is it only in war

time and to the combatants that delusions come, although then they appear in a vividness like the delusions of the insane. They are born and nursed also in time of peace. Every nation at all times lives in a world that is partly the creature of the nation's own emotions.

ALLOWANCE FOR THE NATIONAL "EQUATION"

Much that has just been before us might properly be counted a "rationalizing" of the nation's own behavior, and an "irrationalizing" of the behavior of other nations, in that it manages to see its own conduct as moved by sweet reasonableness, and its rivals' as all dark and tortuous. Occasionally this habit is broken by the nation as a whole, and all the while by some of the nation; but the trend is constant and baleful.

Indeed no one thing could contribute more to sane guidance than to recognize and to make constant allowance nationally and officially for this habitual misjudging of one's own nation and of others. Until this is done a country's policy is misguided by an unwarranted sense of rectitude and generosity. The United States builds the Panama Canal for various proper reasons, among which is the desire to have the navy act quickly and undividedly, if need be, in either ocean. The time and risk taken by the *Oregon* to steam around the Horn, in the war with Spain, had taught its lesson. But when the occasion came for presidential announcement, the Canal had now become America's "gift to civilization," as though the nation's own advantage had hardly been considered. And the Monroe Doctrine has long been regarded in the United States as mainly for the benefit of the weak and unappreciative nations to the south. A nation undoubtedly may strengthen its purpose, although it may cause this purpose to suffer in quality, by seeing

itself as the sure champion of the right, and its neighbors as wedded to their idols.

It is for this reason that a nation victorious in war is nearly always certain that the right has prevailed; and a nation defeated is equally certain that mere might has prevailed. And each side can thus taste a moral victory. Spain after the destruction of Cervera's fleet could still feel her patrician superiority to what she regarded as her swinish antagonist. And the Confederate States, after Lee's surrender to Grant, could continue to believe that they were of higher culture and higher morals than was the North and had more at heart the welfare of the Negro. Indeed *a nation has usually in a larger degree than has the individual a distorted picture of its own character and conduct.* It substitutes its ideal for the sorry reality of its behavior; while it sees in its neighbor's conduct only the sorry reality, and is almost persuaded that the neighbor has no ideal. Its portraits of others have usually a shade of satire if not of downright caricature in them, unless the nations are allies in war; for then it paints them with the brush and colors it uses for itself.

But in seeing what comes of these partisan commitments, one should not lose the rounded truth. *For with loyalty to country, although not with antipathy toward others, comes insight also.* By their common ardor for the nation's welfare men perceive a new reality in one another; and on coming to know the nation, they are introduced to a form of reality different from what they had discovered in one another severally. *Nor is there any permanent necessity in the delusions themselves. They can be corrected whenever the loyalty is corrected,* as has occurred in the family, where the appreciation of one's own does not exclude an appreciation of others also and a sanity of knowledge and opinion of them.

CHAPTER XI

THE BEHAVIOR OF DIFFERENT NATIONS

THUS far, we have considered the traits which the nations have in common. But it would not be well to think that all nations are psychically identical. Their differences of mind also should be observed. And it is now possible to state what some of these differences are, in the thought and external action of certain nations. We are only at the porch of scientific knowledge; yet we have passed beyond the point where we take as solemn truth the impressions of casual and, too often, biased observers. Nor need we any longer confuse the traits of a nation which are discerned in its people as separate individuals with the traits of this nation when it behaves as a political whole. Both of these ways of regarding a people—looking now to the qualities displayed by its many members in their relation as individuals, and now to the qualities they display in their corporate political life—both these ways must be followed, unless we choose to abide in an intellectual shadow.

INTELLIGENCE IN DIFFERENT NATIONS

We have already seen something of the native intelligence of races; and although we still are ignorant of what would come of a thorough study, in their homelands, of the leading peoples of the world, we must now add what is known of intelligence in nations. For with regard to Europe and the United States we already have evidence which is of importance for policy, since we know that *the men who in*

recent years have come to America from certain countries of Europe do, in their intellectual endowment and when grouped by their nationalities, differ greatly. And when we place the countries in their proper rank in this respect, placing first the nation whose sendings to America are highest in their average of intelligence, and placing last the nation whose sendings stand lowest, they fall into the following order:[1]

INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

Rank	*Country or Nation*
1	England
2	Scotland
3	Holland
4	Germany
	Average Native White American
5	Denmark
6	Canada
7	Sweden
8	Norway
9	Belgium
10	Ireland
11	Austria
	Average Foreign-Born White American
12	Turkey
13	Greece
14	Russia
15	Italy
16	Poland

These ranks are not lightly to be set aside by saying that they show mainly the immigrants' command of the English

[1] In this and the tabular ranks later, only the gross position of a nation or nationality can safely be regarded as significant. The true place might well be a few steps below or above the place given; but with less and less probability would it be in a more and more remote part of the scale.

language. For those equally at home in English receive very different ranks; the English people and the Scots stand above the native white Americans; the Canadians stand below; while the Irish, for all their fluent English, stand very low, indeed far below many nationalities for whom English is a foreign tongue. Again, there is a wide divergence among those who are alike in having a foreign language as their mother tongue: the Dutch stand higher than the native whites of America, the Germans and Danes are near the native level, while far below these come the Greeks, Russians, Italians, and Poles. And finally, the farther one goes in the study of American children whose parents came from these European nations, the children being in American schools and reasonably familiar with the new country's language and ways, the greater becomes one's confidence that the general ranking of the samples is not far from correct. The children of Italian parents take a place below those of American parents, as do also the children of Portuguese, Spanish, and Mexicans in the United States, whom the list just given does not include. The evidence, then, may properly affect our judgment as to the nations from which, so far as intelligence is concerned, an emigration to America is most and is least to be desired by Americans.

But may this evidence rightly guide a decision regarding the intellectual fiber of the different nations as they are found in their own homes? Do we now know that the Italian nation is less intelligent than the Irish, that the Danes are of an intelligence inferior to the Dutch, and that the Austrians are far inferior to the Americans?

No; and for these reasons. As with the races, so here: the evidence tells only of those who *left* the foreign nations to live in the United States, and tells nothing of the great mass that remained at home. From some nations there may have gone chiefly men who had failed, who went or were

sent to America because in the old country they were too dull to hold their own. Of other nations the very opposite may be true: the more ambitious, more venturesome, more intelligent may have been the very ones to leave; they were too bright to stay at home. The United States may have received the cream of Holland and Scotland, and the skimmed milk of Ireland, Italy, and Poland. Further research alone can tell the full truth of this.

Thus far, then, we are justified in saying only that several countries—among which are Poland, Italy, Russia, Greece, Turkey, Ireland, and Austria—have begot and have allowed to emigrate to America a mass of persons whose average intellect is decidedly inferior to the native American stock. These nations must then be looked at askance as a source of increase of America's population, since they have reduced the general level of American intelligence. England, Scotland, Holland, and Germany, on the other hand, have each produced and given to America a mass of citizens whose native intelligence is in general superior to the present average there. These nations may well be viewed with favor; they are among those that have enriched and raised the national level. Tests in America, then, speak importantly with respect to nations of Europe so far as certain aspects of their emigration is concerned. American foreign policy surely should not ignore the facts brought to light. *The tests leave us in the dark, however, as to the intellectual ability of the homeland nations themselves—as to the ability of these nations compared with one another and with the United States.*

Moreover, it is easy to forget that the native intelligence of a man is not his intelligence trained and furnished with knowledge instead of superstition and dogged misbelief. And still easier is it to forget that his value as a citizen depends upon much besides intelligence and knowledge—

depends upon these, but also upon his temperament, his steadiness and balance, his sympathies, his essential and acquired soundness of feeling and impulse, about which no intelligence test says a word.

EMOTION, BELIEF, AND PLEASURE IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES

With an eye now to other aspects of the mind, we find that in different nationalities the various springs of fear, of anger, and of pleasure are not of equal force, and point to a difference of emotional training and perhaps also of endowment. Thus the beginnings of such a study indicate that among women and girls of the French in Paris, of the Poles in Warsaw, and of the Russian Jews and Southern Italians in New York and Chicago, music is for all these groups a chief source of pleasure; but churchgoing stood above music and dancing as a source of pleasure for the Italians; and travel and the theater rise above music for the French. Next below music come the newspapers, for the Russian Jews; and come flowers, for the Poles.

As for the cause of fear, all groups placed fire nearly or quite in the first place; the Russian Jews feared thunderstorms quite as much as fire; the Poles, the Russian Jews, and the French placed contagious diseases among the three chief sources of their fear; while for the Italians snakes and the end of the world were more dreaded than were contagious diseases.

And for the occasions of anger, the situation placed first by the French, the Italians, and the Poles was to see a helpless person abused. The Russian Jews gave as the chief offense to them to be deceived; and only less than this was it to be called a liar—an attitude with which an American or a Briton would feel a rising sympathy, a sympathy felt apparently in less degree by the Italians, French, and Poles.

For while to be called a liar stood third in the order of occasions of anger for the Russian Jews, it stood either fourth or fifth for the French; stood seventh for the Poles; and ninth for the Italians. The Anglo-Saxon, forgetful, for an instant, of scientific caution, would feel tempted to mutter in his heart that no nation can ever stand at the forefront of nationhood unless its breed be brought to take hot offense at being called a liar, second perhaps only to the offense of actually being a liar.

We have a hint also of the interests, the beliefs, the nervous and mental stability of students in a few countries of Europe, to compare with those of the United States; many more studies of the kind would be welcome, and might help to give rest to a few misgivings. For some have at times inclined to despond over the rejection of the light, for example, in regard to evolution. And yet, comparing student with student in equal numbers, the belief in evolution seems to be somewhat more frequent in America than in France or Poland, and to be about as frequent in America as among the Czechs. The belief that war is a biological necessity is more frequent among Polish and French students than among those of the United States. The belief in God is more commonly accepted by students of Poland and of the United States than by those of the French and the Czechs; although in all four groups of students the belief in God is far more frequent than the denial. The Americans in larger proportion than the students of the other nationalities disbelieved in ghosts and in communication of the living with the dead. The American students as a whole, then, are perhaps as much impressed by science as are those of the countries named; and probably a larger proportion of our population is having collegiate opportunity.

As to the rank and order of pleasures and interests of youth in college, the French, Poles, and Czechs placed

music first and gave a third or fourth place to studying. The American youths blithely put athletics first, and to studying they gave the humble rank of *eleventh* in the order of their pleasures! Mere professors and all whose world is centered in libraries and laboratories should prick any dear illusions they may have as to their importance in the eyes of those who frequent the stadia. Let us rejoice, however, that—perhaps because of his immunity to intellectual contagion—the American student seems a mentally healthier young whelp and gives less frequent signs of nervous and mental instability than does the student of these other nationalities.

COMPARING THEIR DISTINGUISHED MEN

Next let us look to the number of distinguished men—men of high, world fame—which some of the leading nations have produced, and to the kinds of distinction which different countries foster. Cattell has selected by an objective method the thousand men who in the judgment of the modern Occident are most eminent, and has grouped them according to the countries of their origin. His is not the final word in this realm but it is the best that we have thus far. The principal countries, when ranked according to the number of these great men which they produced, stand in the following order, where the country with the largest absolute number is first.

Rank	*Countries*
1	France
2	Great Britain
3	Germany
4	Italy
5	Rome, Ancient
6	Greece, Ancient
7	America

8 ..... Spain
9 ..... Switzerland
10 ..... Holland
11 ..... Sweden
12 ..... Russia

And as for the *kind* of eminence which these several countries have encouraged, it appears that France has fostered military talent above all else; she has begot more men of military distinction than she has begot men of distinction in any other field; and more men of military distinction than has any other country in the world. Compared with other nations in matters military and with herself in all other matters, then, France, is preëminently the mother and nurse of geniuses in war. Great Britain, on the other hand, who has produced only a small fraction of the number of military geniuses that France has produced, has given forth more statesmen than France has given forth great warriors—more statesmen than has any other country, more statesmen than any other kind of great men in Britain. She, then, has led the world as the begetter and schoolmaster of geniuses in statecraft. Italy, in a like way, has been the cradle and home of artists. Of the eleven classes of distinction used in this study made before the War, Germany has had preëminence over all other nations in none. Germany has had many great artists, but not so many as Italy; many great scholars and scientists, but not so many as France or Great Britain. Indeed the story of the cultural achievement of these latter two countries is not completed in the number merely of their warriors and statesmen respectively. France, while first and foremost a producer of soldiers, has nevertheless had a larger number of distinguished scientists and scholars than has any other country. And Great Britain, head and shoulders above others in the number of her statesmen, has besides exceeded any other

nation in the number of her eminent sovereigns, poets, philosophers, and churchmen.

RESPECT FOR LAW BY DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES IN AMERICA

Along with their great men, there are important facts of an opposite kind by which to judge the nations: among other things, by the conduct of their plain men and women. We shall need in the end something like a sublimated Dun or Bradstreet to gauge the moral soundness of countries as shown by the fitness of their undistinguished citizens for communal life. Nations are by no means all alike in this. For example, the girls of San Francisco who were born in Spanish-American countries give, in comparison with other foreign-born girls, more than nine times their due proportion of the juvenile delinquency of the city. And among those American-born girls whose parents were foreign-born, an undue proportion of delinquents come from Italy and the Spanish-American countries. Girls whose parents came from Germany or Ireland, however, give less than their due proportion of delinquents. But the findings as to these countries represented in San Francisco by the conduct of their girls are not quite parallel to those with respect to crimes our nation over: for now Mexico, Ireland, Austria, and Greece have an evil record; while Germany stands well, as do also Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, and Great Britain.

Let us, indeed, set in rank the countries whose people's behavior we know with respect to law and order in the United States, giving the first and highest place to the country the *least proportion* of whose representatives are in penal institutions in the United States. Using the returns from a special Federal Census in 1923, published in 1926, the order of some of the important nationalities is as follows:

OBEDIENCE TO LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

Rank	*Country*
1	Germany
2	Switzerland
3	Holland
4	Denmark
5	England and Wales
6	France
7	Belgium
8	Italy
	Average Foreign-Born White American
9	Russia
10	Scotland
11	Poland
12	Sweden
13	Norway
14	Greece
15	Austria
16	Ireland
17	Mexico

When we compare the ranks of these countries, in the one aspect and in the other—now in intelligence, and now in obedience to law—it appears that several of the *nations which have the better records in one of these respects have better records in the other also.* The more intelligent group is, in general, the group of the more law-abiding. So far as our records speak of them at all, those who come from Switzerland, Denmark, England, France, Germany and Holland stand high among the foreign-born in both of these respects; on the other hand, a low rank among the foreign-born is held by Poland, Russia, Mexico, Ireland, and Greece.

CORPORATE BEHAVIOR OF NATIONS

Of late our attention has been upon the behavior of the individuals of the different nations, acting as individuals

in a special situation. But as was said earlier, their conduct as individuals is a very insufficient index to their conduct as a body organized. The paradox is upon us that a corporation, whether it be commercial or political, may behave toward others after a manner that contradicts the characteristic conduct of its members as individuals: so it has been with commercial corporations like the Standard Oil Company; and so it is with political corporations like the United States, Italy, and England. The behavior just reported, then, cannot satisfy us and turn us back from examining the nation's conduct as a political body, which is to be seen only in world affairs. In the quiet of national growth, as well as in times of political passion, turmoil, and crisis, there appear the facts of the nation's character that are most significant for the intercourse of sovereign States.

For such intercourse political stability stands almost first. Just as we could hardly deal normally with a man who in nerves and mind is ready to go to pieces, so it is with nations. Rebellion and revolution in nations correspond to the "nervous breakdown" of individuals; and we should take note of the nations that in our present time have longest made their inner adjustments by discussion and compromise rather than military violence.

The self-governing nations that have shown their stability, their political sanity, by accommodation of this kind for nearly or quite a century are not many, and the following would perhaps be a list almost complete:

Belgium
Great Britain[1]
Holland
Norway
Sweden

[1] Strictly, of course, and not the Empire generally.

But of even fuller importance is a nation's ability to maintain orderly intercourse with other civilized States. And although the things that bring a people into conflict with others may lie quite beyond a nation's own exclusive keeping, yet we should recall the countries that have contrived long to live peaceably with their civilized neighbors. Their freedom from foreign wars must in some degree depend, not on happy circumstances, but on endowment and skill and self-discipline, upon important traits in their own national character.

The countries that for approximately the last hundred years or more have had no foreign war with any civilized people are:

Holland
Norway }
Sweden }
Switzerland

CONNECTION BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT

Now we should look sharply at the nations that appear in either of these two groups. And it is interesting to note that those of whose immigrants we have any record at all *have a record in the United States which is better than the average of the foreign-born with respect to intelligence; of all but Norway and Sweden, it is better than the average of the foreign-born with respect to obedience to law.* The qualities shown in the samples of population which the United States has received from England, Holland, Belgium and Switzerland seem to correspond with important differences in behavior of these foreign countries themselves as political wholes. The character of the representatives in America of these particular countries is probably more nearly representative of something in the national char-

acter than we can with scientific caution as yet regard as demonstrated. But it would not appear strange if there should be a causal connection between national conduct with respect to civil and international law and order, and the conduct of the nation's citizens as individuals with respect to law and order. Exceptions there clearly are; but *in general,* it now begins to seem not improbable, *the more orderly the inner and outer corporate national life, the more adequate and orderly the private behavior of the nation's members.* It is probable that each of these important characteristics is in part the cause, and each is in part the effect of the other; and both are in part the result of common causes; each reacts favorably upon the other, while the endowment and discipline and social atmosphere that foster the one foster also its companion.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ORDERLINESS OF NATIONS

But let us now compare the unrebellious and the unbelligerent, not with some groups outside them, but with each other. What of the foreign policy of the countries that for long have been free from rebellion and revolution, and what of the internal political order of the nations that longest have been free of foreign war? The two groups of nations have a large membership in common. There is a clear tendency—although again with striking exceptions—toward a union of the two kinds of behavior: most of *the countries that longest have been free from rebellion or revolution have longest been free also from foreign war with civilized peoples; while nearly all of the countries which have had no such foreign wars in the last hundred years are among those that for nearly or quite a century have had no rebellion or revolution.*

Nor is there any deep mystery in this connection. For it

seems reasonable that the steady attention to internal adjustment by nothing more heady than violent talk and balloting should be of influence toward a more accommodating foreign policy; that a nation unable to discover resources other than violence to relieve its internal stresses and strains should also fail to adjust without violence its disputes with other nations. And the converse of this would also be in reason.

As for the special causes which are behind these interconnections, we can say with assurance that the mere size of the nation does not win the day. Small nations have no immunity from disorder within or without. Central America and South America have had small countries that live in boiling water. The Balkan states illustrate the same truth, that little and weak countries can have as many rebellions and revolutions and foreign wars as can the greatest powers.

Something deeper than numbers is here at work. The truculent "honor" so nearly central in the Spanish tradition, by which it is a disgrace to compromise with an opponent, has doubtless had much to do with the political turmoil of Spain and the Spanish-American countries, and has marked the politics also of Portugal and Brazil that lie so close to the Spanish culture.

France, too, has been ready to settle her conflicts, both within and without, by explosive violence. This has long been noted by observers from various lands—observers both of the French as individuals and of their public action. To Fouillée his own countrymen appear to love reason and to neglect observation; to be excitable, expansive, explosive, defective in their powers of inhibition, of arrest. Bryce found that the French, in company with their strong disposition to obey the public authority, are prone to violence —he remembering particularly the revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848, and the great dissensions in France since the latest

of these dates. And in the Gallic temper, Cæsar observed an insatiable curiosity and a readiness even in momentous public affairs to act on impulse, stirred perhaps by some wild rumor, even by a pure figment of a stranger's imagination who happened to pass their way; so Cæsar held these ancient French to be unstable and lovers of revolution. It would be of value to collate, with regard to all the nations, the judgments formed by the most competent witnesses, to see what would emerge either of complete agreement or of strong trend in their conclusions. Fair unanimity of independent and able minds in different nations could hardly be despised.

And since Italy, too, has had a long training in disorder; and since the Slavic temper—in Russia and in its successors, the Soviet republics, and in the kindred peoples in eastern Europe to Russia's southwest—has not stood strong for political moderation either toward its own people or toward others, one seems compelled to regard appreciatively the nations of the Germanic culture, both Anglo-Saxon and others. Violent indeed many of them have been, within and without; but nevertheless in a world only preparing to emerge from international chaos, they must be given honor for the qualities that look toward law and order. Four of the five countries that for nearly or quite a full century of troublous times have been free from rebellion or revolution are Germanic, namely, Great Britain, Holland, Norway, and Sweden. The only remaining of these less rebellious nations, Belgium, is also Germanic in its Flemish part. All of the four nations that have lived through nearly or quite a full century without warring on a foreign civilized people are wholly or largely of this same culture.

The English-speaking nations have not been wholly unready for internal adjustment without recourse to arms. Great Britain has been steadiest within. The United States,

by failing to settle without a civil war its dispute over slavery and union, perhaps most notably departed from the established tradition of its kind. Outwardly, toward nations not of their own circle, the English-speaking countries have had more of that stiff readiness for the military solution which seems characteristic of the Latin and the Slav, and from which the smaller nations of Germanic blood or culture have been relatively free. Indeed the purpose to be a world power, such as we find in Great Britain, the United States, or Germany, brings a moral or political strain which cannot as yet be withstood even by the great advantages which these nations have in their stock and training.

But to return to the wider findings which we have before us, it is clear that along with much that is alike in all nations, *the chief nations have their individuality, each with its own peculiar life. They give forth ability of various types,* one nation forming its most talented persons chiefly to purposes of war, another directing its genius to statesmanship, while still another bends mainly to art. *They give to their own undistinguished nationals, in all likelihood, moreover, varying grades of excellence*—of intelligence, of discipline, of fitness for participating helpfully in a communal life. And most important for governmental progress, *nations differ in their corporate behavior, inner and outer.* There are nations whose inward aud outward conduct is undisciplined, in contrast to nations orderly within and orderly without. *The vigorous and vital nations which withhold themselves from violence are of especial interest to those who look toward juster conduct under law in the international world.*

Already we have passed beyond the nations as separate societies, and have entered upon their conduct toward one another. This great topic must now have our full attention.

PART II

THE CONDUCT OF NATIONS TOWARD ONE ANOTHER

CHAPTER XII

THE RISK IN CLOSE ACQUAINTANCE

FRIENDLINESS EXPECTED FROM INTERCOURSE

VON HUMBOLDT felt that the hostility among many of the peoples of the New World was largely due to the physical barriers which prevented their intercourse. And to-day it is often said that nations need only to be acquainted with one another to become friendly. The familiar story of Lamb is tellingly used to enforce this. For when he expressed dislike of a certain person, and a friend protested that Lamb didn't know him, Lamb expressed amazement that he should be expected to dislike any one that he *did* know!

And so some persons see in the new means of communication an end of international enmities. Nothing more is needed, they believe, than to allow the increasing intercourse to bring its sure result. International friendliness and law and orderly behavior will come by steamship, railway, automobile, and airplane; by newspapers, mails, telegraph, telephone, and by wired and wireless communication. These for the first time in all history are bringing the ends of the earth to know one another, and those who know one another are friends.

We find, in consequence of this belief, an effort to facilitate mutual acquaintance. International visits by bar associations, medical associations, chambers of commerce, advertising men; an exchange of professors, especially of those engaged in research and teaching in the field of inter-

course between States; special scholarships and fellowships for travel and study in foreign countries; these may be intended at times only for breadth of personal learning, but often they look also toward closer ties between particular countries—as when Cecil Rhodes provided for the coming to Oxford of Americans, Germans, and Colonial British; and when Emperor Wilhelm and President Roosevelt encouraged an exchange of professors between Germany and the United States. Still oftener the aim is to bring all peoples into friendly relations by making them familiar with one another.

And since language is the great means of acquaintance, language is looked to by many who hope for good will by intercourse. Here is the one sure way to know a people, it is held; here is the talisman against misunderstanding. The possession of the same mother tongue by two nations, it is felt, gives almost a guarantee of peace between them; but next to a common mother tongue comes the acquiring of a common tongue. In consequence some have the hope that all peoples will learn the same additional language to supplement their own—English, or French, or something made out of hand, like Esperanto. Mutual understanding is the very substance of right social conduct, it would appear, and language is the key to understanding.

GROUNDS FOR DOUBT

Now nothing could be further from my thought than to belittle all or any of these attempts at a freer intercourse. There should be more and not less of them; and public-minded wealth, let us hope, will bring their increase. But we may with all sympathy look steadily at them, asking ourselves whether the faith just described is entirely sound, whether nothing more is needed to rid the international

world of enmity and injustice than for the nations to become acquainted.

And with a word further about language, the belief in its efficacy to relieve international tension is in part because suspicious or warring nations usually speak different tongues, as France and Germany, Italy and Greece, the United States and Spain, Russia and Japan, England and the Transvaal. But we must remember that nations so generally speak languages different from one another that no strong inference can come of that; if they fight at all, they can hardly choose but fight a people of foreign tongue. To counterweight whatever of gravity is in this ill will between countries divided by language, one must take due account of the wars between peoples speaking the same language: Prussia and Austria, England and Ireland, Spain and her colonies, England and her colonies, England and the United States, the German states with one another, the Italian states with one another, the ancient Greek states with one another, the English-speaking American states, the Spanish-speaking American states with one another. And we must take account also of the opposite type of fact —the long success in avoiding war where the language is not the same, as between Holland and Denmark, Holland and England, Holland and Belgium, Belgium and England. To these and scores more should be added the success of the French and English in Canada, of the Flemings and Walloons in Belgium, and of the French-speaking, German-speaking, and Italian-speaking cantons of Switzerland. From such evidence must we not conclude that while speech is important, it is by no means of the first importance. It creates neither war nor peace. Deeper than the verbal expression is the spirit to be expressed, which if generous and intelligent can be perceived through a fairly opaque medium, and if narrow and nettling is all the more clearly

understood when done by those who use the same words for their ill will.

Doubt is awakened in our minds by nations that know each other most, and like each other least. The Chinese and the Japanese are close together in blood and culture and place of living; Buddhism and Confucianism are bonds between them; they can read each other's written language; each people probably understands the other better than it understands any other people. And yet of Japan's two modern wars, one has been with China; and there has been earlier hostility, and the feeling is hardly cordial now. The French and the Germans likewise are close to each other in blood and territory, and they have had a growing knowledge of each other for centuries and indeed for thousands of years, from a time before the coming of Cæsar among them. Every educated German knows something of the French language, and looks wistfully at the urbanity of the French; Goethe pleased the Saxons by saying that one of their cities was a miniature Paris and made its people cultured:

> Mein Leipzig lob' ich mir!
> Es ist ein klein Paris und bildet seine Leute.

The French, even if they do not care greatly to know well any foreign people, have been forced to pay attention, century after century, to their neighbors northeast of them. And yet war after war has been fought between them, and they probably will long remain for each other the arch objects of distrust. England's sea power in Elizabeth's reign made that country know—and hate—Spain as she then knew and hated no other nation. Again, the French and English have but a thread of water between their coasts and yet, when not busy fighting each other, they have eyed each other with unusual suspicion. And certainly the

English colonists of America in the eighteenth century knew England as they knew nothing else. Yet then and for a century afterward, they felt perhaps more friendly toward the French. Feeling turned its back on all the old familiarities which grew out of language, literature, law, and religion, and took its own headstrong course to fight two wars with the mother country. And there was also the antipathy among the American states themselves, after their union; between North and South, between sections of a people who had come to know each other better even than they knew the English, having struggled in common for liberty and for a new government and against all the hardships of the frontier.

ACQUAINTANCE MAY LEAD TO FRIENDLINESS OR ENMITY

Indeed the conditions which make for acquaintance are among the most powerful to make for enmity. Neighborhood is one of the most dangerous of international situations. The neighboring and acquainted states of Germany when they were not held together by strong political union quarreled with one another. Machiavelli depicts for us no happy family of the Italian states of his time. The Greek states in snug Hellas found implacable enemies in one another. War does not select the countries in greatest ignorance of each other, but rather the reverse.

Indeed intercourse is as important for enmity as for friendship. The idea is without scientific warrant, as we may later see, that men are hostile by nature and with no outward cause, while friendliness requires care and cultivation. Each of these responses comes of meeting and contact; being equally natural and equally cultivated; and whether there shall be friendliness or enmity depends upon the quality of this meeting. Acquaintance, intercourse, are

essential to enmity, bringing occasions of "misunderstanding," which is not so much a defect of acquaintance as it is a failure of adjustment. And with nations a failure of adjustment is easier to compass than successful adjustment. With nations, therefore, Lamb's happy remark could be used either in the form he gave it or in an opposite form: they cannot be expected to dislike each other until they meet. For with contact come conflicts of interest, and rarely a settlement that satisfies all. Lean grudges remain to be fed; and as the attention becomes fixed upon unsatisfied desires and upon the hopeless moral inferiority of all one's neighbors, the relations are not eased but are heavier-laden.

And yet while acquaintance is the way to enmity, it is the way and the only way to lasting friendship. It is through the perilous gate which opens into discord that nations must arrive at comity. The nations that are fast enemies consequently are not the only ones that are well acquainted. Great Britain and the United States of recent decades, the United States and Canada, the Scandinavian nations, could hardly have attained what degree they have of mutual good will if there had been no long familiarity. Passing attraction may spring up overnight when stranger-nations face suddenly a common danger: Napoleon's armies trampling over Europe brought together countries as separated as Austria and Britain; the fear of Russia has been more than once a bond between Turkey and Britain; the late Alliance in Central Europe finally gathered against itself the ends of the earth. It would not be true that nothing lasts of all this association. The enlarged acquaintance, the experience of actual coöperation among those that did coöperate, has made possible a new web of relations among them. The crust of habit has been broken, and these countries can never again be quite so startled by the idea of co-

operation, nor require quite so intense a stimulus to make them fellow-workers.

THE KIND OF UNDERSTANDING NEEDED

A large part of the fallacy that acquaintance always leads to friendliness is perhaps due to the two meanings in "understanding." We quite correctly say that war grows out of misunderstanding. And then nothing seems more reasonable than that all hostility can be prevented merely by knowing one another.

But what is needed is not alone such understanding as a skilled huntsman has of his quarry; who knows the animals' feeding time and place, the timidities, the keenness of sense, the "spoor," the vital spot for his bullet. Knowing more of this than perhaps does any scientist, he brings down his game.

A larger kind of understanding is necessary, where tolerance and appreciation are fused with the knowledge, as in the understanding between a man and his dog, or between friends, where the knowledge is no less than with the hunter, but with something added to transform the whole. That the higher form of understanding can easily be changed into the lower and then be restored, is evident from playmates or friends who may fall out and fall in again, or in courtship with its transient misunderstandings. The misunderstanding here is not equivalent to a decrease of knowledge; no facts need be forgotten that were known before. What is said in ill temper is not unintelligible; it is only too intelligible. But the attitude has changed.

The sources of friendliness and of hostility, then, are somewhat larger than those of intelligence merely, of acquaintance with fact. The mutual attitude, the use to which the knowledge of each other is put, the breadth of

purpose behind the acquaintance—these are the fateful additions. Such a vital thing as good will can somehow be present even with considerable ignorance, and be missing even where there is fair degree of knowledge.

The practical question, therefore, is not whether we shall have mutual acquaintance, but what we shall do with it, and whether we shall rely upon it alone. We may or may not wish it, yet acquaintance is upon us; the hidden corners of the earth now find themselves on the highways of land and water and air. Invisible, inaudible messages are throbbing across deserts and mountain chains and oceans. *But the easy confidence that all these things will of themselves bring friendliness is misplaced.* The almost unbroken contact, the readier intercourse, the fuller acquaintance prepares almost indifferently for either an increased good will among nations or an increased danger and mistrust. *Indeed the intimacy of relations, if nothing additional and constructive is done regarding it, is apt to bring trouble rather than freedom from trouble.* The new annulling of space, the knocking-out of partitions, means a universal surprised confronting, with all the novel problems and risks which come with such proximity.

CHAPTER XIII

PSYCHOLOGY IN ANNEXATIONS AND THE BIRTH RATE

AN IMPRESSIVE DOCTRINE WIDELY ACCEPTED

IF Homer had not nodded, would he have seen that the Trojan War was not due to Helen but to a pressure of population among the Greeks? Such at least is coming to be the revised version of those who believe that an excess of inhabitants is the principal cause of international conflict.

This is the burden of recent writings, scholarly or popular, book on book. "Population pressure is always a major cause of war, either directly or indirectly," writes Professor Raymond Pearl of Johns Hopkins University. "Perhaps the most important force making for an unstable equilibrium between the nations of the world is overpopulation," says Professor Warren Thompson of Miami University, who adds: "The unequal pressure of man's numbers in different areas makes it impossible for any nation to eat long of the cake of vast and monopolized resources and yet preserve the cake of peace." "Growth of population not only creates occasions of war, but makes war inevitable," writes Mr. Harold Cox, the editor of the *Edinburgh Review*. Increase of population "compels nations to expand and thus inevitably brings them into collision with one another," declares Mr. John Bakeless. And so by him and others a war is foreshadowed wherein the nations will contend for territory, since they are driven to this contest by the relentless pressure of their numbers, by the sheer natural force of procreation.

There can be no doubt that the increase of population in many a country creates a grave problem, and that war in our time is largely for economic gain. But there is convincing evidence, I venture to think, that this struggle for economic gain is not itself forced upon the nations; they are not compelled to it by biological necessity, by the hunger-need of their people. The statesmen, the specialists, the popular writers who believe this are believing what is compounded of fact one part, and nine parts illusion. There appears here a strange mocking of reality which, however, is not to be despised; for quite as though it were solid truth, it can affect policy and bring war.

A PRELIMINARY MISGIVING

That the pressure of population is not the chief cause of territorial expansion and clash is suggested by several facts; and first of all by what of itself is not persuading, but merely casts a shadow of misgiving across the mind. This misgiving comes because of the classes of men who are to-day the readiest to advise annexation.

One of these groups is of large investors who see an enriched opportunity for themselves in foreign lands if only their own flag be there to protect and advance their interests. In every powerful country there is unceasing machination to extend the national domain, with or without any other motive than that of commercial gain. Whenever investments are afoot, the nation soon finds itself urged, for honor's sake and for humanity, to dispossess some weaker nation of its land. With a sigh as from a slave of duty, Great Britain consents to accept rich mineral deposits and fertile valleys as a part of the "white man's burden." The United States is urged to-day and incessantly to go farther into Mexico and other Latin countries

of America, and has not always been able to withstand the urging. But those who bring a government to such a course seem not always to be thinking of the poor and needy of their homeland. Wherever the United States enters and remains, the holdings of these investors increase in value. Their purpose may be entirely honorable, and their success may be of benefit both at home and abroad, but they do not appear intent, before all else, upon the needs of an excessive home population.

The other group ever ready for annexation is military and naval. These men espy positions not in our possession: an island here which is the key to an entire ocean; a tidy bit of earth there, without which the homeland will never be safe against the foe. For this reason Italy needed for her better defense territory along the Alps possessed by Austrians, and upon the Adriatic lying close to the need of the Slavs. Likewise in France the military men would have had her annex all the German territory on the left bank of the Rhine. Similarly Japan's annexations have been pressed forward by the military and naval influence so powerful in her government. With America also, so I observed when in the Philippines, the military men are heart and soul with the business men in the desire that these rich and immense islands be definitively annexed to the United States. And when the American purpose was taking form some years ago with respect to Cuba, it was a naval officer and not a settlement worker at Hull House or in Henry Street who would have had us extend our boundary to the South. "I myself," wrote Admiral Mahan, "thought if we went to war we had better take Cuba, the military importance of which to our position had been evident ever since we became a nation. I was out of sympathy with the self-denying resolution of Congress, which in advance pledged us to non-acquisition." Even

with the United States, then, though fortunately less strong, the influence ran in the same direction as with Germany in 1870-71, where the military men were all for taking the provinces which for so many years have vexed the heart of Europe: "I regarded the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine with misgiving," said Bismarck in a conversation with Richmond who was painting his portrait; "Moltke insisted upon it as a necessity. Russia made a great mistake when she created another Poland for herself by taking Bessarabia."

If there are those who desire above all to find an outlet for an excessive population, they are, then, ably seconded by others in working for an enlargement of the national domain. The investors and the army and navy in each of the more powerful countries join heart and soul in the unceasing attempt to extend the nation's boundaries.

OVERPOPULATION IN RECENT WARS

The suspicion made quietly astir by facts like these becomes more fully awake when we look to the origin of the more important wars of our time. It will there be seen that overpopulation may perhaps appear upon the scene, but it probably plays no leading part and certainly no exclusive part in causing these great conflicts.

The World War, it is well known, sprang from rivalries almost too intricate to name, but in no case was there overtopping all else the prime need of sustenance; other motives arising from other aims were in control. Between Russia and Austria there was the desire, whether from political ambition or from a sense of insecurity, to dominate and to prevent the rival from dominating the Slavs and other peoples of eastern and southeastern Europe. Between Germany and England there was the German desire for power

upon the seas, and England's unwillingness to have her own power threatened. Between France and Germany came old and varied grudges and ambitions, in which the bitter defeat of France in 1870, the wresting of her rich provinces from her, exerted no minor force.

No one of Germany's chief enemies—Russia, France, England, and the United States—had a population threatened with hunger because of land lack. The British Empire, Russia, and the United States had wide territory. France already possessed more land at home and abroad than she could densely people. And as for Germany herself, she had colonial lands unfilled and, as will be shown later, her homeland was not so crowded but that for many years before the War the stream of those who wished to enter and live in Germany was far larger than of those who wished to leave the Fatherland.

In the war between China and Japan, when Japan acquired Korea and Formosa and would gladly have acquired a foothold in Manchuria, an excess of population may have had a more important place. But still more potent was the example of the Western powers that had despoiled China by annexations unabashed and by annexations pleasantly called leases, concessions, and spheres of influence, and that had, moreover, taught Japan the use of such powerful means as a modern army and navy. Japan had become ambitious to adopt the Western culture; and she wished also by control of the adjoining Asiatic mainland to keep from her own close neighborhood these rapacious Western powers.

And when Japan later fought Russia, the crisis was brought, not by overcrowded Japan, but by Russia with her great Siberian plains still waiting for population. Russia pushed her power to Japan's very door who tried long to avert the war but finally accepted it and rushed forth ready

by a bold stroke to stop so menacing an approach and at the same time to gain her ambition for prestige with the West by a military victory over a great Occidental power. Japan's guns spoke a language intelligible both to Europe and America, and she became at once one of the lords of the world. In a vigorous nation trained from of old in military standards of honor, the desire for respect and for protection through her own sword would easily exceed her anxiety for the mere crowding of her people. The Oriental mind has not usually viewed with gravest concern a dense population.

If surplus population came far short of the first place in causing these wars, still farther from the first place did it come in the Boer War, or in the war between the United States and Spain, or in the wars for primacy and union among the German states. In the Boer War the Dutch and British were not crowded to suffocation in the large spaces of South Africa; the rich veldts and diamond mines were not unable to support the teeming population. And when the United States and Spain went to war, neither side had a thought of taking land for an overcrowding people; but the United States had long disliked Spain's presence in Cuba, and there were commercial and naval ideas to lead on. Nor in the war between Prussia and Austria of 1866 was population the prime mover; it was rather that each of these powers desired to be first among the German states then looking toward unity—a unity which was attained, with Prussia at its head, by the war of 1870 into which the truculent militarism of France allowed herself easily to be baited by the shrewd devices of Bismarck, von Roon, and Moltke. In every one of these wars some motive other than that of overpopulation is found to dominate.

BEHAVIOR IN CROWDED AND IN UNCROWDED COUNTRIES

But while such evidence already indicates that our modern wars and the annexations to which they lead are not aimed primarily at sustenance for a needy people, let us press on toward a third group of facts which will further confute the dark saying that the struggle for territory and more territory is inevitable since the nations are driven to this by biological necessity, by the inexorable operation of their hungry numbers.

And first of all is the striking fact that certain countries, which clearly are excessive in their population as shown by recurrent starvation, are not the ones which are pouring forth into new territory or clamoring for new territory; the cry for foreign land is not from them. India with her three hundred million inhabitants periodically limited by hunger; China with her three hundred millions periodically starving—these are not the countries irresistibly driven to seize more and more thousands of square miles. If there were biological necessity in the present national expansions; if these came, as is said, by an inexorable operation; then the inexorable operation ought to be clearly seen in the populous Asia of to-day. But China and India, instead of being compelled by very nature to wage war for an enlargement of their boundaries, would be glad indeed if they could but hold for themselves what insufficient land they have.

Not from them come the seizures and the wail of distress, but from the relatively unpopulous West. The countries of the Occident which have desired more land are many and are not equally uncrowded. England, Holland, Belgium, Germany, and Italy—countries whose homeland is densely peopled—have supplemented their lack by large colonial holdings. But others less straitened have by no

means all been idle. France, whose home population she herself would gladly see increased, has nevertheless pushed on into immense regions of the earth—into South America; into Asia, where, apart from her mandate of Syria, her more easterly possessions are twice the size of France itself; and into Africa, where she possesses a territory over sixteen times the size of France. Russia with fertile land not densely peopled has moved southward by the Black and Caspian seas and eastward for thousands of miles through Siberia to the Pacific. The United States, long before her Atlantic coast and her great valleys of the Ohio, Missouri, and Mississippi were crowded, had possessed herself of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, the Northwest, and Alaska, and had made firm her grasp in the Caribbean, on the Isthmus, and out on the Pacific to the shores of China. The more thinly settled countries, if only they possess power, have thus felt the urging to expand. The supposed inexorable operation has worked in their case quite as inexorably without pressure of population as it has worked in others with pressure.

Moreover, the nations which are supposed to be actuated by sheer pressure of population are as ready to take territory densely populous as to take land nearly uninhabited. Alsace and Lorraine that have passed back and forth like a volley ball are not waiting for population. Alsace is more thickly peopled than is Germany in general; while in contrast to France's general density of 184 inhabitants to the square mile, Lorraine has 245 to the square mile, and Alsace about 349. And as we pass over into eastern and southeastern Europe, we find that almost every country there—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Greece, and Italy—has been hungry for indigestible populations, if only some territory could be swallowed with them; while in the Far East any and all accessible parts

of China have been coveted by the Occidental powers no less eagerly than have the thinly inhabited regions of Africa, Australia, and the Pacific coast of North America. The powers desire rich territory, and care little whether it be rich and uninhabited, or rich and populous.

Furthermore, the claim of insistent territorial need has not always been well supported by the behavior of the people itself. In Japan, for example, the inhabitants have shown themselves not loath to emigrate; they have shown themselves a people not stolidly stay-at-homes. More than one hundred and fifty thousand have emigrated to Australia; more than a quarter of a million have moved into China, Hawaii, and California. They have gone also into the territory which Japan acquired from China, into Korea and Formosa, where there are half a million Japanese. But the northern region of her own island group, notably Hokkaido, is not populous, nor is there other than a scant population in Karafuto, the Japanese possession in Sakhalin. The Japanese, like many another people, are ready to emigrate to places where there is promise of more favorable living. But life in their own green and wooded home is not felt by them to be so hard that they must leave it in any case, as men left Ireland in its famine years. Nor is there any mystery in this to the visitor in Japan who has before his delighted eyes the miracle of their industry, their sweet countryside, and the cheer they can put into hardest labor.

But even more than Japan, does Germany illustrate how a people may contradict the claim of the publicist that nature herself speaking by the birth rate is compelling them to annex some neighbor's territory. Already long before the War—which many have thought was because Germany's enemies had ringed her around with steel and were stifling the breath of life within her—she had acquired her immense

colonial lands in China and in the Pacific and most of all in Africa. Her burning desire for still more territory, it was said, was because of the refusal of her people to swarm into these new lands.

But if Germans preferred to live in Germany, life there was not insufferable. Indeed the less endurable the home conditions were declared to be by her governors, the more did her people choose to remain in Germany or to return to Germany if they had departed. Her emigration overseas greatly declined in the thirty years before the War. During the year 1881 German emigrants overseas (my figures are from her official documents) numbered 220,902. From then on, the emigration of Germans to countries overseas steadily grew less, until in 1913 it had shrunk to 25,843—to one-eighth of its former number. And in the meanwhile the return flow into Germany from beyond seas increased until it by far exceeded the outward current. Not only was Germany not stifled, but men and women by thousands were feeling that they could draw a deeper breath in Germany than in any other country that they or their friends had yet attempted. Instead of there being a pressure of population outward as though ready for an explosion, there was a partial *vacuum* which sucked population from without. Thus the Germans, still more clearly than the Japanese, have in their conduct made an unmistakable comment upon the assertion that the pressure of their population was compelling them inexorably to take some neighbor's land. Ahab and Jezebel should have thought of this excuse for their territorial expansion.

LUST FOR TERRITORY

And, still further, if the acquisition of territory were because of biological need, would there not come repletion

—as a man eating from hunger does in time cease to eat? But nations eyeing territory ill defended are like greedy boys whose appetite is divorced from need. With nations the drive for territory does not cease when the territory is acquired, nor with a hundred times the territory of their wildest early dream. Russia with all her acquisition has never eased her lust for the earth's surface; nor is England ever sated. The United States has acquired province upon province, from England, France, Mexico, Russia, and Spain. And as one looks to China, where the taking will cease only when China can resist it or when the powers prevent one another and not when all are satisfied, does one not become almost assured that the land seizure is less from need than from greed?

Clearly then the land hunger of the powers is not governed by the plain need of sustenance. There is the least of connection between the two: underpopulated nations are as eager as the populous; they seize not only thinly peopled territory, but thickly populated as well; their hunger is never appeased; and those that should have most appetite if this came because of numbers are wholly missing from the ravenous crew. Territory is sometimes taken because of need, but more often because of greed united with power; it is taken because there is the power to take it and because it often adds to the power by which it was taken.

We must recognize a plain lust for territory, independent of dire need, but always with some plausible excuse. "A nation that holds the coast," wrote Lord Bryce, "will say that it ought to have the 'hinterland'; a nation that dwells some way from the sea will insist that it must have an outlet and ports to develop its commerce. Any pretext will do;—the protection of a native race, a large share in some natural product needed for warfare, a blessing to be conferred upon the world by the diffusion of a higher type of

civilization." And to these pretexts stripped bare by Bryce may we not add that of an excessive population crying at home for food?

WHAT OF FEAR FOR THE FUTURE?

"But," it might be said, "although there is no visible connection between actual need and the current lust for territory, yet the facts are invisibly conjoined; the powerful are driven along their course by the fear of a need and pressure to come. They foresee the danger while yet it is afar off, and rush to prevent it."

One may not deny the existence of such a dread and such a motive of provision. In some nations it is unquestionably strong and well founded. But everything indicates that this fear is not ruling the world's international movements. For the clear truth is, that wherever military danger and military advantage have been in the air, whether in ancient Persia the Great or in the pettiest of Balkan states to-day, an increase of population is something less feared than welcomed. Many of the greatest powers of our time are anxious over an increase of their own population, not to avert it but to see that nothing prevents it; and, if it comes, to kiss it on both cheeks. France all these years has not been thanking high heaven that she had no excess of population; she has rather prayed as she watched Germany that it might come also to herself. Germany when she was thought to be in straits because of population was glad in the vigor of her birth rate, and saw to it that there should be no slackening; by word and deed her Kaiser spoke out bravely for large families—even as Roosevelt with us, he of the Big Stick, preached to an expanding nation the fear of race suicide. England, with one of the most crowded national populations in the world,

has had her misgivings lest a lower birth rate should weaken her military strength. And to-day Mussolini and his Fascists in an overcrowded country do not wring their hands—they exult—because in the few years of their régime, Italy's dense population has increased by millions of mouths. A "magnificent prolificity" it has been called in Italy; "never in the history of any people has there been so rapid a rhythm of population increase"; it is of "supreme historical importance." Italy is not overpopulated, declares Mussolini, but underpopulated, and must in the next twenty years raise her population from forty millions to sixty millions. And to assist the increase a tax is imposed on bachelors, and rewards are given for large families.

This, then, is the ominous fact, that in many parts of the West and in those parts of the Orient which have breathed most deeply the breath of the West the great increase of a population already great is dreaded and yet even more it is desired. And why is the increase desired? Because it is an added element of power, like territory and wealth and a strong army and navy—indeed as an important means to these elements of power. A large population offers hope of increased defense and, if policy so inclines, of increased aggression. A large population brings with it a peril far greater than that which comes from the bare need of food.

It is an added danger here, that there comes a besetting self-deception. A fear of population without ample means of subsistence is real even though relatively weak; and being real, other and far more powerful motives step in and use this weak one for their own covering and advantage. The major desire is for power and for security through power. Each nation covets for itself a favored political place, a favored economic place; and many of them covet the prestige and advantage of military and naval strength.

These powerful aims outvie the solicitude for an overcrowded population and especially for an overcrowding which has not yet come. But a solicitude for plain men and women and children in need of food is the more admirable motive; and so upon this the nation rests its introspective eye, upon this it fondly dwells. With no intended hypocrisy this motive is proclaimed to the people itself and to others to justify conduct which through and through is not so humane. Thus comes a serious delusion: the rivalry for prestige and independent power and for security through independent power is imaginatively adorned until it seems fit for moral approbation. The less honorable motive is hidden from the nation itself, while dubious annexations are solemnly regarded as though done in helpless obedience to an inexorable law that men will procreate and their children will have food. The self-deception here is deep and wonderful.

We should be able finally to prick this illusion. The forces which move toward annexations would then no longer appear as a compulsion of nature and to be "inexorable," but would be recognized as a part of national ambition and of responsible human will. We could then with some heart seek a way to defeat them.

OTHER WAYS THAT ARE OPEN

As for averting the danger of excessive population—a danger which is great—we may expect the chief nations to feel no warmth toward any proposal that deeply disappoints their desire for power and for security by means of power. Increase of territory as a means of relief from human increase agrees so well with commercial and military modes of thought, that to territorial expansion the nations will continue to turn until the light within them grows clearer—

looking to increase of territory as the sole treatment for hypertrophy of population. They are so wedded to this particular cure indeed that many could truthfully testify that they had tried the remedy centuries ago, and had used no other since.

And yet it is not as though nothing else could be done; for other ways are open, open singly or in conjunction, whereby if the one does not suffice, all of them together will.

The nations could, for one course, *encourage smaller families*, or at least cease to encourage large families, where large families are undesirable. But Japan, who is thought to be most anxious for relief, has done her stout best to prevent any teaching of her people toward this end. Nor is Italy in her present mood likely to welcome the teaching. And even in England, whose population is nearly the densest in the world, the Second Birth Rate Commission declared with anxiety: "In the event of a war similiar to that which we have just experienced what would happen to us with a greatly reduced birth rate? Surely all we have would be taken, and we must become slaves." Indeed for these and other reasons no country is apt to greet heartily the proposal to have a lowered rate of birth.

Another course, open to those for whom a lessened birth rate is not acceptable or is insufficient, is to *look to the economic means of providing for their numbers*. Science and its inventive applications are such that we cannot now be as certain as we were some years ago that the world is on the eve of reaching its limit of population; or that many of the Occidental countries have already reached their limit. Not only the number that can live at all, but the number that can live in greatest economic prosperity upon a given territory, is changing with every advance in the technique of production and distribution. Up to a certain point there

is an obvious benefit in having more people on the soil and in the cities, and this best number is not unchangeable. What would to-day be this optimal population for Germany, Italy, or Japan will be far from the optimal population two decades hence. It is possible, then, for nations to go some distance toward relieving their lot, if it be hard, by making their agriculture and their wider economic system better suited to the increase of their people. Much could be done by nations coöperating with one another.

And for a third course, it is always possible to encourage an unfocused, *a scattered emigration to foreign lands.* The United States, it is true, leaves the door open only a part of the year to the Italians; but the United States is not all the world: other lands do not shut their doors at any time. And as for the Japanese, they are not excluded from China, Russia, Latin America, and many another country if only they will remember to leave their flag at home. And likewise the Germans. For when Germany was not yet bent upon world power, she saw with no deep regret her people move to America. It was not until political ambition entered into her soul that this emigration caused her distress; strength needed for the *Reich,* she now felt, was being spent on others. Her anxiety had by this time become clearly less for her needy people than for the Imperial Eagle; a solution of the problem of population was unthinkable for her unless it enlarged the Empire's might. In this she was of one mind with all the nations ambitious for power.

We cannot expect anything but coolness toward any of these measures for limiting the population, so long as there is the strong desire for a result the very opposite to such a limiting. Nations will not work heartily against increase, when increase is the very thing which in their hearts they desire. Unless we can strike at this wish itself, there is

little hope of serious national interest in preventing huge numbers.

TO WEAKEN THE DESIRE FOR EXCESSIVE POPULATION

And so, in closing this chapter, let us inquire whether anything can be done against the desire itself, to weaken it by removing perhaps a chief cause of it so that the fear of overpopulation may work unhindered toward a solution. Even with all good will, the solution must in practice be difficult enough. Is there a promising preparation?

We have already seen the soil which nourishes the love of numbers. The nations welcome great and still greater population as a means to power and security. They fear economic and military defeat; they long for economic and military primacy. They desire wealth, and they want their wealth secure. And this secure greatness they too often picture as attainable by separate strength. With large population and territory to be taxed and to bring forth men, it is possible to have greater armies and more formidable navies. And so an ever larger population is with too many of the peoples secretly or openly welcome, as giving the excuse and incentive, and also the military means, for annexations—for annexations which still further augment the national power.

Population, with annexation for still greater population, is thus all fused into the purpose to attain safety by independent might. My thought is not at all that population is increased solely by political ambition and apart from nature and economic conditions; for we know that in certain parts of the Orient, at least in our day, there has been no political fostering of numbers. But in the world of Western ambition, there has been during the present century an arming as never before, and as never before also a looking to great

population as the very substance of armament, since the military strength issues no longer from money alone nor from a special class, but from the entire nation—from its wealth, manhood, and womanhood, all combined. Competitive strength of population is therefore seen clearly to be joined with competitive strength of armed nationhood. *What stimulates an arming by the nation stimulates also the desire for a larger population; and what will quiet the one longing will help to quiet the other longing also.* The two kinds of relief, from armament and population, are therefore linked together.

Now the problem of armament is by most nations felt to be closely bound with the problem of security: unless there is promise of safety by some better means the nations will look to great separate military establishments as a protection from one another. And they will look also to increased population which is the very heart and substance of all their defense.

Is there, then, any clearer way to lessen the desire for great and even for excessive population, than by lessening the danger from which the desire draws so much of its life? And the danger which governments have so long tried to avert by independent national power, the most of them are now beginning to see can be lessened only by common guarantees of safety, by making the security of each a common enterprise of all. So long as security is sought by separate and independent strength, we shall have rivalry in arming, rivalry for territory, and rivalry for population. And with this there will be a deep political aversion toward any practical measures for keeping population within bounds. *The nations which stand for security by separate might, then, are unwitting friends of overpopulation, and those which aim at joint security are its unwitting enemies.*

The problem of population will not be solved merely by

security, but the way will then be prepared for a solution. We shall have rid ourselves of the inner conflict of desire which makes politically impossible any and all the means which might bring relief. With security attained, the problem of population would be freed from its present fusion with the need for overpowering independent might. The difficulty caused by numbers could be faced in a new spirit differing from the present divided mind in which the thing feared is too often loved and even courted. At present this inner conflict is sure to paralyze all proper action.

CHAPTER XIV

THE ATTITUDES CONNECTED WITH COMMERCE

ARE THERE TWO DISTINCT KINDS OF NATIONS?

NO nation to-day seems warlike in its own eyes; each seems to itself to be a faithful lover of peace. But as we look out upon other nations do there appear two opposed classes, some nations being warlike, and others commercial?

There undoubtedly is an opposition of this kind in history and our own time. Ancient Mexico would illustrate the one type for, with her, military honor was the supreme honor, and education and all the chief energies of State were, above all else, directed to conquest and military prestige. In its own degree the same spirit was in ancient Persia under its great military rulers, in Macedon under Philip and Alexander, in Prussia under Frederick the Great, in France under the first Napoleon, and in Germany under Bismarck and William II. The opposing type, in which the commercial purpose shapes things to its end, would be illustrated by the Hanseatic League, by Genoa, by Venice, by Portugal in the time of her great navigators, and at various periods by the Chinese, the Dutch, the English, and the Americans.

But clearly we shall not be able to fit all nations nicely into such classes. As Steinmetz has seen, nations, like the United States, which surely are commercial are also ready to engage in war. And warlike nations, like the Germany of 1870 to 1914, have commercial success. The English, also,

are both traders and fighters, even as were the Venetians, the Romans, and the Phœnicians.

Moreover *every* nation is in some degree warlike, being ready to maintain itself by force of arms. Even the Chinese, who until recently have been held up for our admiration or scorn as a nation of pacifists, have had their military tradition and their ancient solemn requirement of war preparation. The Shih King and the Li Ki of their classics tell in detail of the martial arrangements needed in a well-governed State. China, which, as truly as Napoleon's England, is a nation of shopkeepers, has had her immense armies in our own times and has shown that she can again be warlike with the rest.

And every nation is in some degree commercial. Even to support a heavy armament there must be active trade. Only a people not large enough in number or sufficiently developed politically to be a living part of the society of nations can exist by war plunder alone or by local production alone without exchange. We need look for no such antithesis between the warlike and the commercial as would reveal the one group of nations waging war without commerce, and the other group trading without war. *The two spirits, of war and of commerce, live in every modern nation;* every people is possessed by both. The most that we can say is, that the one or the other spirit may be uppermost, the national policy being shaped here by merchants, and there by soldiers.

BEHAVIOR OF COMMERCIAL NATIONS

But what of a kindred question, of great moment for the world's practice? Does the spirit of commerce tend to nourish or to starve the war spirit? Are those right who hold that trade and its rivalries are the greatest cause of

international ill will? For it is a current saying that the commercially minded nations are most eager for raw materials and markets; they elbow one another, and from jealousy they come to hatred and finally to blows.

One hardly need indicate the importance of our inquiry; the face of the future is changed by the answer. For since the coming years are sure to be even more commercial than the present, will they make it easier or more difficult to have law and order and good will in the world? Let us consider for some moments the bearing of a few nations of the day toward their fellow-nations, asking ourselves whether the more commercial are also the more ardent for war, and the less commercial the less warlike; or whether the opposite is true.

And before coming to the great powers, we might glance at some not counted great, that play no leading part because of war strength. Argentina, for example, has built up a highly successful commerce, her exports and imports in 1927 having a value of nearly two billion dollars. And yet she has been among the least inclined to war of all the nations on the American continent, or in all the world; she has waged no foreign war for over sixty years.

Indeed when we consider the nations which have had the least recourse to war—having had no foreign war for fifty years or more; Argentina, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, the last four of these having had no foreign war for about a hundred years—when we view these persistent avoiders of war, we find that all of them are vigorous commercially. To find commercial weaklings, you will have no difficulty if you search among such countries as Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania—countries always game for fighting. Greece, for example, whose population is one and a half times larger than Switzerland, and whose territory is three times as large, imported in 1924

only one-third as much as Switzerland, and exported only one-sixth as much. Among the lesser nations of the world large commerce has been possible without zeal for war, or without driving them to war in spite of themselves. And want of zeal and ability for commerce has not brought peace.

But of the more powerful nations, has not commerce intensified their war eagerness? We shall find, I believe, that it has and it has not.

Great Britain and the United States, for example, have been among the most active commercially; and yet they did not have more wars with other civilized peoples during the century ending in 1929 than had Russia and Austria-Hungary that were powerful but were not at the commercial front. These less commercial countries were in conflict no less often, indeed were in conflict more often, than were the nations whose eyes were fixed on trade.

But a nation's attitude toward others is to be judged not simply by the number of its wars, but also by its inclination to compose its quarrels by friendly means. And so we may ask whether the more commercially minded were the more or were they the less hospitable toward pacific methods of adjustment, such as arbitration. Were they the staunchest believers in war and in a free hand to advance their trade interests as they saw fit, unhindered by the judgment of others?

We find that nations most powerful in trade have encouraged international arbitration. If we compare the United States, a commercial people, with Russia, which has been more sluggish in trade, we find that the United States during the nineteenth century submitted to formal arbitration no less than fifty-eight of her disputes with other nations, while Russia submitted six. The nation with a merchant's outlook was nine times readier to resort to this

relatively new and unwarlike device. And if we do not keep our eye exclusively on formal arbitration, but include such means as arbitral boards, commissions for the delimitation of boundaries, and the like, the United States entered this wider field of international adjustment far oftener than did Russia. Great Britain, a trader to the core, was even more markedly hospitable toward this method of settlement. During the last thirty years of the nineteenth century, when we can compare her attitude with that of the German Empire (also becoming mercantile, but less so than warlike) and with the Russian Empire, we find Great Britain entering into seventy-eight such peaceful arrangements, while Germany entered into but twenty-two, and Russia into only fourteen. Nor were Austria-Hungary and Turkey, also relatively free from the mercantile spirit, in the vanguard of those favoring unwarlike accommodation.

And similarly when we come back to the less powerful States, and now look not only to their wars but to their use of arbitral methods. Here also we find that the nations more active and successful commercially—such countries as Holland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland—which we have already seen to be not inclined to rush into war, had in force in 1926, the four of them, no less than eighty-seven treaties (in addition to their commitments by reason of being members of the League of Nations) which provided for arbitration in case of dispute with other countries. An equal number of States with far less of the merchant's outlook—Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Mexico—had in force, all told, only fifteen such treaties. The mercantile countries had voluntarily bound themselves by more than five times as many formal pledges against the free use of war as had the less mercantile.

We may not say that commercial nations are never eager for war; nor that their hesitation to rush into war is due

solely to their commerce. But the belief that the nations intent upon trade are the more apt to be hard and hostile seems not to be favored by the evidence. Such a creed runs against the fact that indifference and open hostility toward other nations, as shown in war and in coldness toward substitutes for war, is found rather in the uncommercial. *The nations of mercantile zeal—stiff-necked and violent though they are—are in general a little less stiff of neck, a little less ready for violence, than their fellows.* The trader-nations on the whole are somewhat readier to bend their will and to recognize that they are in a society of nations than are those less interested in commerce. *To rid the world of its worst aggressions, then, does not require us to rid the world of its nations bent on trade.*

INTERNATIONAL TRADE RIVALRIES

But would the facts just described tend to quiet a deeper doubt? Might not the softened behavior of the more commercial be due to forces quite other than their commerce? For are not these commercial nations the more progressive generally, readier to feel the fresh currents of thought upon international comity; and more inclined to better conduct, not because of their commercial interest, but in spite of it? The very spirit of trade, it would be said, is ruthless; the desire for wealth, the acquisitive impulse in nations, is the most imperious motive they know, and its movement is far less toward harmony than toward discord; trade rivalries are implacable rivalries, inspired with a pitiless animosity that means a struggle to the death of one or other of the rivals.

Let us, then, look farther into commerce and its supposed rivalries, implacable and deadly. It will be of use to see the spirit of modern trade.

Now the rivalry between the United States and Great Britain is no beflowered and silken rivalry. America has held and lost and has tried to regain the carrying trade of the world. The Union Jack has pressed back the Stars and Stripes in nearly every quarter of the globe, and has been kept from the American coastwise trade only by governmental exclusion of all ships of other nations. America has at times distressed England's cotton factories and has goaded her in the sources and markets of steel and petroleum, while England has grieved America with respect to rubber. The chagrin, the loss on each side, is often great. And yet with all the intense and often bitter competition, and the pressure toward what is carelessly called an inevitable conflict, the conflict has been avoided and there has been no war between these nations for over a hundred years—between two nations that are exceedingly powerful and that are among the nations most dominated by commercial ideals. The will, the intelligence to avoid the conflict has made avoidance possible. Each of the two nations grits its teeth, "looks" things unutterable, swallows its wrath, and carries on its commerce with new vigor.

Norway and Sweden also are in many respects rivals commercially, as are the Dutch and the Danes. These cut into each other's markets without being driven to a decision by armies. The intense economic rivalry between England and Germany in the decades before the World War, we can now see, need not have led to the folly of a naval challenge by Germany. This was due to special perversity, and was not a necessary consequence of the trade rivalry itself. If Germany had been content to see her trade climb steadily toward the first place and had not made her tragic attempt to add naval guarantees to her already clear supremacy in army power, there was no effective national purpose either

in England, or in America with whom also she was a trade rival, to prevent her commercial success by military force. The commercial rivalry did not escape war, but it could have escaped it if Germany's guides had not been blind and if there had been a different political spirit in the international world, both European and American. There was no inevitable world war in Germany's and England's trade rivalry itself. An equal rivalry between England and America did not bring war.

EVIDENCE FROM DOMESTIC COMMERCE

That economic incentives do not of themselves inexorably demand violence, that they are responsive to the law and order of the society in which they move, is seen also in the intense and yet unmilitary competition among the parts of the one nation. New England competes with the factories of the southern states of the American Union; the farmers of America see themselves constantly opposed by the manufacturers of America. Canada and England, Australia and New Zealand are in many respects rivals each of the other. By all international lore these rivals should be driven to settle their difference by bombs and soldiery. The whole solemn absurdity so current would require that competing cities, competing private corporations, competing individuals could never see themselves outsold without rushing to arms. But the plain fact is, that the rivals may dislike or even hate one another; they may, although usually they do not, go down to commercial defeat before some one of their company. Usually they survive and flourish in great numbers. New York and Chicago, or New York and London, or London and Berlin show no sign that, because of the other's success in trade, one of them must become a habitation of owls and coyotes. If either of the two competitors is de-

feated, it is defeated, and straightway looks more sharply to its commerce rather than to poison-gas and lewisite.

Trade, then, save in international life, is normally without physical violence; indeed it usually increases the opportunities of success even for one's opponent. And if between nations it is the opposite of this, and often leads straight to the cannon's mouth, this is not because of something in the trade, but because of something in the nations. In the nations' state of mind almost any serious rivalry leads to violence. We need not believe that there is a deadly difficulty inherent in commerce, and bound to last as long as commerce lasts.

NATURAL ACQUISITIVENESS CONTRASTED WITH TRADE

Indeed when we look more closely into this economic activity, we can see that its character is by no means what appears in the popular portrait. From street orators bent upon showing the demoniac traits of the capitalistic system, one might believe that commerce is nothing but primal rapacity come into power. In modern business, such speakers believe, the acquisitive instinct stalks forth naked and unashamed.

But this, of course, is imaginative. The possessive impulse in its more nearly native form is seen rather in the dog's snapping a bone from another dog, in the child's grabbing a toy out of another child's hand, in a nation's seizing by arms some territory rightly belonging to its neighbor. In all such cases there is no compensation, no *quid pro quo,* no exchange.

Commerce, in contrast to all this, is a clever invention whereby the possessive instinct is refashioned to accommodate itself to human society. Animals are acquisitive but not commercial; they store and use what they store or

what some other animals have stored; the social animals cooperate in acquisition, and they may enslave others and have them at hand to contribute. But no group of them, not even the bees and ants, have invented a systematic and intentional shopkeeping and exchange of products; they have not seen the possibilities of trade.

In commerce, then, the possessive impulse is skillfully schooled for social use. It has been so altered in habit that men can live with it and prosper because of it. For in this new harnessing of the acquisitive instinct, you take from another person only with his consent, and on condition that you allow him to take from you something which he values more than the thing he surrenders to you. It is an invention more remarkable than the mariner's compass or the airplane. The rough thing that in its native state brought gain to one only, and loss to all others, is now so turned and twisted that the possessive desire in one person actually helps to gratify the possessive desires of the rest. Instead of despoiling your opponent, you give him something which he prefers to what you take from him; you enrich him.

And now we can see clearly the accommodating, the binding force in trade, stronger than the divisive. The merchant, while he may hate and may attempt to defeat some other merchant, nevertheless succeeds in his merchanting only by adapting himself to the desire of his customer; even as the trading nation must in some degree accommodate itself to the need of the foreigner. There must also be a certain confidence that the other person will not act by untrained impulse but will hold himself in control and not be predatory.

This trust in others, which trading requires, can be seen at its lowest pitch in the barter among most backward and suspicious peoples of the Orient. The Koeboes of Sumatra,

"perhaps the most primitive on the globe," and the Semang and Sakai of the Malay Peninsula practice what is called silent trading. A man brings to a certain place what goods he cares to offer, lays them down, and retires. Another man who would trade with him then comes forth and leaves beside the first man's goods what he offers in exchange and he himself than retires. The first man now reappears, examines what has been left behind by the second man, and, if not satisfied, takes away his own and leaves what was offered for it. If he is satisfied, however, he carries away the offering, and leaves his own goods instead, and the bargain is closed.

Even here, where distrust of the other trader is hardly to be exceeded if it is to leave any possibility of commerce, there is some confidence that one's own property will not be stolen outright or that oneself will not be ambushed and slain by superior numbers. And there is, moreover, an attempt by each person to meet the wants of the other. Along with such almost perfect distrust, there is something both of accommodation and of faith. And—although with a far higher degree of accommodation and faith—so it is in trade generally. Commercial nations must give hostages to the foreign nation: men and goods are abroad in ships and warehouses, and the costly web of the trade organization itself is exposed, ready to be torn to shreds at the first shot. Such hostages, such vulnerability, will not always prevent war; but they make the nation that has given the pledges a little less ready to begin violence; rapacity is under bonds. A nation intelligently bent upon commerce is to that extent committed to acquiring goods by exchange and not by plunder; it is committed to heeding certain interests and preferences of other nations. For this reason the nation commercially minded is, if anything, a little less arrogant, a little less lofty of manner.

CONTRAST BETWEEN COMMERCE AND WARFARE

The nation that is solely of military mind is placed under no such restraint; it need trust no other nations nor accommodate itself to them. It is not interested in their prosperity nor in an orderly world. Military *men* of course are not indifferent to all these things; such individuals have their high integrity; they partake of the personal culture of their times. But the policy itself which looks first of all toward military success has no need of a stabilized world, no need of the law and order which furthers trade; indeed it needs the very opposite, it needs to be left free to trouble the waters and to fish in them as it pleases.

But those who will see no difference between the commercial and the military spirit take their last stand upon what they regard as the psychology of trade. These fix their eye upon ruthless destructive competition, such as that wherein the Standard Oil Company drove others to the wall and destroyed them; and they declare this to be the characteristic spirit of commerce; that it is nothing but warfare in another form. War and business are not essentially different, such thinkers declare; business itself *is* war.

This is talk like that of Bildad the Shuhite. Makers and merchants such as Ford and Woolworth and A. Nash have had their success, partly by keeping their mind upon their rivals, it is true, but still more by rendering a more acceptable service than these were rendering. And normally their rivals have not been driven to the wall, but farther from it. By scores and hundreds these others are rich, even though not as rich as the few leaders who could create a new system and could meet as by a stroke of genius some interest of the consumer.

But leaving the exceptionally rich, and coming back to the plain tradesman, your corner grocer does not usually

stand on the prostrate form of some business rival. The families in the region where he has come with his stock in trade had been buying at a distance and inconveniently; he started his modest shop, not by killing some one else, but by discovering some marketable service which he could render to the neighborhood and thereby at once advance his own and others' interests. And in general if men are injured in the business process; if a competitor finds himself bankrupt because some one else performed better the service which the bankrupt was attempting—we must regard this injury not as the prime and characteristic result of trade but as something extraneous, something to be rid of without hurt, like the maiming and death from unsafe machinery in a factory.

But in war if you prevent the maiming and death, you prevent war itself; the damage is essential. Wrapped up warm in its very purpose is injury to the competitor. War is designed to ride roughshod over him, in order to reach one's own. The successful merchant may have no less self-interest than the warring nation; he may be a very Scrooge and Marley combined. And the warring nation may be not wholly selfish; it may at heart be a Bayard. The difference is not in the self-interest that may or may not be at the heart of the United States at war and of the steel corporation at peace. The important difference is that the selfish commercial house must make for others something they desire; whereas in war the selfish nation takes from others what they would give their eyes and breath of life to retain. The benefit to others is central to the one kind of operation; the injury to others is central to the other. The highwayman and the shopkeeper may look alike. Both are trying to get what they want and both want money. But they go about their business in ways that are as day to night in their attitude toward the community. To say

that they are psychologically the same is to be ignorant of psychology. A scientific psychology looks into more than some single bare motive of the persons to be compared, looks also into their social methods and adjustment, into the habits which they practice.

In sum, the spirit of business and the spirit of war not only are different, but they are as different in their communal relations as black and white. Both are rivalries, it is true, and both may be of self-interest; but the merchant does not normally take the money from his customer at the pistol's point and give him nothing, nor does he normally burn the rival's office and kill his clerks. *Those who say that economic rivalry is essentially the same as war, then, are indulging in imaginative discourse.*

The truth is, that in the international world one may easily be now tradesman and now brigand. When a nation cannot get by commerce all the wealth it wants, it readily turns highwayman. Both methods have been tried by foreign nations in China. *But we should not confuse these two forms of obedience to the acquisitive impulse, and ascribe to commerce what belongs to robbery.* It is not commerce which divides the nations. They are divided when acquisition utters itself in spoliation: the despoiled nation resists, and the robbers quarrel over the loot.

So it is hardly by chance, or in spite of their commerce, that the trading nations in general to-day have no more frequent wars than do their fellows, and indeed make greater effort to settle their disputes amicably. Their behavior accords with the spirit of the commerce to which they are committed, and is against the brigandage to which they are growing cool. There seems no good reason to doubt that their conduct is in part due to the spirit of commerce.

The plain facts thus plow through the root of the belief widely accepted, that commercial rivalry is the inexorable

breeder of international enmity. The lapse from commerce, back into robbery—this more primitive form of the acquisitive impulse it is which inevitably brings hatred and violence. The poisonous ill will must not be ascribed to commerce, but to the defective international order which still permits robbery. The trend of commerce itself is clearly against hostilities, is pacific; the more a nation is consistently commercial, the less dangerous it is—the more ready it is to respect its customer-nations' feelings.

CHAPTER XV

THE DESIRES WHICH DRIVE THE INTERNATIONAL LIFE

THUS far we have observed but piecemeal the impelling forces in the conduct between nations—the motives concealed in race, in nationality, and in the very forming of the nation itself. And a few motives have been seen in action when nations have close acquaintance; when they are, and when they are only said to be, driven by a surplus population; and when they are controlled by the acquisitive impulse.

SEARCHING OUT THE NATIONS' "INTERESTS"

But now we should search out with thorough care to find if possible all of their important directions of desire; for only so can we understand the mutual attraction and repulsion of States, understand their friendliness toward some nations and their distrust of others. Behind the readiness to coöperate or to remain aloof or to attack are *their many deep desires*. These are the sources of overt international action and of international sentiment and emotion. Not so much in the suspicion and fear and anger themselves shall we find the prime movers. These and often intelligence itself are but aids or instruments of desire. To uncover so far as possible the full system of what the nations long for, will be also to uncover the nations' "interests," the objectives of their restless effort, and the occasion of their outbursts of passion. Such a

search requires patience but brings its reward; for only thus can we know the forces which conflict and must be brought into order and relied upon in the international world.

And the better way, I am certain, will not be to adopt beforehand some compact formula, like that of self-preservation, into which to press and pack all national interests; but rather to review with fuller freedom the rich array of separate things which nations have at heart. Later, if we wish, we may crowd them into as narrow a space as possible; for in the meanwhile we shall have seen them clearly.

What then are the things which nations value, which they will passionately defend and passionately try to enlarge; what are the sensitive points, upon the touch of which we can be sure of a response, and by avoiding which we can avoid a strong reaction? In part we shall find them by looking at the kind of things for which nations fight. If we bare what the nations are elated to gain and are downcast at losing, we shall see some of the forces which cause their wars.

THE PHYSICAL LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY

The United States, Great Britain, or Japan are not indifferent to the death by violence to any of their own number, for example, in China. The death of Americans in Mexico, or of Italians in New Orleans, is a matter of grave concern to the country of which the dead were citizens. Thus a people values the lives of its individual members, the physical life of its men and women and children. These the nation is ready to defend, even with the loss of many lives of its own. At times a nation is equally intent upon

destroying lives among some other people, even at a cost of many lives of its own.

But since a people is ready to sacrifice the life of its own, is not this a proof that the life of its own, after all, is held cheap by the nation? No; for we must know that the life of some of its members is not the only thing valued by the nation, as we shall soon see. And even apart from any other things held precious, and counting only the lives of men, the defenders hope in the end to save more lives than they will lose, to save lives by the very lives they lose. The Belgians, the French, in 1914, it is true, freely gave their own for something more precious to the nation than the lives surrendered; but they gave them also with the thought that fewer of their own would need to die in the years to come if many died now; that Belgian life, French life, would in the end be made more secure by the lives now sacrificed.

FOOD

Life depends on food; and so the nations go to war to take food from others, and to prevent the taking of their own. And when they have enough to support life, they wish a greater plenty now or a surer abundance in the future. With nations in our day the food supply is a matter of grave concern even for the powerful, perhaps less often because they see their present population starving than because they wish for themselves a secure and favored place at the world's board. No nation has so much to eat but that it would have more, either to sell or to use more prodigally or to bring food prices within easier reach of the poor in its population. And no strong State can forget the possibility of war, where victory or defeat may be decided by food. In the World War, England and

Germany each saw that, with the sea lanes and the food ships in the hands of the other, its own people could be brought to submission. There must be assurance of enough to eat in war and peace.

The food interest is seen in its naked simplicity perhaps only among savages. With the civilized, the motives are more complicated, and there are self-imposed illusions. But Darwin has described the distress in Tierra del Fuego from scarcity of food, and the tribes' warfare for the means of subsistence. American Indians nearer us also went to war for the very necessity of life; but at times the warfare was less from necessity than because food could be had more conveniently by taking than by slowly raising it. So the Indians of the Paraguayan Chaco had as one of their frequent causes of war their greed of others' flocks and herds.

But we need not be misled because an interest does not stand alone. The desire for food may be seen in wars with other aims as well. For in general no nation's fighting is for a single purpose only.

TERRITORY

If the barest rock possessed by the United States in mid-Pacific, a rookery of gulls and puffins, were to be taken by a foreign power, the nation would instantly be on its feet aghast. How much greater would be its excitement if the foreigner were to take Long Island or Florida!

Such is the attitude of nearly every nation. Nor do some have to imagine how they would feel; they know by the actual taking from them. China has lost territory all up and down her coast; Mexico lost Texas and California; Colombia, the Isthmus; Peru the rich province of

Tarapacá; Spain lost Cuba and the Philippines as the last of a long line of losses.

And to-day in Europe much of the feeling there smoldering or ablaze is over territory. The nations defeated in the War have had lands cut away, like flesh from their bodies. Germany has lost territory in East Prussia, Silesia, Alsace, Lorraine, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific Ocean. Austria-Hungary, that earlier had pushed her frontier outward to include so much of eastern Europe, is dismembered, with much of what was once imperial territory now given to Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, and Italy. Bulgaria and Turkey have lost much of their domain. Russia has seen the erection of a line of States in whole or in part at her expense: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, Finland, and more. The territory for the victors: the limits of new States, old States, and countries under mandate—these have been matters of grave anxiety. Great Britain and Turkey have had unquiet hours over parts of Mesopotamia round about Mosul. Italy before she would enter the War made certain that she would increase her holding along the Adriatic and the Alps; and has announced that at the Brenner Pass the Roman standard may move forward but never backward; she has cut Austria off from her former seaport, Trieste; she would like to have the Adriatic an Italian sea; her poet-filibuster, D'Annunzio, melodramatically seizes Fiume. So Italy has been in turmoil with Jugoslavia and others over the entire Dalmatian coast; with Greece, over Corfu; and she longs for more islands in the Mediterranean and more of the mainland of northern Africa, especially in Tunis. Jugoslavia, besides her territorial troubles with Italy, has angered Bulgaria over the Strumna Valley; has with Czechoslovakia had an eye on the Burgenwald. Poland, through irregulars under Korfanty, attempts

to enlarge Poland's territory in Upper Silesia; through Zeligowski she takes Vilna from Lithuania, whereupon Lithuania turns and takes Memel coveted by Poland. Both Rumania and Russia desire Bessarabia; both Rumania and Bulgaria want Dobrudja; both Greece and others wanted Salonika, eastern Thrace, and lands near and far in Europe and Asia. It is an eagerness that goes back and back, given new vigor by the discovery of continents in the era of Columbus, but extending behind even the civilizations of Rome, Greece, Egypt, Assyria, and Persia. Uncivilized peoples had land hunger like the civilized: a removal of boundary marks was one of the many causes of hostility in the South Seas generally, while in New Zealand there were frequent and destructive wars, in part from the desire of some chieftain to extend the boundaries of his land.

The desire for territory is no simple thing; into it and out of it play many interests, small and great. Land is desired not only for food and free movement and a place of dwelling for the individual, but for the almost infinite needs of organized social life. The American Indian wanted land not only for trapping, shooting, fishing, or simple agriculture, but he fought for what was to him "the land of his fathers," whose bones in earlier times he often carried with him when he emigrated. In our civilized world the land is all of these and more; it is a thing at once of hard utility and sentiment: the place for which our patriot-fathers fought and died, over which the national flag long has floated, and which is to be dwelt in and loved by our children's children; and it is also the foundation for railways and ways for automobiles, for docks and dry docks, temples, theaters, schoolhouses, forts, law courts, and legislative halls; the place of raw materials, markets, factories, and a thousand things that serve our social life. And what can serve us in so many ways becomes, by a

well-known law of the mind, also an end in itself, loved for its own sake. I doubt not but that any reader would feel personally enlarged, with a new proud value in his own eyes and others', were he to awaken some fine morning to find himself possessing in fee simple and free of all taxation some thousands of square miles of the Gobi Desert. Nations are subject to this same affliction, but go farther than would an individual in that they will sacrifice the lives of their sons by thousands to acquire or hold some haunt of jackals.

WEALTH BEYOND FOOD AND LAND

Morgan's raiders during the American Civil War would gallop into some northern town, throw themselves from their horses and, rushing into a shop, would there load themselves with horn buttons, chafing dishes, bolts of calico, or strings of skates in midsummer—things only to be thrown away after a few miles of riding beyond the town. So the natives of Rapa, when Ellis' vessel early touched their coast, would have carried off openly and by force everything portable on shipboard—the cat, the dog, the dog kennel, the ship's old iron, the ship's boy. Here in its elementary form is the possessive impulse which with us has grown so great and, taking new forms, builds factories, banks, and stock exchanges. It begins early to be a motive in warfare proper; the Marquesans went to war largely for plunder; even as in New Zealand the chieftains would wage war not only to enlarge their territory but "to augment their property," which we may take to be a euphemism for looting. The Omahas recognized spoils as a chief aim of war, even as plunder was a war object also of the Apaches. Cattle and horses were of course not overlooked; when the Pawnees drove off the horses of the

Omahas, war was the result; quite as in Africa herds were important in the plunder for which the Kaffirs made great war expeditions.

But from early times even to our own, human captives have been an aim in war—captives for slaves or wives or both. A chief object of the distant marauding expeditions of the island-Caribs was to capture women, as the capture of women was among the causes of war in Australia and Tasmania. In Africa, although rarely among the Kaffirs, war has been preëminently for slaves; and a main part of the army equipment might be cord in plenty to bind captives. Especially in Dahomey, rulers and people alike had a passion for war and the capture of slaves. And aboriginal America has felt the same motive: the Chinooks made frequent raids for slaves; and the Caribs discovered a further economic possibility in war—to their memory war profiteers and munition trusts the world over should erect a tablet. For the Caribs incited the chiefs of alien tribes to war against one another, the Caribs paying them handsomely with knives, beads, and fishhooks. And then from both sides the Caribs bought the war prisoners to sell them to the Portuguese for the slave trade, from whom and from the Dutch the Caribs received more beads and fishhooks to incite more wars. But upon occasion the Portuguese would eliminate the middlemen and would incite the wars and receive the slaves direct. The connection between human slavery and war would bring us, if we cared to follow it, to the American Civil War.

The acquisitive purpose in savage war takes also another form which comes close to civilized aims. For instead of taking immediately all that could be carried or driven off, war was aimed at a permanent income from tribute. So the great African king Chaka perceived that to make a people tributary was more profitable than to strip them bare—or,

as General Sheridan put it, to leave them nothing but their eyes to weep with. In Fiji, also, there was tribute-winning; and the withholding of payments was a prelude to a renewal of war. Still another form of the wealth-interest which the modern world knows—the use of governmental means to collect commercial debts—was seen among the Battas of Sumatra, with whom claims of debt were a frequent cause of war.

With us there are a thousand forms of the wealth-interest which mingle with the love of added territory. This desire is not only for the land's own sake and for the agricultural and mineral wealth inherent in it, but also for the trade which it may control as a port or waterway or trade route by land. In the past the Persians and the Greeks, the Carthaginians and the Romans incensed each other by interfering with each other's trade, as later nations have been jealous of the passage of one another's trade from India and the Spice Islands and Cathay. And we have had, and in some cases still have, heartburning over ports, straits, and "corridors"—over Danzig and Memel on the Baltic; over Dedeagach and Salonika on the Ægean or the waters near it; over Durazzo, Zara, Fiume, and Trieste on the Adriatic; over the Polish corridor to the Baltic, the corridor to connect Czechoslovakia with Jugoslavia, and the corridor from Jugoslavia and Bulgaria to the Ægean; over the Dardanelles desired so long by Russia and kept with the Turks so long by those who opposed Russia; over the Panama Canal and a canal site through Nicaragua; over the Suez Canal and the Kiel Canal and the use of international rivers such as the Danube and the Scheldt. Great Britain's naval and military strength is partly to keep open the trade routes of her empire, and especially the way to India, along which lie Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, and the Egyptian connections with Suez.

Materials and markets are among the ends for which these routes are kept. The nations desire opportunity for their merchants or merchandise. So the United States standing at the breech of cannon, opened the ports of Japan. So Great Britain forced opium into China; and the "open door" has been a part of American policy there; while thousands of Americans, Europeans, and Japanese, with immense investments of capital, and with territorial possessions, leased territories, concessions and a billion and more of dollars in the annual value of their trade, give proof of the extent to which the desire for wealth drives the foreign nations in that unhappy land. Nearer to Europe, coal and iron have caused international anxiety—in Silesia, between Germany and Poland; in Teschen, between Poland and Czechoslovakia; in the Saar Valley and in the Ruhr, as well as along the upper Rhine, between France and Germany. Oil in eastern Galicia, in Mesopotamia, and elsewhere has not reduced the friction of international bearings. Wherever steel, coal, oil, and rubber are not excluding the attention from all other things, water and water power are sure to become an object of international solicitude.

Thus the interest in commerce and its wares, as well as in labor and the various other forms of economic service, is bound up with the desires for territory, food, and life, but is not exhausted by them. And the desire for wealth, as we shall see, runs forward into interests yet to be named.

HUMAN ASSOCIATION TO A PEOPLE'S LIKING

Desire does not end with food and land and further wealth. Individual men like to choose their associates. Toward some persons they feel friendly, and toward others antipathetic. Nor has this to do only with private affairs,

with social clubs and week-end parties; the prejudice for likable associates is deep in the feeling and political practice of whole peoples.

It appears in the desire to have within the governmental borders those who are of one's own nationality or who are "assimilable." From this source in no small degree comes the web of attraction and repulsion in eastern Europe, Asia Minor, Africa, India, the Indies, the Philippines, China, and regions along the remaining shores of the Pacific. The English-speaking peoples of America, New Zealand, Australia, and Africa do not wish to have living with them in large numbers certain Orientals. Nor, as we have seen, is this aversion wholly on economic grounds; for in some of these lands where an increase of Oriental labor would clearly add to Occidental wealth, the residents would rather be a little less rich and have their own kind about them than be richer and rub elbows forever with another race.

Other considerations can overcome this feeling; but even though the feeling can be downed, yet a nation deeply values its own kind or nationality, which it will desire to incorporate politically with itself, and from which a political separation is grievous. Hungary longs to have united with her the millions of Magyars who have been given over to Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Rumania. Rumania holds, besides Magyars, nearly a million Ukrainians whom Russia looks upon as her own, as she does also upon many of the people of Poland Rumania also holds in the Dobrudja hundreds of thousands of Bulgars, even as Jugoslavia and Greece include a large Bulgarian population the sight of whom under a foreign flag moves Bulgaria to resentment. Albania looks with concern upon those in Greece who are of Albanian origin.

And in the parts of Europe nearer the west, Sweden re-

gretted to lose the Swedish population of the Alaand Islands now given to Finland. Denmark has for decades kept a living interest in the Danes of Schleswig and Holstein, many of whom are politically hers once more by the decision of the World War. For like reasons Germany and Austria attract each other and would perhaps unite if not prevented by France and others. Germany is aggrieved because millions who hold themselves Germans have been made part of Czechoslovakia, while others have been taken from her to form Poland and Danzig, not to speak of the German Austrians of the Tyrol taken over by Italy. So it was not solely because of mineral wealth in their land that France wished to "redeem" the French whom Germany took from her in 1871; nor will it be solely because of this mineral wealth that Germany will wish to "redeem"—although not necessarily by war, which the Treaties of Locarno as well as her covenant with the League will oppose—the Germans now lost to France.

Americans, who have no longing to bring under the Stars and Stripes the Anglo-Saxons of Canada, may feel themselves puzzled by this mad struggle for one's own kind. But the possession of Texas, California, and Hawaii was not wholly disconnected with a feeling for Americans already in these lands. And should any of the countries to the south of the United States ever hold a large American population in political trouble, we may almost confidently expect their trouble to become the trouble of the United States, and the two flags one.

In general, then, there is a desire for a selected political association because such association gives satisfaction in itself and gives the means to other satisfactions. Fellowship with one's particular kind is in part for the very fellowship, but it also eases the way to coöperation and thus is felt to aid a securer life, to be of help for food and

lands and further wealth, as well as for the many things later to be told.

CULTURAL WAYS AND POSSESSIONS, INCLUDING RELIGION

The people of southern Tyrol have resented the Italian opposition to their traditional German ways. In Jugoslavia, after bitter feeling, it has been announced officially that the language of the many "minorities" there would be respected. And in the trouble over minorities elsewhere—in Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, for example, and Greece—animosity springs up largely from an interference with cultural ways. A spirited people is stirred when others menace not alone their language—which touches their schools, newspapers, and the very names of their familiar towns, villages, and streets—but menace also their manner of public and private assembly, their manner of keeping their business accounts, their courts of law, their marriage ceremonies, and their communal festivals. Even when a minority is "protected," its culture hardly runs a free course, and there is unrest.

Partly for this reason, then, a people wants to be with its own "kind" or nationality, which is so largely a matter of culture. Racial prejudice, as we have seen, is a protective aversion far less to blood than to a culture which if allowed to spread would destroy one's own. It is cultural sympathy standing stiff on guard and become emotionally resistant or aggressive. And when men fight for their country, it is not wholly for dollars and cents, for an intact skin and a sure dinner, as many would have us believe, nor is it only for a particular form of government and a special color on the map. It is also for the purpose of continuing their significant and intimate life-habits, the well-fitting garments of all their thought and conduct. The greater

success of some than of other Europeans in governing backward peoples has been in part due to a respect for the ways of the governed.

But an endeared portion of a people's culture is its religion, its faith and the traditional modes of uttering its faith. Cool and weak as this sentiment may appear in the nations which count themselves advanced, yet no one of them would endure without passionate resistance the prohibition of even the forms of their religion. Imagine Catholic Ireland compelled to become outwardly Protestant; or Protestant Ireland Catholic! Or imagine Americans forced to attend nothing but Episcopal churches or Jewish synagogues or Buddhist temples! If such imagining is absurd it is not because men have ceased to value religion enough to impose it upon others, but because they have found how difficult and valueless is any enforcement in this realm. Were the lesson forgotten or not learned, as we still find that it is in parts of southeastern Europe and Asia Minor, people would be found to resist to the death.

Religion in the past has been ready to drive men not simply to resistance but to aggression. And this begins with culturally simple people. Thus in the islands of the Pacific, war might come of speaking disrespectfully of the gods, as certainly as from an insult to king or chieftain. A tribal turning to other gods might stir deep feeling in a tribe still true to the faith; for unless the action were avenged by others, these would merit the anger of the insulted deities. So in Hawaii when a chief named Rihoriho abolished idolatry, this brought him into immediate war with another chief, Kekuaokalani. The gods themselves might demand war, making their will known by an inspired man, as in New Zealand; or by an omen such as a flaming comet, in Samoa or Tahiti. And the battle might become a conflict, not only among men, but—reminding us of Troy

—among gods as implacable as the human warriors themselves. In the Marquesas Islands the prime object of war was to get prisoners, not for slaves but for sacrifice. And war to spread the faith was not unknown to the Incas and to the Aztecs who felt called upon to subjugate the known world not only to their visible power but also to their god, Huitzilopochtli.

Thus the spirit of Islam with its converting scimitar is not unique. But the Prophet's example and the summoning words of the Koran have urged Islam in a special degree toward war as the way to bring others to religious truth. Judaism, the parent of Islam, had early felt this martial impulse in religion, but had possessed less skill and power to express it. The other child of Judaism was received by peoples of political genius and might; and Christendom in consequence has repeatedly been impelled to war against the infidel and against its own dissenters. But in thinking of the Crusades and of some of the wars when Europe was experiencing the great religious schism and when there emerged such captains as Gustavus Adolphus and Cromwell and when the Armada threatened heretical England and Elizabeth, one need not forget, any more than with Mohammed or the Aztecs, that religious interests are never quite apart from other interests—from political and other forms of cultural solidarity and from economic welfare. The religious motive joins with these others and reënforces them. So we find it of political moment in parts of the British Empire to-day, as it was in the Netherlands of a century ago and of earlier centuries; and as it may be found to-morrow in the Philippines or in the larger regions where Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, or Shintoism lie deep at the heart of peoples who must meet powerful nations with religious ideals of another tone.

INDEPENDENT POLITICAL EXISTENCE AND A NATION'S OWN PREFERRED FORM OF ORGANIZATION

Mussolini, when criticized by the Internationale at Amsterdam, could proclaim almost truthfully to his deputies: "No régime has ever been struck down by foreign influences. All régimes which are threatened from abroad rally like a single man around their flags." And when Soviet Russia found that foreign support was being given to its opponents, it could count upon an indignant rallying against this threat to its special manner of organization. So sensitive are nations to any shadow of menace to their autonomy, that the United States was stirred when a British Ambassador, Sackville-West, during a presidential campaign in America merely expressed a preference for a particular one of the candidates!

From such valuing comes indignation when one government tampers with the loyalty of another government's officers or common citizens, encourages disaffection in its people, or otherwise violates the inner fealty of another nation. So there was resentment of such conduct as that of Germany's bribing Esterhazy, which led to the Dreyfus case; or of France's attempt to create an apparently spontaneous uprising against Germany in Bavaria and in the Rhineland, or of Austria's forty-years' incitement of nationalist feeling against Russia in the Ukraine. A cause of Chinese ill will toward foreigners is their persistent interference in the internal affairs of China not only by directing her commerce to their own interests but by helping to keep her government demoralized by bribery of her officials. However corrupt or otherwise incapable a people may know its organized life to be, yet until they themselves are prepared to change it, they see with anger any other people touch their precious thing.

And while our world of to-day is seething with open or suppressed desire for independence—in Europe, Asia, Africa—no nation will readily grant independence to a part of itself. A nation loves its own political integrity; it resists cleavage. It permits an individual to secede, but it heartily rejects the idea of such self-determination by any constituent group that wishes to carry territory with it. So a nation glorifies its own struggle for independence and curses an attempt, by any part of itself, to rebel and secede. Such was the attitude in the revolt of certain American colonies against Spain; of others against England; of the Dutch, the Irish, the Belgians, the Greeks, the Swiss, and the slave states of the American Union. The ancient Persians fought the rebellious Greeks of Miletus. The great Kublai Khan put down by arms the rebellion of his kinsman Nayan and had him executed. So it has been nearly at all times and everywhere with States; *vi et armis* they resist division.

Even more stoutly do they oppose the taking of their political life by a foreign State; an independent people will resist subordination to another. The Boers, endangered by the British, trekked to distant regions; and being still endangered, fought valiantly against any degree of "autonomy" short of sovereignty.

Thus in our day peoples value political existence and self-direction. Even when a people consents to partition without war—as did Norway and Sweden in 1905, so notable in history—the change is felt to be momentous. War or no war, then, the existence of the national government, the decision as to its policy and personnel, the form and width of its sway—these are among the things precious to a nation; these it desires, these it clings to or surrenders with profound regret.

Nor was this feeling unknown to the aboriginal peoples

of the New World or of the Pacific, or of the Old World where less civilized. The Aztecs resisted to the death their conquest by the Spaniards. And Garcilasso de la Vega tells of his Inca people, that in rage and despair at the menace of the Spanish yoke whole families hung themselves in huts and caverns. Among the less civilized also there is an interest in the existence and continuity of government: the Sultan of Achin resisted the occupation of the north of Sumatra by the Dutch; the Americans have met resistance from the Moros and others in the Philippines; in the South Seas men would go to war to defend their chief; or there might be war because a neighboring people refused to acknowledge the king's son as his rightful successor; or because the chief of some neighboring and friendly tribe had been murdered; or because there was the will to reinstate a deposed and banished ruler. Thus even backward peoples have manifested that dynastic interest which, century upon century, racked Europe with wars to keep the crown upon a particular head or within a particular family or in a particular line of succession within a family.

And next to this and in the same region is the interest not so much in the person or the line of succession as in the general *type* of government—an interest which is felt by a nation for its neighbors as well as for itself. Autocratic States have been interested in keeping the world safe for autocracy—as in the Holy Alliance of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, which called into being, with England's encouragement, the Monroe Doctrine by way of democratic defense. And democracies have felt the need of safety for democracy; even as the Soviet governments have wished to see a rule of the proletariat in all the leading countries of the world.

The political existence and the special type of organization are valued as means to many ends—private and public,

economic and more widely cultural. And they are valued for themselves.

NATIONAL POWER AND INCREASE OF POWER

Behind the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 were rival ambitions for power in eastern Europe. Austria in 1908 had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Archduke had married a Slav wife, and there was in mind the erection of a Slav kingdom to be added to the two existing kingdoms of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Serbia also was bent upon a Greater Serbia; and the purpose to murder the Austrian Archduke was known by the Serbian government in time to prevent it had they wished above all to do so.

Thus with the wish for national existence unbroken goes the wish for added power. The burning desire that the governmental sway be undiminished is accompanied by a desire hardly less ardent that this sway be enlarged. The warfare between Boer and Briton, between China and Japan, between Japan and Russia, between Spain and the United States, between the opposing alliances and ententes and associations in the World War had this element in it; as had also the wars for the unification of Germany, and of Italy, and the wars of conquest by France, England, Spain, Russia, and many another country in many another period, and extending to include the conquests by the Huns, Mongols, and Teutons, back into and beyond the conquering advance of Rome, Greece, Persia, Assyria, Babylonia, and Egypt.

The desire for extension of sway is not in great States only and in the West. In Africa where the fighting was so frequently for loot and slaves, there was also a clear urging to conquest—as in Dahomey and among the Kaffirs and

Zulus. Many of the American Indians had little or no compelling love of dominion over others; yet the Iroquois were not of this unconquering temper. And beyond the territory now held by the United States, there were notable conquerors in Mexico and Peru; the *conquistadores* here met their kind. The Aztecs, along with other aims in their warring, desired to subject to their own will all known peoples. And even in the Pacific we find a like spirit: the ruler of one island would conquer neighboring islands—as Kamehameha by warfare brought into his one kingdom the entire Hawaiian group.

The desire for power may have all manner of other desires hidden in and behind itself—to protect against violence the life of one's own, to gain food and territory and other wealth, to select and reject human associates according to one's own preference, and to maintain political independence. It may also be the servant of interests not yet named. But, like territory or wealth or independence or life, it may be valued quite apart from anything it can confer other than the satisfaction in the power itself. As a boy may enjoy controlling or even bullying other boys, without having them do anything of use to him; as the rich man without display of wealth and even without his wealth being known to others may yet enjoy the sense of unused power; and as men generally take pleasure in doing their own will and are displeased to have their will blocked even in trifles; so it is with nations. The satisfaction in power is more than the sum of the satisfactions from all the particular fruits of power.

And while power may be sought as a means to other ends, these may be sought also as a means to power. For this reason, in part, is wealth desired, and organized association with one's own, and political independence, and often an enlarged population regardless of blood and culture. Na-

tions take to themselves not only those of their own nationality but those of alien nationalities as well; and not only when these aliens are inextricably mingled with their own and there is no recourse, but also when the land lies otherwise. German Austria, in order to have her kin, was not compelled to have quite so many Magyars, nor to desire quite so many Slavs. Rumania and Czechoslovakia, today, and Poland, Jugoslavia, and Greece are suffering from gfeed of population which at times, under the guise of a desire for those of their own nationality, gives them unassimilable masses, gives them ethnic indigestion. But to the benighted the added numbers look like added power, even as General Mangin rejoiced in the French Africans in France as a makeweight against the population of Germany.

PRESTIGE AND "HONOR"

The nation has a desire for more than size, wealth, and power. Its anxious eye looks for a certain respect or deference from others, and upon what a duelist would call "honor." Much is there that the code of honor will accept: loss of wealth, for instance, as in gambling, or the loss of morals. But it will not brook a pulling of the nose, which may leave the nose uninjured, but wounds the pride.

So a nation is pained by the disrespect, if its embassy is violated or its flag is trampled upon in a foreign land. In spite of an assumed indifference to the judgment of others, a nation is angered by being treated as an inferior.

Consequently although Japan had accepted with no ill grace the exclusion of certain classes of her people from the United States by the "Gentlemen's Agreement," yet she resents legislation to the same practical effect but with a different social flavor. The practical restriction counts less for her than the indignity. And similarly for China, who

suffered in her dignity by Japan's famous twenty-one demands as well as by the special exemptions and privileges wrung from her by various nations. China's feeling is not wholly because of the practical inconvenience and loss arising from extraterritorial privileges and from a foreign hand in her taxes and from foreign troops continually in Tientsin and Peking, but in part because of the humiliation from these things.

This sensitiveness to disrespect, which is but the negative pole of our love of appreciation, so vital for social life, lies deep in human nature and training. The feeling for the dignity of the individual as well as for the political body, is found among savages. Certain Omahas were once taunted by Pawnees and, giving battle, won the fight but lost the life of their chief, who thereafter was looked upon as one who had fallen "for the honor of the tribe." In Tahiti, when the king Pomare's representatives spoke disrespectfully of a certain dead man, there was immediate war upon Pomare by another king Otu. In a like spirit, hostilities might be occasioned by pulling down the king's flag or by speaking contemptuously of the king or his chiefs or by offering direct to any of these or to their allies the slightest affront. The chieftains in New Zealand were so supersensitive in their honor, that disrespect even toward children of rank—perhaps only some word—sufficed to bring on war. Insult was among the causes of war in Australia, Tasmania, and New Caledonia. The bellicose Aztecs also would go to war because of some action which they regarded as insulting; but they had developed the technique of militancy in this further respect that they would intentionally goad some reluctant neighbor into war with them by demands which were unbearably humiliating. Thus the ancients of the New World have joined with other ancients in stealing our modern thunder.

"Respect," thus, is dear to a people's heart. When there is lordship over others or there is added territory, population, or commerce; or when an indemnity is exacted or colonies are snatched away or a nation passes from high to low estate in wealth—when any of these things befall, the material gain or deprivation is real; but real also and painful is the humiliation. The nation is salved and scented or is blistered in its self-love, in its love of admiration which is the more grateful if there is in the admiration a dash of fear. In each nation is some trace of what that New Zealand warrior felt who, when an Englishman was in his power, assumed a fierce expression and brandished his weapon above the man's head as if to kill him; then after a while the New Zealander desisted, only to renew the action again and again; and when finally he ceased, he asked the Englishman significantly whether he was not afraid! Von Tirpitz, before the War, declared that Germany must keep fear in the hearts of her enemies.

Prestige is also among the gains of victory in war, and accordingly is to be counted among the objects for which the nations fight. When a State feels its place lessening in the eyes of the world, or would have its place enlarged, it soon bethinks itself of a successful war. "For this reason," said Machiavelli, "many consider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster some animosity against himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown may rise the higher."

The sweet of victory and the bitter of defeat lie partly, then, in gained honor and lost prestige. Even though the victor may in all ponderables have lost far more than he won—as France at the World War's close was, and still is, a France reduced—yet imponderables are there. The king, who after military defeat sent word: "Madame, all is lost but honor," knew a something which still counts in a world

which thinks itself all for realism. Its value even in the cold language of diplomatic negotiation is witnessed in those general treaties looking to arbitration of all disputes with other nations, where the United States and other States have excepted from such an arrangement matters which touch the nation's honor. It has been claimed by some writers on international law that every State has a fundamental right to reputation and a good name. "Such a right, however, does not exist," says Oppenheim, who holds, convincingly, that the reputation of a State depends upon its behavior, and that "no law can give a good name and reputation to a rogue." But though law cannot give reputation and a good name these, we ourselves can see, are among the clear objects of national desire.

RIGHTS, AND THE PUNISHMENT OF INJURERS

When the United States found that she could not deal effectively with smuggling if she seized vessels only within the three-mile limit, she went beyond that limit and promptly received protests from other nations, protests which later were met by special agreement with Great Britain and others that had been offended. Nations are thus jealous of their rights as sovereign States and especially of those rights that are recognized by international law, such as their right to the free use of the high sea for navigation, for fishing, and for telegraphic cables; the right of "innocent passage" even within the three-mile limit of another country's water; of protection for citizens abroad; of certain immunities for diplomatic but not for consular representatives in a foreign country; and so on.

The violation of right is of all degrees of seriousness up to full occasion for war. The American Union entered the World War partly because it felt that its rights had been

transgressed. The war of 1812, likewise, was over rights upon the sea; the war of 1776 was over rights upon land; the Boer War was in part with regard to rights because of Great Britain's suzerainty over the Transvaal and because of rights of *uitlanders* among the Boers. The Americans similarly insist upon rights in Mexico, Nicaragua, and other Hispano-American countries. The Chinese have a will to exercise what they regard as their rights which powerful foreign countries will not accord them: for example, in 1925 they demanded, among other things, that their laborers in Shanghai should be free to work or not to work for foreigners and should not be punished for refusal to work. The greater powers cling to their extraterritorial and other rights in China.

Rights, we may say, are a part of culture in the international realm and become clear and expand with culture. So we recently have had to define the right to navigate the air over a foreign land and are having to face international problems of wireless communication. The more important accommodations in conduct may be formulated and sealed by international law but are not created by it. Certain ways of behavior such as are vaguely suggested by the Monroe Doctrine may be valued by some particular nation and may be recognized by others, without being a part of international law. Nor does a nation's sense of its own rights always conform to law, nor is its punishment of others always meted out by legal measure.

Close to justice and serving as an untrained housemaid to make roughly ready the room for justice is revenge. When Colonel House visited France in the weeks which began the World War, France's government (he felt certain) had no purpose of revenge for the loss of its Rhenish provinces in 1871, although the French people were perhaps of another mind. If his observation was correct, it need not mean

that the interest in revenge itself was dead, even in the government, or was gasping its last; but only that it was not in control of public policy. Nations do not soon forget another's violation of a cardinal right of theirs. And when new injury comes and action begins, then the old feeling rushes forth to add its own energy to the struggle.

But whether or not the French desired revenge, the Germans—one may know from living some years in Germany—believed that the French desired it; and thus it entered into the composition of forces in 1914. And Italy, although she bargained shrewdly, also had old scores to settle. Indeed in every effort to "redeem" one's people who have been separated from the home-nation by force, there will usually be mingled with the generous sympathy with one's own a desire to retaliate upon the ravisher. Accordingly the nations which by the War have seen thousands or even millions of their people torn from them—Germany, Russia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and others—have a pent-up longing not only for their own people but for requital. The desire for revenge is thus to be reckoned with by every nation that looks for victory in war. Indeed it enters upon both sides from almost the first instant of hostilities. The Britons recalled Majuba Hill; the Boers, the Jameson Raid; the Americans fought the war with Spain, crying, "Remember the *Maine!*"; there were many who would have had the Americans fight in the World War crying, "Remember the *Lusitania!*" Something less sinister, closer to disinterested justice, was aroused by the wrong to the Belgians.

This sense of outrage and the desire for vengeance was in Italy and her wars of a far earlier time. A noble lady is on pilgrimage to Rome and, having repulsed the advances of Bernardino Polenta, Lord of Ravenna, is killed by him. Her two brothers, aflame with anger, win the ear of the Grand Company of Mercenaries, led by Lando; and it is

not long before Ravenna—its unhappy peasants as well as their guilty lord—is put to fire and the sword. And Lando's Grand Company was again employed in 1358 by Siena that had been defeated by Perugia and wished to have Perugia's land laid waste, for revenge.

Such an aim was in the wars of American Indians, of the natives in the islands of the Pacific, and of other savage peoples widely scattered, and often was regarded by them as a worthier purpose than spoils. Thus among the Omahas, to be in a war-company seeking revenge was a higher honor than to be in a plundering expedition. The desire for reprisal may take the form of head-hunting in war, as in New Guinea and among some of the Malays. In the earlier Philippines there was such zeal on both sides to have a superior score of heads that something like perpetual motion in warfare was assured.

But we must not go farther into the subject of revenge, which tempts the mind on, fascinating it like a venomous thing. Those who hunger for the facts will find much about it in Waitz, Sumner, and Westermarck. Here we need see only that it is an *additional* interest which peoples have, and incites to war. Although it springs from some other attachment—to kindred or lands or prestige or any other object of desire—yet it may acquire its own force and standing and is sought with a blind improvidence to all interests beyond revenge itself. For the lost lives are never restored by vengeance; and the revenge may be exultingly attained at a fresh expense of life to the avenger, greater than the original loss which he has avenged. A people that feels the insufferable tumult of this passion throws tangible gains to the wind, and injures for the very joy of injuring those it hates. The feeling has to travel a weary road and submit to long rites of purification before it can become a calm love of even-handed justice.

WAR-STRENGTH AND VICTORY IN WAR

Nations desire military, naval, and aërial strength, and desire success in its use whenever it comes to be used. This desire is all interlaced with the desires for wealth, population, power, prestige, and uninvaded rights; so that no surgeon could quite trace to its utmost fibers the one and leave untouched the others.

The eagerness to round out the military side of government is ever with us. The United States keeps an unsatisfied eye upon her war equipment—her armed forces not only along her own mainland, but on the Isthmus, in Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, and even in China. Admiral Mahan would have had us annex Cuba as a naval necessity; the Panama Canal was urged by Roosevelt as a means of naval strategy; the nation is officially committed to a policy of naval strength no less than Britain's. An army, a navy, an air force, with their bases, forts, schools, arsenals, and their trained and loyal personnel, have tens of national uses, and are prized for their visible service; but at the back of them is an imposing art and science of war which wins its own enthusiasm. Men study war and go to war with a half-confessed delight in the thing itself.

One does not need to show this passion pure and alone, in order to prove it real; one does not have to discover nations to-day warring solely for the joy in war. Conduct is more complicated than this; it is rarely or never with an eye which is single. But nations are heirs of the less civilized, whose interests will help us to understand our own.

A New Zealand chieftain, so Darwin relates, who found that a precious keg of gunpowder was about to become worthless, forthwith declared war upon some unoffending

neighbor, to prevent the ammunition's going to waste. In Dahomey the passion for war reached such a pitch under able leadership that the people themselves came to demand it as their right that the half of every year should be given them for warfare. Something of this liberal pleasure in war was also in certain of the American Indians and especially in the Aztecs with whom fighting became the most important of life's concerns for which no ulterior excuse was necessary. Such a delight in war itself was expressed in the ancient Teuton's picture of Valhalla, as a place where the blest could count upon a daily abundance of beer and battle.

A generous trace of this old enthusiasm is probably not missing from our modern world. In the France of Napoleon and his devoted marshals and men, there was a mastery of the military art itself which added its own temptation to the enticing design to retrace every boundary in Europe and make all thrones face Paris. A similar feeling was in the Prussia of Frederick the Great, as it was in the later Prussia and in Germany, Austria, and Russia. In Japan also the military interest has been close to the seat where policy is formed, even as in all those lands where for so long the chief claim to renown was in being a consummate warrior. "A prince," said Machiavelli, reflecting this spirit, "ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than War and its rules and discipline; for this is the sole art that belongs to him who rules."

Our military men are ready to believe that they, more than all other men, hate war because, as they say truly, they know its horrors. But no high-minded profession really can abhor its own very purpose, abhor what it gives its heart and life to be proficient in. Nor is a powerful organization thus inspired quite content to remain a mere

instrument of policy; it soon has a mind of its own as to what the national policy should be, and the organization begins to press the nation in the direction of this choice. It no longer is happy to display its excellence on parade and in annual maneuvers, but looks for exercise in actual war. The United States must be aware of the psychological consequences of building a powerful war organization, and to know that these consequences will follow, regardless of the announced purpose of building it; regardless of all protestations and honest belief that it is solely for defense. Such preparations in every country are solely for defense. In time of peace and calm these instruments look harmless; they are inert and docile enough. But let the crisis come with its need of all sobriety of statesmanship; with its need of a thousand wise devices before war is thought of; then your docile instruments arise to direct the directors; the fists bully the brain.

"The growth of armies," said Lord Bryce, speaking of the causes of the World War, "had produced a large military and naval caste, a great profession in which the habit of thinking about war had in some countries grown to be a mental obsession, almost a disease. The building up of huge armies and navies had created a desire to use them. . . . So long as powerful naval and military castes exist, it will be hard to keep down armaments."

Must it not then be said that war, war machinery, war personnel, war success, are valued by nations? They, it is true, are means to ends; but they are not thereby prevented from being prized also for their own sake. Always created in large measure as devices to attain other objects, yet nations resort to war also in part for war's own sake and especially for the joy of a victorious war.

PEACE WITH SECURITY

Along with the desire to live dangerously is the desire to live securely. Often, in thought at least, these may not conflict, for the love of the danger may be to avert a greater danger to one's peace. But even when the satisfaction in war and the satisfaction in security do in fact conflict, we need not believe that the love of safety is then ungenuine. For a nation is as ready as is an individual to have discordant desires. Like persons who long for things hard to conjoin—for wealth, along with freedom from care; for travel, with all the comforts of home; for a steady incoming of letters from distant friends, without writing to them—so nations are all for incompatibles. They prepare for war and for victory in war, and yet also wish for peace and for the things which war and great war preparations impede or absolutely prevent—riddance of sickness and poverty from their own people, a humane education, a mastery of the difficult administration of dependencies, and a mounting wealth by widely diversified production and by the unbroken organization of trade with foreign lands. War threatens supplies and markets and postpones everything not vitally needed for success in war. War, then, has strong supports in national desire; but so also has the opposition to war. For there are a host of aims which find themselves frustrated, in part or all, by war; and which can count upon a fuller satisfaction in peace time than in war time or in the years following a war.

Indeed in our day war preparation is honestly intended for security first of all. Armament programs are drawn up, and huge appropriations are made with the honest purpose to insure peace. Peace is one of the aims for which the big stick is carried. It was a source of satisfaction to Wilhelm II of Germany that for years he had maintained

the peace of Europe. Every nation in entering the World War declared its inalterable devotion to the cause of peace; declared that the war was not desired, but was forced upon the nation by others. These declarations were not wholly insincere; they went with the growing effort by many nations and by many men and women in every nation to organize for greater security against war. The steady development of arbitration, the conferences at The Hague, the erection of a permanent court of arbitration, the signing of many treaties for mutual assistance and defense, the founding of the League of Nations—these are clear evidence that peoples, along with all their other desires, desire security and peace. They do not wish peace or even security at any cost; they are not willing to sacrifice all other desires to this desire. But with their many aims is this aim also—and becoming stronger as it seems less utopian—to have the national life less frequently or never at all thrown into disorder by war, to give less of energy to war and to recovery from war; to conduct international affairs more by law and less by violence.

The World War, with its terrible losses to all the world, intensified this desire for peace, so that the longing is now shared by a larger number of States than ever before in the world's life. And more closely than ever before is peace joined in thought with security. In seeking peace the nations see more clearly than before that they must also seek guarantees of security. And the peace desired is not conceived as a spacious time for inaction and rusting; but as an enlarged opportunity for the many kinds of activity which are opposed by war activity and are more rewarding. The peace desired by nations is a positive condition of security to pursue national aims without instant interruption from some other nation's will. It is perhaps better to

be described as a condition of law and order, instead of chaos, in international behavior.

THE WELFARE OF OTHER PEOPLES

"The more I see of the dealings of governments among themselves," said Colonel House to President Wilson in 1916, "the more I am impressed with the utter selfishness of their outlook. Gratitude is a thing unknown." And in the Farewell Address, Washington takes a somewhat similar view.

Yet we must not misjudge even when we remember that a nation will cause heartless agony in another nation. For an individual might have a spark of kindness and gratitude in him even though, when his life or property or prestige or wife or child were in danger, he might make some one suffer pitilessly. A wider humane feeling or spontaneous sympathy might not be utterly wanting to his constitution, but only be overpowered for the moment by stronger and obsessing interests. So nations at war take measureless satisfaction in the suffering they cause to enemy peoples; and in peace they will not allow the need and distress of others to prevent some headlong course which is of advantage to themselves. National conduct is selfish, because self-interest overcomes all generous interest. But the generous interest is there, bewildered, not dead; and in the more highly cultured States—at least whenever there is no call for the bludgeoning of sympathy by corporate self-interests, since no self-interest for the moment is endangered —then a plain human good will is ready to raise its head. The good of the alien now and for the time is really desired.

Thus, when in recent years there has been a great earthquake in Italy, Japan, or California; or a famine in Russia, India, or China; or a massacre in Armenia, Syria, or India;

or a trampling roughshod upon a small nation by a great military power, as in Belgium, there has been sympathy in many other nations and a desire to give succor.

Nor is such good will always a private impulse and never official or governmental. The relief, it is true, is often unofficial; the gifts may come from private donors, as in rebuilding the destroyed libraries at Louvain and Tokyo. And to some persons it has seemed impossible that it be otherwise; I heard Bryce say that a government could never properly be generous, any more than could a trustee with another's money. But such a view hardly seems destined to hold, even in our day. For repeatedly the American government itself has shown a generous interest in relief, not only by bringing the foreign need to the attention of its citizens and recommending private aid, but by formal grants from its own treasury and stores. The Congress and the President some years ago gave $20,000,000 to purchase grain and particularly seed grain for Russia; and gave more than $4,000,000 worth of medical supplies to Russia. The President also made an official grant for child relief in Austria. Other forms of aid also have been given officially—such as aid through the Red Cross Society abroad, and the use of the government's vessels to transport refugees from one foreign port to another. Beside these, there was the well-known remission to China, for education, of a large part of the American share of the Boxer indemnity; and the less-known return to Japan of money received by the United States from Japan because of the Shimonoseki incident.

Such good will flows forth more readily to those from whom, for the time being, there seems to come no shadow of risk to our own strong self-interests—to a nation that is weak or for any other reason awakens in us no self-protective antipathy, no defensive jealousy; or to those

who are working with us, making common cause with us, perhaps as allies or associates in war; or to those whose race and culture have as yet developed no rivalry with our own. So on the eve of the Great War, after the ultimatum by Austria, the Russians in at least one of their great cities thronged late into the night, roaring their determination to help their brother Slavs in Serbia. And so it is less difficult to sympathize with a foreign people struggling for independence—for the French to feel well disposed toward the American colonies striving to become free from England; and for ourselves to be interested in the successful revolt of the American colonies from Spain—less difficult to feel good will toward the weakling than toward the same people when strong in sovereign nationhood. The callant is not as yet our rival; he threatens nothing we hold dear; indeed his independence may even weaken some State whose power we mistrust. Such human kindness is not always insincere nor wholly calculating; it merely is unimpeded, unparalyzed, its ways are smoothed.

As good will goes forth more freely to those who are not against us, so it is easily withheld from those who oppose visible or spiritual things we value. Sympathy is dried at its source by inhumanity—as when the Neapolitan government shocked the English people by its cruelty to political prisoners in 1847 and later. So the France of the Revolution provoked abhorrence and dread in the people of Great Britain and other countries of Europe. In more recent times the treatment of Russia's political exiles, as revealed by Kennan and others, made America less warm toward Czarist Russia, even as the cruelty of those who turned against Kerensky and the moderates has helped to make both America and Britain cool toward Bolshevik Russia. The inhumanities of General Weyler in Cuba were of effect in the American judgment against Spain. Thus cruelty is

not seen without abhorrence even in international affairs; a nation that is not blinded by self-interest is repelled by such cruelty.

And humane behavior is valued even when it contributes to no other national interest. The tide of feeling in England which was running so strong for the South in the American Civil War, turned unswervingly to the North when Lincoln at last made it clear that the North was fighting to free the slaves. If only the obstacles to right feeling are removed the welfare of other peoples is desired.

For nations after all are made of human persons in whom hostility is no more natural than good will. Friendliness is as truly rooted in the nature of man as is antipathy. For either of these attitudes comes forth instinctively according to circumstance, according to the total situation past and present. And we are beginning to see that this total situation which stimulates to enmity or good will is already in large measure within our control; and that with wise endeavor the welfare of other nations can become far more valued than at present. Even now it is no longer a negligible national interest, and it will grow, other nations' prosperity becoming of increased value both because of unprevented good will and because self-interest itself can be more fully gratified.

These, then, are the many things upon which the nations fix their hearts. These are the things for which they are ready to be fearful or to fight or be friendly.

CHAPTER XVI

THE PATTERN AND RECONCILIATION OF NATIONAL DESIRES

INTERESTS ARE VARIOUSLY CONNECTED

THE things just reviewed are the chief objects which nations value, these are their "interests," these reveal the desires which weave themselves into a nation's will. They take their place, as we shall see, among the causes of hostility and friendship; out of them come crises whose issue is war and peace. Not seeing them, we should miss the springs of national life and of international conduct.

The interests, as was said, are best seen at first in their array, widely spread out, with no attempt as yet to conceal their variety under some general term like "self-preservation" or "power" as the sole aim of States. The objects at which the nations aim are sufficiently distinct and sufficiently important to deserve a separate notice and naming.

And yet there should be no thought that they can be separated from one another. Some, as we have seen, are but parts of others—war-strength, for instance, is but a part of power; and political life and its special forms are part of a people's cultural ways. Some of the objects may be desired for their own sake; a people needs no further excuse for holding to a human association that has become endeared. Some may be desired for what is inherent in them, and may be desired also for some further good; national power and prestige are gratifying in themselves, and as aids to commerce or to a secure peace. The connections, then, are intricate and unmistakable.

THEIR MAIN GROUPS

And having once seen them pass by in single file we should now see that they belong in two main groups.

The one group is of tangible goods, largely economic, which begin to merge nevertheless with what is not of their kind:

The nation's food
Its territory
Its wealth beyond food and territory
The national power and increase of power
The nation's war-strength and victory in war

The other group is of goods which fuse with the tangible, but which in the main, if not intangible, are at least unmarketable:

The lives of the individual members of the community
Human associates to a people's liking
The nation's cultural ways and possessions, including religion
Independent political existence, and a nation's own preferred form of organization
Prestige and honor
Rights, and the punishment of the nation's injurers
Peace with security
The welfare of other people

It is thus clear that *a nation's desires far exceed its purely physical possessions.* It is unbreakably attached to things economic; but the tight assertions that it is interested in nothing but these things—such assertions are blind to the nation's readiness to sacrifice lives and treasure to attain or defend political independence, rights, prestige, and cultural freedom.

LIMITS WHICH THESE GROUPS EXCEED

Nor are its interests wholly self-interests, much less are they wholly selfish. Within the nation itself, there is the persistent schooling to a generous regard for the fellow-members of the nation: the patriot gives his heart to his country; many a soldier gives his life; the nation's civil servants are as loyal and devoted as its soldiery. And beyond all this is some strengthening regard for people not of one's own country, provided only that they are not for the moment our war enemy nor otherwise the serious threateners of our self-interests. Men are beginning to feel the suffering even of foreigners and to be sensitive to their praise or blame. The threads of humane concern are slowly extending beyond the national border, there to form a web of social ideas, sentiments, impulses, and emotions.

A nation's goods are not fully told in enumerating the private possessions of its individual citizens. By victory in war, for example, a nationality may acquire political life, prestige, and honor, which are corporate possessions undivided and undistributed, in which each person nevertheless has a share which no government can withdraw or confiscate after the manner outlined in some of the proposals to "take the profits out of war." The Philippine Islands, although they give opportunity for great increase of private wealth, also add to the sense of importance of the nation that holds them. Even should the lands there remain mostly in the hands of Filipinos, and were the American Government to spend for its military and naval activity connected with the islands a continued sum of money vastly greater than will ever return in profit to American trade, yet the nation would value its position there and would surrender it with reluctance.

All that men value singly or in groups short of nation-

hood; all that is held dear by the individual, the family, the village, the tribe, or the commercial corporation—life, food, land and other wealth, the private or group rights, and the habitual human associations—these continue to be valued by men organized into statehood. But to all these have now been added the interests peculiar to the nation. The same men, having constructed their larger political organization, prize this organization itself and desire to maintain and strengthen it until it has prestige and can hold assured all those rights which go with sovereignty and which go to no persons not organized into a State. *The nation thus has all the characteristic desires of its citizens as individuals, and has great desires besides.* We shall find use later, when we come to the fuller supports of war, to recall that a nation's interests are not confined to those gains which come to bankers and manufacturers and which can be taxed into the public treasury as war profits. The surgery that can cure war must cut into deeper tissues than these.

THE FLUIDITY AND INTERPLAY OF INTERESTS

Although many of the desires are lasting, many are not. A people's physical life, and its food, wealth, security, and culture have always been valued and doubtless will be valued to the end. But men have not always cared whether the sovereign over them was the "legitimate" sovereign, whether a certain succession, a certain dynasty, was continued, or whether their neighbor nations were of the true religious faith and the true political faith. These things were once of little or no interest and later became momentous, and now again many of them are as a tale that is told. The present era thinks much about the independence of nationalities only to think far less of it perhaps with time.

Ours is an age, too, of lust for national territory and national war strength. But if nations succeed in attaining a common and mutual economic and political security, these desires will probably not retain their present heat. *Under our very eyes, then, the interests take on new intensities and new forms.* There is nothing inevitable in many of them; they are not prescribed by the very fact of natural life or even of national life; they are not all native, but many are acquired and change with a changing world.

The various desires felt by nations conflict among themselves. *Certain interests may be—indeed always must be—sacrificed to other desires.* One or the other purpose, in its limited form, has to give way; they cannot both be realized. Such is the case when each of two nations intends to be first in naval power generally, or to be first in submarines or airplanes; or to "command" a particular sea, like the Pacific or the Mediterranean; or to have the greatest armies in Europe, or to hold the same territory in Africa, Asia, or America; or where one country wants a part of the coast, say, of the Adriatic, and another country wants it all. These aims as they stand cannot be mutually reconciled; the one or the other of them must yield or be modified, if there is to be agreement.

THEIR CONTRAST TO MECHANICAL FORCES

But many—or shall we not say most?—aims are not so starkly incompatible. The greatest desires of any one nation are not only compatible with the like desires of other nations and are capable of being sought and attained by methods that are compatible; but with wit they can become contributors to the desires of the other nations. The work of international adjustment lies far less in abating the chief national desires than in ridding the chief na-

tions of their dogged attachment to their current methods of gratifying these desires—methods which cannot be used by all without an increasing loss by all.

The belief to the contrary is so persistent that we should be keen to examine it, root and stem.

An object of national desire does not possess some inherent force, by which it must in the same degree at all times impel the national will. It changes as lifeless things do not, which are free from the effect of suggestion and experience and education. Stones moved by gravitation to-day behave exactly as did stones a million years ago; like the Bourbons, they learn nothing, they forget nothing.

That the nation's interests are not mechanical forces driving it in this or that direction, as a stone is driven, is further evident. For a nation does not always move toward its true advantage, but toward what it thinks or feels to be to its advantage. And here there might be sung a long dirge of mistakes. Russia under the Czars followed a course which, the events have proved, was against her economic, social, and political interests; and under the Soviets she seems to be but little wiser. Austria, France, England, Italy, Germany, and the United States also can tell of tardy awakenings—and to some things still no awakening —to the wrong done by themselves to their own interests. No two nations look upon their interests in the same way; no single nation views its interests to-day precisely as it viewed them two decades ago. And this is not alone because the situation has so deeply changed externally, but also because of deep internal changes, where experience has done its plowing. The national eye no longer looks out with its old appraisal. Thus a nation is unlike an inert mass which can neither blunder nor come to a new level of achievement. The addition of mind to the nation's equipment means that the conflicts may come or go, not only

by acquiring new interests or by finding a new significance in old interests, but also by perceiving and emotionally adopting *novel ways of ministering* to interests new and old.

But let us attend further to those for whom the interests of different nations seem to act with machinelike inevitableness, quite apart from the experience and contriving of the nations whose interests they are. Two nations' interests either agree or disagree, such persons feel, because of something in the interests themselves. The external situation, it is thought, ordains that the interests of certain nations shall coincide, and of other nations shall clash; and all this, quite by the inherent quality of the interests themselves and of the externals. Those who have this view arrive at something like a Calvinistic doctrine of foreordination in affairs of State, and declare that an ultimate agreement or a competitive struggle is determined by an "inviolable law." There are different shades of belief in such foreordination: some hold that because the interests of nations are *one,* the nations must all ultimately come into harmony; while others believe that the conflict must continue everywhere, because interests are generally *opposed.* Still others are a little less sweeping in decision, and select certain nations, say the Nordic whites, for inevitable mutual friendship, because their blood makes their interests agree; while such nations as the Chinese and Japanese are the inevitable enemies of European and American States because the interests there and here are naturally opposed.

ILLUSTRATIONS FROM A REGION NOT INTERNATIONAL

All such thinking, if one mistake not, moves in twilight. And the shadow over it will perhaps be more nearly evident if we look away for a moment to conflicts of desire which are not between nations. For of employers and employed

it also has been said that their interests are inherently opposed, with coercion inevitable; and again, that their interests are inherently one, and permit no real quarrel. And yet neither statement is quite true, since the facts themselves are by nature in neither form, but are pliable and leave men free to choose what form to give them. Each side—the employers and the employed—may seek its own advantage regardless of the other; may seek high profits chiefly by keeping wages low, or seek high wages chiefly by keeping profits low. Or each may heed also the advantage of the other, being intent that wages and the profits shall rise together. The external facts lend themselves listlessly to either course. But the course by which the interests are set in opposition takes less brains, less patience, less experience, and less careful planning; and so will seem more nearly "natural."

And of two individuals we may say truly that their hungers for food do not of themselves agree or disagree, do not inevitably conflict or harmonize; but rather that the *persons* agree or disagree in their way of satisfying their hunger. Each person may grab at food and be willing to let the other starve, or may join hands with the other and produce food enough for two or four or ten. Each can seek his place in the sun, either by elbowing the other into the shade, or can work with him to let in sunlight enough for both. It is somewhat as with boys, who can choose to get their fun either by a practical joke that makes others squirm, or by calling for ball and bat where each can help to make fun for himself and the rest.

THE TRUE SEAT OF CONFLICT AND OF DANGER

And so it is with nations and their interests. The agreement or conflict does not inhere in their desires or in the

things they desire, but in their manner of seeking to gratify their desires. So long as France and Germany desired security and sought it each by a way which made the other insecure, their interests were set in conflict. But when each seeks safety through the League and the agreements of Locarno, their methods are reversed; they now seek something in common, and their desires for safety no longer have the old degree of clash. The interests have not changed, but only their ways of advancing these interests.

Wealth and security are similarly among the interests of the United States, Latin America, and Japan. And are these various interests opposed, or do they coincide? In themselves they neither clash nor harmonize, but the countries can seek to gratify their desires by ways that clash or harmonize. It is quite possible for the United States to seek advantages of trade and of security—to seek these by methods that endanger the trade and security of Latin America and Japan. And it is possible for Japan and the Latin American countries to follow a like course. And then the interests conflict. But it is possible to do the very opposite—to move toward an expansion of trade which brings expansion for the others also, and for a security which makes the others more secure. The interests then would be brought into agreement.

Would it not be well to say with assurance, then, that *the nations are not driven by their interests as by external forces?* The nation's interests will drive that nation now hither and now thither, according to the degree of wisdom in the nation itself and in others. With change of emotional attitude, of habit, and of intellectual outlook, the nation seeks to gratify its fundamental desires in new ways; and conflict may give way to agreement, or discord may take the place of harmony. Conflicts of interests are not inevitable; they obey no law apart from our mental

life; they are expressions of social maladjustment, and show that nations have not yet learned to satisfy their chief wants in a social and effective manner.

And the conflicts are dangerous in so far as the desires on both sides are deep and lasting and unreconciled, bringing to each other a menace which seems too great to brook and too great to be removed by the pacific means at hand. The danger is the greater, in that the interests appear to clash of themselves, leaving nothing but violence to be looked for; leaving the nations apparently freed from the task of intelligent study and adjustment. This fatalism gives a real war danger to desires that would be harmless enough. *The danger thus has its seat not in the external objects which nations set their hearts on, but in the fact that it requires less intelligence, less experience, less breadth of will and feeling, to have interests at sixes and sevens than to have them work together toward a common end.*

CHAPTER XVII

ATTRACTION AND REPULSION AMONG STATES

THE EFFECT OF BENEFIT AND OF INJURY

WE have been peering into the desires of nations and into the clash and reconciliation of these desires. And it was said that such desires are at the root of national sentiment and emotion—fear, anger, and friendliness, for example. It might now be well to illustrate this; to become convinced, perhaps, that as a nation perceives its desires to be affected by other nations, it assumes now one and now another bearing toward those nations.

In general, the attitude of one people to another is the result of benefit or injury, or is the result of the expectation of benefit or injury. If a people is so fully cut off from another by distance or by the established lanes of intercourse that there comes neither help nor hindrance to any interest whatever nor any anticipation of help or hurt, then there is neither friendliness nor ill will but only indifference; each is forgotten by the other. Such is the attitude of the United States toward Siam, Albania, and many more. Friendly it is called in the language of diplomacy, and it is not unfriendly; but it is rather an almost complete disregard. Yet when one of the peoples beyond what seems to be the horizon of benefit or injury to us is seen to be in distress—as Armenia has been from the Turks, or Syria from the French, or the Congo some years ago from Belgium—then the indifference gives way to sympathetic attention. As we have seen, a very real interest of ours has even in the distance been injured.

THE DIVISIVE EMOTIONS ILLUSTRATED

National repulsions require no long search for their illustration; history and our time are crowded with them. No people, weak or powerful, civilized or uncivilized, has ever lived many days undisturbed by distrust or resentment or by some other of the feelings which drive men apart. China, India, Persia, Assyria, Egypt, Greece, and Rome in the Ancient World of Asia, Africa, and Europe; the Maya, Aztec, Peruvian, and other powers in the Ancient World of America—each of these has felt hostility and has awakened it in its neighbors.

And as we survey the world to-day, we see the globe circled with nations that distrust or fear or hate. The nations of eastern and southeastern Europe and of western Asia are notoriously in this condition: Poland is cold toward Lithuania, Germany, and Russia; Hungary, toward her neighbors who hold land and people rightly Magyar, or who ring her round with the purpose to keep her weak; Rumania has anxiety as she looks toward Bulgaria and Russia; the Bulgars are ill at ease also with Jugoslavia and Greece; Greece, with Italy and Turkey; Egypt and India are impatient of Britain whom France coöperates with but distrusts; China has felt resentment toward England, France, Japan, and the United States. The United States, besides, is mistrusted by some of the countries of Central and South America, and is beginning to be mistrusted in Europe. With Japan also at times suspicious, the study of the causes of international antipathy should have a pressing interest for Americans.

The repulsion among these nations is a sign of something deeper which causes it; it is not usually baseless and self-originated. With fear, anger, and a host of kindred feelings, it springs commonly from injury—injury past, injury

now occurring, injury not yet come, injury half or fully expected.

If the loss is not yet come, there may be any particular one on any mingling of several emotions—anxiety, terror, depression, excitement, and anger. If it has already come, there may be depression, anger, a hot eagerness for revenge, or a sullen hate. But these emotions arise from loss and the anticipation and memory of loss; from the injury to any of the chief interests of the nations.

War springs from such feelings, but it is also a fertile cause of them. Along with the friendliness which allies are apt to have for one another so long as the war is on, there is a very acme of anger and hatred between the adversaries, which extends far beyond the war into the times of peace. This is because the injuries done in war are felt to exceed all other injuries, and the memory of them lives longer in the minds of both sides and are joined with pictures of a day of reckoning. The feeling between France and Germany is based upon injuries to nearly all kinds of national interest; is based on losses connected with the names of Louis XIV, Napoleon, Bismarck, Wilhelm, and Clemenceau. France of to-day still looks upon devastated fields and ruined buildings in the old war area; and Germany sees loss of territory and power on every frontier of hers, as well as in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. Each of these nations can imagine also new injuries to come. So every sensitive surface is kept angry and inflamed.

And repulsions elsewhere are likewise from losses experienced or impending. Those who have suffered recently by defeat—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey—feel hatred and distrust of their neighbors because these neighbors have despoiled them. And the nations that have suffered by victory, and have had the power to advance some of their interests by victory—Italy, Jugoslavia,

Greece, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, and Britain—have either taken something desired by their fellow-victors or can imagine losses to come from the vanquished when strength returns.

Each of these nations and also the chief powers in all other parts of the world see injuries full-fledged and new injuries in the hatching. Anxiety, distrust, ill will thus suffer a psychic summation, the actual losses being all the while supplemented by the thought of possible loss which in turn provokes defensive injury. And so on, increasingly. If there were no corrections of all this, there would soon come upon our world once more the reign of "Chaos and old Night."

MUTUAL ATTRACTIONS

Fortunately an attitude the opposite of repulsion is not unknown. Good will, appreciation, is to be found, even though never as yet with the unclouded look of personal friendship at its best. But friendliness was not wholly wanting between Athens and Platæa, and between France and Scotland. And to-day there is some measure of confidence between Canada and the United States, the United States and Great Britain, Great Britain and Holland, France and Belgium, France and Poland, Austria and Germany. For many decades England and Italy have been friendly in no merely diplomatic sense, although for the moment their fellow feeling is not at summer heat. For decades also there was good will between Japan and the United States, and between the United States and China. Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, aside from the irritations which creep into the friendliest circles, feel a strong bond with one another. And still stronger is the bond among the many English-speaking nations of the British Empire.

These attractions come from benefit done in a special way.

For of itself benefit does not always create friendship. A nation may receive, for example, its institutions and its spiritual outlook largely from another nation, as the United States from England; England from Germany, France, and Italy; and Japan from Korea and China, without feeling weighed down by gratitude. The commerce between one and another is usually a good to both, without making them grateful.

But when benefits are intended, and especially if they represent good will and a policy of coöperation, then they are not so easily benefits forgot. Such an influence is felt among allies in war and in anticipation of war. So the Platæans and Athenians were useful to each other against Thebes; so the Scots and the French, against the English; the French and Americans, against the British. Whatever may be the wider divergence of purpose governing the various allies, those who fight shoulder to shoulder touch each other's interests and emotions favorably; each in contending for his own is glad to contend also for the other's. For the time and, if there is victory, until it comes to dividing the spoils, the friendliness may be unbounded; never in men of another breed, then it seems, has there been such store of manly qualities as are suddenly discovered in the nation that supports our cause in arms. Their accord and ours seems heaven-born and destined to endure through all generations.

And if nothing untoward occurs, the feeling may long leave a favorable trace. The aid which France gave the American colonies in the eighteenth century, even though it was from no especial love of the Americans, has long been remembered; and a certain fellowship from it was strengthened by association in the World War and weakened by happenings since. In the World War our relations with England also became friendlier than they had been; al-

though here, too, after-events have tended to cool the feeling.

COGNITIVE FACTORS INVOLVED

It would not be quite true to say that nations are drawn together by the imminence of common loss and by an opportunity to be of mutual benefit. It is true that they are drawn together by certain obvious common dangers, such as a military threat from some powerful neighbor of theirs; but a thousand common dangers and a thousand opportunities for mutual help less evident will leave them apart. We should have to say, if precise, that attraction comes when nations become *conscious* that the danger is a common danger and *conscious* of the opportunity for gain by coöperating. It is a fallacy, as we have seen, that common interests do of themselves draw nations together, and that conflicting interests separate them. The bare external fact that a like danger confronts them all does not of itself unite nations. They blink for centuries at common dangers and remain miles apart. They do not *recognize* the danger to be common, or else they do not recognize a common way to meet it. An enemy in arms at one's door, and the benefit of joining forces against him by those that he will strike, is easy to be aware of; and for this reason it acts as a mild love potion, where other common dangers leave nothing but mutual aversion. So a large part of Ireland was drawn toward Germany by seeing a common opportunity to strike Britain; Russia and France and England, by seeing a common opportunity against Germany; and Germany and Austria, by such a chance against Russia and France.

Benefits apart from war also bring some measure of good will. The return to China of a large part of America's share of the Boxer indemnity has been of effect. The return of the Shimonoseki indemnity to Japan; the Japanese gifts to

sufferers by earthquake in California; the America relief to sufferers in Tokyo; these and other benefits unquestionably lessen the distance between nations. Respect for the interests of another people always tends to create a favoring attitude in return, and to compensate in part for the repulsion caused by the numberless injuries among nations.

For the reason that injury is never far away from benefit in this region, both repulsion and attraction are usually commingled. Norway, Sweden, and Denmark have their cordiality tempered in some degree; Sweden celebrates her victory over Danish usurpers; Norway and Sweden recollect that they were glad to come out from under the one political roof. Great Britain and the United States feel their mutual good will slightly flavored with impatience. And scrutiny would perhaps reveal something of this blend in even the strongest of mutual attractions, as among Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

WHY DISTRUST PREDOMINATES

In the world of nations generally there has long been a clear predominance of distrust over good will; and this is not because nations are innately governed by antipathy. We are not face to face with an instinct that is sure to outwit all contriving of statesmanship. The prevailing distrust is simply an index of the fact that the nations are always on the verge of receiving from one another more of injury than of benefit. We need not assume in the case of nations, any more than of races, a native and natural fear of the unknown, especially of the unknown foreign nation. The "unknown" here is in fact an altogether too-well-known source of injury. And the nations injure one another so habitually, not because of a primitive desire or impulse to injure, but merely because of the very natural desire or im-

pulse to satisfy one's own cravings. Each nation has for centuries been seeking to advance its own interests, and will continue to seek this for all the centuries to come. And to pursue this course in complete disregard of other nations' interests is practically easier at first, is psychically simpler, than to advance one's own and others' together. This latter requires a more penetrating attention and by more persons and organizations at the same time, even though the prizes in the end are larger. Although mutual assistance toward common gains can in the end count upon a richer and more complex emotional support, yet it requires a wider reach of attention, a riper experience, than does particularism and the neglect of others. It demands a longer preparation of the intelligence. And so it is, that benefit and the will to benefit are leagues to the rear of the readiness to hurt.

If then we regret each nation's imagining of injury from others, and the suspicious air, the distrust, the repulsion which goes with such imagining, one would have to admit that the suspicion is not unfounded. It comes of a long line of actual injuries, of injuries to others and to ourselves, of injuries by others and by ourselves. Guardedness, fear, resentment toward one another are responses normal to a situation so fraught with danger. The fear, the suspicion is not of itself the main source of the trouble, and the trouble will not be cured by looking to this alone. *The abounding distrust among nations is not spontaneous; it is not an instinctive attitude entirely without origin in offenses and injuries. It arises from the actual experience of few intentional benefits and many injuries. And the distrust will be fully quieted, not by admonishing the nations to be less distrustful, but by practical means to reduce the causes of their distrust;* by practical measures which prevent international injury, and which foster coöperation and common benefit.

For the emotions and sentiments are but partly under the direct control of the will. Their current is not stemmed or rechanneled merely by saying to oneself, "Go to, now; I shall from this day neither fear nor hate." The feelings are more successfully managed by some shrewd indirection, by cutting the ground from under them, by striking at their causes and by smoothing the way for the feelings which should take their place.

CHAPTER XVIII

INTERNATIONAL WARS AND ANIMAL PUGNACITY

TO understand war we must go back into the ancestry of nations, into those unconscious urgings which are behind the purpose of the belligerents, behind the clash of their recognized desires. Does not warfare come because cave men inherited their pugnacity from the animals? And among the animals, in turn, is not combat the only important instrument by which the fittest have survived? And consequently must we not look into a spacious and obscure past to find the true causes of war, as though nations in their struggle were vaguely recollecting their brute inheritance?

RELATIVE INFREQUENCY OF ANIMAL FIGHTING

Among animals, fighting is plentiful. We find it in wasps, bees, and ants; in some of the birds; and in nearly all of the mammals, especially such flesh-eaters as the wolves, hyenas, lions and tigers.

And yet we may well ask whether, after all, fighting is as important for them as has been asserted. Are their ends gained mainly by fighting, or mainly by other means?

If one lives for a while in the wilds, with an interest in animal doings and in their fighting, what is to be observed? Perhaps I will be pardoned for referring to my own experience in the mountains of California, during seasons which invite pugnacity, and through times that, if added, would run into years. In remote places—camping, fishing,

prowling, peak climbing, sleeping under the stars which shine through the branches of great pines or through the stunted growth of the higher levels—one may peer by day and listen by night, aware all the while that for the animals, there is almost endless death by violence. And yet in all this, I have been surprised, and, I must confess, a little disappointed to catch so few signs of actual fighting.

Wild animals seem chiefly to be thieves and robbers, and eaters of the living that can offer them no effectual resistance. A snake by a shaded pool stealthily satisfies from time to time his sluggish appetite for food; I find him now with a live frog half swallowed. The frog may have struggled to escape, but in accuracy there was no fight between snake and frog. For let us reserve the word "fight" for a struggle, not of mere flight and escape, but in which animals confront each other, intent upon doing damage to each other, each with his usual strength fortified by anger. So there is no fight, strictly speaking, where a blue jay from a distant tree darts down upon a huge shaggy spider and has him instantly crushed, shaken, and torn asunder. Or again, on some sunny rocks yonder are lizards basking, cocking their heads, darting perhaps for a fly. With the other lizards about, it would be easy, one would think, to have an encounter. And yet, as I watch them, there is no sign of quarreling. They are using, not their pugnacious impulses, but their quickness and tiny eyes against tiny game that cannot, for the life of them, put up anything that can properly be called a fight against even such small monsters, but must rely upon wariness, swiftness, and concealment, to avoid being swallowed whole. The many rattlesnakes I meet seem never to desire a quarrel; I have to be spry to prevent their slipping away into the rocks. It is true that if you hold a stick suddenly at the head of one of them, or step upon him, he will strike, but I never have met

one that seemed eager to fight: So it is with the trout as I watch them. They are not putting their energies into a struggle with trout or other foemen, but into a quiet alertness, a watchful waiting, ended by a flash, a splash, and the striking down of a defenseless gnat or grasshopper. A large hawk soars and wheels; and there comes a dart downward that may mean talons struck into a mouse or a young bird; but there is no attack to be seen this afternoon upon other hawks aloft there in plain sight. Predatory they are, but they prefer a killing that brings no angry resistance, but only fear and attempted escape.

A chipmunk that I observe is not fighting for the nuts he is getting, nor is a gray squirrel; although another squirrel is having a noisy quarrel with a bird whose nest perhaps he has threatened. Deer are silently about—here is one coming down to the river to drink; over there another is startled from the chaparral; in a little opening at dusk I see another quietly feeding; but nowhere have I seen, although I know that others have seen, a pair struggling, their horns locked. A skunk, a porcupine, a rat, quietly finds something that does not need to be caught and killed. And for the fiercer animals—wild cat, puma, and bear—they are not so far away but that, had there been a deadly combat among them, we could have heard them. A heart-stopping cry comes from within a short stone's throw of where I am lying, in the dead of night; but it is of a solitary animal—a wild cat or a mountain lion perhaps surprised by my presence—and not of a pair of animals grappling with each other in a death struggle.

It would be idle to believe that but few real fights occur in these wilds. But to me the surprising thing has been that with animals all about and with so many of them armed with sting, fang, horn, or claw, so much of their lives is spent, not in combat, but in avoiding combat, in

trying to keep out of a fight with a real adversary, and to prey upon such as cannot really fight them, and can only fear and flee from them. The defense which the prey usually must employ is some unpugnacious protection—a protection by a hard or spiny covering, a bad taste for the enemy, a deathlike immobility to avoid being seen, a swift foot or wing or fin that will outdistance the pursuer, the power to dart to cover, to creep into crevices that the enemy cannot enter; the power to live deep in the earth, deep in water, high on a tree's bough or on the crag. The most useful thing for the animal is escape for himself, and for his prey the impossibility of escape, the impossibility even of fighting, once he is within striking distance. For the quarry there probably is no slightest anger, but rather a sickening terror or indifference or that fearless dreamy painlessness which Livingstone noted in himself with wonder, when a lion leaped upon him and crunched the bones of his shoulder.

The daily life of most animals, it would seem then, is fairly free from real combat. It is true that the forest, the tree top, the deep waters, the scarp, is no place of quiet safety; alert enemies are there; death by violence is at every turn, and true fights occur. But the notable fact is the relative infrequency of fighting; the infrequency of anything that in spirit and in act closely resembles the duel, the prize fight, the drunken brawl, the rebellion, or the international war.

THE MEANS OF ANIMAL SURVIVAL

It is a mistake, then, to believe that the struggle for existence among animals is chiefly a matter of *fighting*. Animals struggle, it is true, and they survive; but they live and have their offspring by reason of many powers, many

advantages of endowment, among which their pugnacity is but one. Would it be well to name these others?

There is, first of all, fecundity; a species will have the greater chance of survival, other things being equal, the greater the number of offspring which come from a mating; a fish that spawns by thousands has this advantage. Again, there is the power to find nourishment in what many others cannot eat; the food here is not taken from these others, these offer no competition in regard to it; so the vulture is not a rival of the eagle. There is also the power to live at extremes of temperature that are deadly to others; the success is here attained by a victory over weather or climate, and not by destroying some living foe; the polar bear, the yak, the forms of life in very warm springs, have this advantage.

There is besides, the power to move rapidly away from a temperature that is too rigorous, and to friendlier skies; the migratory birds have this uncombative advantage. There is survival also by power to resist disease which decimates or quite blots out one's rivals. And there are a host of physical qualities—some of which we have already seen—by which the animals avoid being a prey to others, yet without fighting these others—protective immobility, protective shell, protective shape, protective coloring, protective taste; the power to burrow or climb or fly; special fleetness beyond that of one's competitors in water or air or on the ground.

There are also a host of powers that are clearly psychic and which, quite apart from fighting, give an added chance to survive and have offspring. There is the power to perceive by touch, taste, smell, hearing, and sight, which helps in finding food and mate, and in distinguishing friend and foe; the power to rove far, and yet to find again the earlier place of food or mate and nest and young; to anticipate

danger or safety by signs that are not of themselves dangerous or protecting. By these and other mental powers the weak animal is as though he were ten; he can live by his wits, avoiding combat and its risk of death. There is, too, the desire to mate; and there is the solicitous aftercare for mate and nest and eggs and offspring. The quiet impulse toward a larger association—the flock impulse, the herd impulse, if you will—gives to all of the associates an increased hold on life, an increased chance of surviving. It is not merely that they fight one another's fights, but also that whatever any one of them discovers—whether it be food or shelter or danger—becomes known at once to the rest; the eyes, ears, noses of all are "pooled"; they call one another to food, they give one another the alarm. In certain Sierran meadows the "bobs" have their burrows in large colonies. And although I have camped near by, I have never yet seen a fight in these tenement districts; the tenants do not maintain themselves by pugnacity first of all. There is, rather, a communicable *fear*, so that a warning from some lookout brings the whole clan scurrying to their burrow entrances, ready the next instant, should the danger grow, to dive down to safety—father, mother, brothers, sisters, all jamming the passage in their headlong descent. There is here a coöperative protection certainly no less effective than fighting. Among the still humbler forms of life, there is pacific action of insect upon plant and of plant upon insect, which assists each to survive. There is also the mutual assistance within the community of insects, by which they coöperate to build the nest, to rear the young and to store food.

Later we may see what the office of pugnacity is; but we can already see how absurd is the view that fighting is the sole means of evolution among animals; that they survive and are "selected" by pugnacity alone. Fighting is but one

of many ways of continuing a species. Indeed we may say that *most animals owe their lives and the perpetuation of their species far less to their power to fight than to their power to avoid a fight.* Their most frequent and deadly dangers come from what cannot be met by fighting; come from enemies altogether too strong to leave any hope of victory by fighting, if the attacker comes to grips. *Their chief dangers come from adversaries such as these, and from cold, heat, drought, and disease, and other things, against which there can be no actual fighting.*

It is for this reason, doubtless, that pugnacity does not regularly increase among animals as we come up the scale, nearer and nearer to man. Anger and fighting reach their fullest development, perhaps, among the insects—the bees, wasps, and ants—and, higher, among certain birds; and higher still, among the flesh-eating mammals—lions, tigers, and wolves, for example—that catch their living prey. But the wild animals that are nearest to our human life because of their intelligence and their emotions—the monkeys and especially the apes—have unmistakably a tempered pugnacity. These animals have the advantage of an insatiable curiosity, an impulse to notice, to examine, to remember, to attain a certain insight; and they have the advantage of a deepened attachment to their own associates. By intelligent cooperation, rather than by superior muscular strength and physical weapons and fury, they make their way and hold their place. They fight by exception, and are readier for defense than for aggression. *As we come close to man, then, pugnacity plays a lessened rôle. And hardly anywhere is it the chief instrument of selection and evolution.* Indeed when we consider the subordinate place which true fighting holds among animals generally, we have less confidence that international war is primarily an inheritance of a pre-human manner of behavior.

Warfare, while it is in some respects identical with the fighting among animals, differs from it in so many important aspects that it must be regarded as a unique development of what animals possess merely in the germ.

Certain human traits which enter into war are unquestionably found in animals also and are inherited biologically. But war and the war spirit belong predominantly to man's *social* inheritance, and are continued and developed by human tradition and by active social cultivation. We shall see this more clearly if we compare the fighting among animals with the fighting among men.

RESEMBLANCES BETWEEN HUMAN AND ANIMAL FIGHTING

Animal fighting and human fighting are alike in the following important respects. Normally and natively the fighting by either kind is not for the fighting's own sake, but is mainly "practical," is a means to an end. It is a means to maintain or to enlarge certain other interests. And these interests, if we think chiefly of the higher animals, are in a large measure the same as those for which human beings fight. Both men and animals fight for and in the interest of mate and offspring, fight for food, for home or place of dwelling, for the space around the dwelling place, for associates, for a painless and unprodded activity, and to stand well with others and to have and hold a place over others. Animals singly and in groups, and human beings singly and in groups, interfere with these interests in others; and the interference is violently resisted, and there is fighting.

Animals and men are alike, further, in that these similar interests have similar inner assistants: they find a like support from impulse and emotion. Both in man and in the higher animals, when a desire meets with opposition, there

is an impulse often fortified by emotion—by anger or fear. And both fear and anger pass over into steady almost unemotional attitudes—of suspicion or caution or antipathy or hatred—which readily flare up again into the active emotions of anger or fear.

And these similar impulses and emotions and emotionally colored attitudes, both in man and in the higher animals, make a like use of intelligence. Animals and men put learning into their combats; they use experience as an aid in recognizing the creatures most ready to prey upon themselves, and the creatures upon which they themselves can most readily prey; they learn to distinguish those that are to be feared and avoided, and those that may profitably be seized upon or resisted. They learn also something of the best methods to use in fighting. Men learn the use of military implements of offense and defense, learn the vulnerable points of their adversary and where to find or avoid him; the higher animals learn where to stalk their quarry; and where the attacking animals may strike with deadly effect and with least danger of receiving in return a horn-thrust or a deadly kick or a grip of the teeth. Although fighting seems so often a blind impulse, yet intelligence enters constantly into it, both with human beings and with animals.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM

But in spite of all this likeness, there is ample difference. The interests for which the human being fights have a range far beyond those of the animal. Even where human interests fall into the same class as animal interests, they show a different variety and importance. Thus the property interest of animals is far narrower than that of men, and does not include territory thousands of miles from home,

nor paintings and statuary and astronomical instruments which armies carry off to foreign capitals, nor airplanes and battleships and naval bases, nor indemnities and reparations to be paid through many decades.

Human fighting includes all of the animal interests and goes far beyond. Man has ambition and is vulnerable in his reputation, in his "name," in his spiritual attachments, all of which is perhaps prophesied in the life of the dog, but which never becomes quite real in animals.

Innumerable fights by human individuals thus are for the defense of the reputation of oneself or of others dear to oneself; are for the protection or injury of opinions or beliefs or ideas.

And for their associates some animals will fight—some higher animals for mate or young; a dog for the sheep given into his care, or for his master or a child of the family; and baboons for a captured member of their troop. But boys and girls, women and men, will "stand up" for an animal abused which has never been seen by them before. Human attachments to human beings go far beyond their direct personal associates, and include even those who are quite without their own tribal marks. Most Americans or Englishmen in a foreign city would grow indignant and perhaps would forcibly intervene, were they to see a child, a woman, or a cripple maltreated by some ruffian. Sympathy and antipathy and their allied impulses have thus become far extended, so that with many human beings they are no longer local and tribal but include more than one's own racial kind.

And man's coöperative political fighting, his warfare proper, comes to a passionate espousal of distant interests invisible to many or all of the individuals who fight—subtle economic advantages for unknown members of the nation, or the "rights" of the State and nation as a whole, or the

dignity of the flag. Even savages will fight because of an unsubstantial affront to the tribal organization and its visible head, because of a stray word of disrespect to the chief or to a kinsman of the chief. The sum of human fighting that has been for the "honor" of the political body is astounding and comes well away from anything of the sort among animals. And with this should be joined all the warfare which has sprung from the religious motive, which is clear among the savage and the civilized, but is not to be found in animals.

Thus with man's enlargement of spirit, he has extended the regions dear to him, he has multiplied his points of attachment, and consequently has found more things for which to fight. He has surrendered no one of the animal's interests, and has come into possession of many which do not exist for animals. He therefore lives more dangerously, with far more at stake. His treasure and his heart are in more places at once, sent forth into the corners of the earth and even into regions that are of no geography, since they are in a world unseen.

But beside the greater wealth of interests, there is in human fighting a greater wealth of pugnacious support, both inner and outer, for these interests. The higher animals use anger and hatred, fear and suspicion, together with certain impulses and a modicum of intelligence. Man puts so high an intelligence and so enduring a passion and purpose into his fighting, that no animal—stronger, more agile, and naturally better armed though the animal may be—can for long stand against him. Only man's microscopic enemies to-day prove a match for his powers, and even these are beginning to wage a losing contest. Out of man's understanding come discoveries for his fighting purpose. In times of peace he gives attention to his warfare, inventing new tools, and lengthening and strengthening old ones;

inventing new methods to hurl larger human masses against the enemy, and to have these masses receive a more effective support from those not at the front; inventing new means of organization and morale of the military, so that it will be superior to the enemy in flexibility, in impact, and in shrewdness of campaign. And in all these arts, he uses his own unique power of language as a handmaid to his intelligence. Early man, like man to-day, by his speech makes his plans and coöperation better even than those of bees and ants; he uses his speech also to threaten and promise and boast and by communications of a hundred kinds to keep up the spirit of his own people and to break down that of the opposition.

The sheer persistence of man's affections and memory gives a new color to his fighting. Animals have a shorter mnemonic bridge over gaps of time. None but the highest mammals take revenge. And even these seem doubtfully able to carry, for the long years which human purpose spans, the clear recollection of a particular injury and of its responsible cause, and a steady plan of reprisal. The Mandan chief after years avenges his brother's death; after many more years France may have thought to take revenge on Germany. By book and oration and song, man can renew the memory of victory and defeat and unredressed injury. His traditions and social continuity through generation after generation permit him to keep alive his hatred and fear, and give strength to his planning and to his blow in the day of reckoning. He deliberately cultivates the war spirit against that day. Thus his martial designs are more stupendous and more subtle than are those of the beasts; and when he strikes, he strikes with a blow and with a hammering repetition which is quite outside the world of the tiger and the wolf. *Human warfare, then, is hardly a mere continuation, by drag and inertia, of our animal in-*

heritance. The animal inheritance has been received by man, and with enthusiasm and ingenuity has been *intentionally developed into a special and stupendous art and institution.*

One can perhaps illustrate by a further word about speech this relation between the human and the animal use of pugnacity. Human language is based on an inheritance from animals—on the mechanism of vocal sound and the impulse to utter sound especially when excited. But the lowest of human *languages* is never inherited from animals. It is a unique human development of this crude animal endowment, by which it is suited to human intelligence and ideas, through our elaborate social powers of retaining, accumulating, and improving what has come by tradition. Human beings have thus taken the vocal rudiments which they inherited from the animals, and have constructed them into one of our greatest social institutions and means of still further civilization. Sneezing or coughing, which are equally matters of biological inheritance from animal life, have remained almost precisely what they are with animals, and have found no high cultural use. Human speech is no longer the original animal utterance. And in a similar way *human warfare is not really the inherited animal fighting, but has come nearly as far away from it*—as far away from the attack of the tiger on the deer—*as the language in* Macbeth *has come from the whistle and chatter of monkeys.*

CHAPTER XIX

OUR COMBATIVE ENDOWMENT

HAVING looked at the place which fighting holds in animal life and in the evolution of animals, one ought now to glance at those strands of our individual psychic inheritance which enter into war. These will prove to be but a part of the full explanation, for much must come later from human art and culture, but it is a part which may not be overlooked. Armies are set in motion, in some measure at least, by what Nature and not training has given us.

Physical combat being a special way of trying to have one's will, we shall find that it depends upon no single inborn power, no single natural activity. Let us rapidly review how much of our endowment enters into it.

DESIRES, IMPULSES, AND EMOTIONS

First, there are our *innate desires, and our innate capacity to have desires which are not innate.* The nations take the original desires—for food and drink and free movement and companionship and more—which all human beings have in the crudest unnational life, and add new wants—to dominate an ocean or a hemisphere, for example—which were unknown until nations were formed. The desire for a continuance of the national organization and for its power and honor is a cultivated desire and not a natural desire; yet the *ability* to desire things not occurring in nature but coming to us only through the art of social living—this *ability* is in

us natively. And since fighting is a particular way of trying to attain one's desires, these desires are part of what we must now include in our explanation. Without desire, there would be nothing for which to fight; there could be no human obstacle to desire, no human collision. Whatever desires, then, are felt from nature alone without culture, and whatever capacity we originally have for still other desires, these must be in the catalogue of our native endowment for combat.

Second, then, is *the native impulse to action* which usually goes with desire. When one feels hungry he is impelled to act—impelled to eat if food is at hand, or to go and get it if the food is distant. If a Chippewa desires the death of his enemy, there is in the Chippewa the impulse to go to the enemy and slay him. And this connection of desire with action is part of our native constitution and is essential to combat. For if we had only desires, desires which remained quiet wishes, unurgent, issuing forth into no behavior, there would be no fighting. Fighting requires that at least two persons be impelled to action by their desires, and that the impulse to action by the one person shall impede or frustrate the action by the other.

Third comes the native *readiness for emotion* and for all the forms assumed by our emotions—our native readiness for *sentiment as well as for passion and outburst*. As we may see later, our emotions submit to training and experience, which largely determine what we shall be passionate over, or have some persisting sentiments about. But training and experience cannot make bricks without straw, much less without clay and water, which come from nature. It is conceivable that human combat could come by interference of cold impulse with cold impulse. But human conflicts which are unemotional, without stir of sentiment, are not such stuff as wars are made of. These

are passionate, with flush and pallor in their countenance. No nation to-day finds it possible to organize its armies and to hurl them against the foe without ardor in the nation and in the troops. It is true that there is a studied political cultivation of native emotion into something which is not natural; but the cultivation is a development of a new form and fury in what *is natural*. Behind the ardor of the nation and of the troops is the steady and wider human readiness for passion in the service of desire. We should miss the truth if we did not see that war springs from something deeper than emotion; but we should miss the truth also if we leave the emotions out. Let us then see something of what these are.

WHAT IS DONE BY ANGER AND FEAR

Anger and fear are the chief passions which arise when there is interference with desire and its impulse. Each is part of nature's equipment of us, and each has its clear uses. Anger is the great inner support of the impulse to push on through opposition. It gives a sudden increment of strength to our voluntary muscles, but it does far more. It affects our judgment and especially our judgment of values. It crowds other interests off the stage, so that the matter in hand shall appear for the moment to be all there is of life, to be the very heart of the universe. The angry man, the angry nation sees things out of all proportion, sees them in incredible exaggeration. And this exaggeration, although it does not directly serve truth and may defeat other desires, is useful for the satisfaction of the single and momentary desire which has become an obsession. The interest thus heightened is able to mobilize more of our inner forces, more of our intelligence. For while we could use more of our intelligence if we dispassionately cogitated

for eight days over the situation, than if we passionately viewed it for eight seconds, yet we should usually summon less of our intelligence if we thought the matter over for eight seconds calmly than for eight seconds excitedly. Passion is a crude natural device for use in sudden necessity, and is not to be judged by its disturbance and misguidance when there is no sudden necessity and when other and better emergency devices have been installed. For in ordinary anger we cannot but think, and think rapidly and exclusively, upon the one topic in hand; our mind is more fertile as to what should be done, and is less subject to distraction, than if we were indifferent and cool for an equal stretch of time. In anger, moreover, we are readier not only to think but also to decide and act, and to act with vigor to break down the obstacle to our will. Anger is not the inciter of all manner of impulses; it is selective, putting fire under the particular impulse to sweep the path clear of human hindrance. So anger is the special passion to hurt and destroy, in order to attain our purpose. This innate constellation of anger and impulse to batter down opposition, we may call the instinct of pugnacity in men and children and in many of the animals.

But hatred will do the same thing as anger and in some respects better. Hatred is a result of anger, but usually also is a preparation for a readier flare of anger; we are the readier to be angry at some petty interference from one we hate or even from a person or thing associated with one we hate. Cusera, so von Humboldt tells us of a chieftain in South America, had a wife whose father was hated by Cusera. And when the wife merely spoke of her brave father, Cusera was so enraged that he killed her on the spot. Wars come of such hatred between peoples, often from hatred passed on from generation to generation: as among different tribes of American Indians or in the Marquesas

Islands, or between Spanish and English, or between French and English, or Germans and French, or Italians and Austrians. Only from a predisposing hatred due to injuries long ago, can we understand the urging toward war which is often hidden in a trivial event.

Fear and its allied suspicion are also among the emotional supports of interest and of fighting. Men are brave because they are afraid—dreading loss of food or companions or wealth or freedom or of the political organization. And so they march forth boldly to make their fears untrue. Anger and fear are of one root. No man, no tribe, no nation is angered by those who can do no smallest injury, by those whom there is smallest reason to fear. Anger may burst forth with no apparent fear, but fear is usually in its vitals. A latent solicitude for our interests, a latent anxiety lest these suffer loss or do not increase, is almost a part of the interests themselves. It is at least a part of the natural constitution connected with our interests, our desires. In aboriginal Australia and Tasmania, where there has been much fighting, one of the chief causes of the fighting is said to have been timidity, since with the frequent migration, every stranger was taken for a foe. But the timidity was not the basal fact; there were desires obstructed or endangered, and this obstruction gave rise to the fear. And this is true also of the mutual fears of nations to-day. And all these emotions and their readiness to rush in to assist desire are given to men by nature.

INTELLIGENCE AND MUTUAL ATTRACTION

Nature also gives *the intelligence* which is essential to warfare. The idea that nations go to war in a blind passion which is divorced from all power to think is sheer rhetoric

and mythology. Even the fighting among animals requires some intelligence, and savage warfare demands far more, while the wars of modern nations require nearly as high intelligence as there is at the world's disposal. There must be planning to thwart the enemy, to have one's own will in spite of him, to injure him and bring his design to naught. War in our day is relatively stupid, but it is a form of stupidity which only the intelligent can enjoy. Literal imbeciles cannot be used at the front nor on the General Staff nor can one of them be the chief executive officer of a warring nation. War is a tragic use of talent, not a lack of talent, not an inability to learn.

And finally there is the great endowment upon which rests *solidarity*. For warfare is *coöperative* fighting on a great scale, is a social enterprise impossible without a psychic union behind it. To have war, there must be a society, fairly compact, with like feelings. Thin air cannot fight thin air. But the solidarity must be limited; to have war, there must be men without the pale. Men who are consolidated by psychic bonds must be set in active opposition to other men similarly consolidated. Anger or hate is not enough; it is not even basic. At the foundation of war is the passionate attachment of men to one another, albeit an attachment of limited scope. Tribal prejudice, the contempt of one people for another, their corporate suspicion and animosity—these, as we have seen elsewhere, could not exist if there were no self-appreciation within the two groups. The self-appreciation, the coöperative spirit, may be strengthened by animosity toward others, but it is not created by it. The loyalty to one's own group, rather, is the prime source of the antipathy toward its rivals.

War, then, rests upon a native readiness in men, not only to have objects of desire, to have interests, but also to feel these interests *in common*. This communal feeling is but

an extension of a native companionableness, a native sociability. In this sense, *war does not spring primarily from hate, but from mutual attraction. The hatred is secondary; it is a protective device, to defend what is loved.* If men were wholly unsocial, there could have been single combat, but not war. *War comes in part at least, from man's native desires and impulses, his emotions and intelligence, joined with his great natural endowment for social life. These are the principal native traits which, as we shall see later, are fashioned by art into the great political institution of war.*

CHAPTER XX

UNCHANGING HUMAN NATURE IN WAR

DISMAY BECAUSE OF HUMAN NATURE

"THEY forgot human nature," was the Earl of Birkenhead's biting comment on those in the World War who hoped later to establish institutions that would make an end of war. And the Commander in Chief, in an address to the chaplains of the British Army, turned over to them weapons of encouragement both from religion and from psychology: "Wars will not cease and cannot cease," he declared, "so long as human nature remains as it is, and no human agency can possibly change the main characteristics of human nature. If God wishes to change human nature"—and so on, in a spirit familiar to readers in this field.

If such declarations be true, then of the Four Horsemen described in the Apocalypse, we can hope at most to unhorse but two. For by our increasing medical knowledge we are gradually ridding the world of Pestilence; and there is reason to believe that by science we shall rid the world of Famine. But with regard to War, there are many who join with the Earl and the Commander in asserting that science can offer no hope whatever; that it indeed closes the door of hope. For war, it seems to many a person scientifically trained, springs from human nature, and must endure as long as our enduring human nature itself.

Such a thought, when so commonly believed, is of greatest moment, touching national interest and international policy at every point. And psychology could hardly be of

more distinguished service than by helping toward an intelligent view of so weighty a matter. With the reader's consent, then, let us turn steadily for some minutes to this question. Is it true, that according to our increasing knowledge of the mind, human nature will always require nations to settle their disputes by physical violence rather than by law and its orderly methods? The answer to this is worth a long search.

Those who declare that war comes from human nature, and that human nature does not change, have weighty evidence in their favor. Wars have occurred since the remotest time of history and were doubtless waged long before history began. Fighting less organized than war reaches still farther back, as we have seen, into the animal world. Thus all the momentum of our animal and human inheritance seems to carry us fatally forward along the ways of war. Humanity seems pugnacious in its very nerve and muscle; man, it would appear, is born to battle as the sparks fly upward. Human nature, through all the ages, reveals certain constant qualities, and whatever may be the strong desire for another order of life, so it would seem, no other order may be expected.

And yet the thought which I would offer as a word coming from science is the exact opposite of this. The reader will be invited to observe for himself profound changes in human society, which have not required a shadow of turning in human nature—changes quite as great as would be involved in driving war to the very outskirts of society. Institutions based upon permanent traits of human character have been torn down and swept away, without destroying or even weakening a single one of these permanent traits.

SOCIAL ADVANCES WHICH HUMAN NATURE HAS NOT PREVENTED

It will be well to look back, not to the cave man, but to what has occurred within comparatively recent times—in Mexico, in the islands of the Pacific, and in Asia, as well as in Africa. In these and other places it was customary to sacrifice living men upon the altar of some powerful supernatural being. To obtain the creatures for such sacrifice was often one of the aims of war. And beyond this, it was thought that the divine wrath could be appeased, not by sacrificing war prisoners only, but by sacrificing one's own son or daughter, by thus offering something that was still more precious both to the worshiper and to his god.

We can imagine the opposition when in due time there arose the wish to do away with this ghastly institution. "What!" it must have been said, "Would you change human nature? Do you expect men to surrender their very religion? Would you have us refuse to offer to our divinity the rarest, the most valued things we have?" Yet in spite of such misgivings human sacrifice in all civilized regions has been abolished forever and without altering a single one of the deep motives which supported it. There remained unchanged the love of children; indeed, this love grew stronger; and there grew stronger also the sense of the value of human life generally. There remained the same awe of the unseen world. The institution of human sacrifice was destroyed without changing human nature and without destroying religion or preventing a dedication of human life to the ideal.

And the same is true in another great region of our social life. Blood vengeance once existed almost the world over. The death of a member of one's own family must be avenged, it was felt, by taking a life from the family that caused the death. The impulse to wreak such vengeance

has been exceedingly powerful and exceedingly difficult to control. Even so mild a statesman as Confucius believed that a lesser official could not live in the same country with one who had killed a high officer of State; that a subordinate must personally see that the death of his superior was avenged.

But there came a time when the spirit of the law spoke with a different voice. It said "No" to this deep and almost irresistible cry that a man who has been wronged shall himself take the life of the wrongdoer. "Vengeance is mine," the law came finally to say, "not yours. Your impulse is, in a measure, just; but it is a too-crude, a too-expensive way to obtain justice. There will be more of justice if those who are less close to the wrong decide who is guilty and what shall be his punishment." Here, again, we can imagine the critics in that day exclaiming in opposition to those who urged this reform: "Do you expect a man to feel no indignation at the death of his kinsman? Is he to accept coolly the killing of his father or of his son? Dreamers! you will have to change human nature to attain your goal."

Yet the institution of private blood vengeance has been done away, and without requiring human nature to change by so much as a hair's breadth. There still remain all the deep motives of revenge. There is in us to-day the same love of family, the same hatred and rage at the willful killing of one's own flesh and blood, the same desire to right the wrong done by the violator of the family tie. Personal blood vengeance has given way to communal law without requiring that human nature itself should give way. We simply have instituted better methods of satisfying the ancient human impulses, while leaving the impulses themselves strong and untouched. In the same way one might speak of piracy and of dueling, which also have been

virtually abolished while human nature remains unchanged.

But I hasten on to slavery, which comes closer to us, and whose abolition is within the memory of men who still live. Slavery's hold is from earliest times; the enslavement of others has marked the leading peoples of the world; civilization itself has seemed impossible without it. Only yesterday the living bodies of men and women were bought and sold; its effect is still before all eyes, in the millions of Negroes everywhere in the United States. What psychological roots slavery had! Into what depths of our being it reached! It drew its strength from the acquisitive impulse—from the desire for wealth, for property. It drew its strength also from the joy of dominating other human beings; from the satisfaction which comes of escape from incessant labor, and comes of leisure with its opportunity for a more generous giving of necessities and of luxuries to one's own family and to one's friends. Slavery was protected by all the intellectual and the emotional defenses of those who owned slaves. It seemed as though the laws of nature, of society, and of God, not only supported but required this institution; and as though the men and women who worked to abolish slavery had no acquaintance with the human mind, no knowledge of what is possible with human nature.

But when the time came for Great Britain to abolish slavery throughout her dominions, and for Lincoln to sign the great Proclamation, did these acts, by one jot or tittle, have to annul the laws of human nature? No. They left men to be avaricious still. Men still are ready to use other men for their own interests. They still incline to believe that what they deeply desire is also deeply right. But society has fixed new limits to the ways in which men may gratify their impulses to acquire wealth, to control their fellows, and to seek leisure and luxury. No attempt was

made, no attempt was needed, to eradicate the old impulses, but only to set bounds within which these impulses might seek their satisfaction. There has been no general repression; indeed there has been given a larger opportunity than ever before to acquire wealth and to control one's fellows. Even with the restrictions a larger opportunity was offered to the disappointed impulses. But men have been prohibited from buying and selling men as one buys cattle.

RIDDANCE OF WAR REQUIRES NO CHANGE IN HUMAN NATURE

Now to turn our attention back again to war, and to ask whether war in its relation to human nature is essentially different from these other forms of social behavior. War unquestionably is one of the modes in which our nature finds expression. Deep, indeed, is its hold upon us. The worst, the best, of us goes into it. Hardly an interest is there to which war does not minister. The difficulties of restraining it are immense; those who would change our ways with regard to it have no light task. So deep are war's foundations, so firm its iron hold, that all thoughtful men will have at times some touch of despair that there can be success against it.

And yet despair is not scientifically justified. Confidence of success here can be had without forgetting or distorting the truth. Hope can be held without shutting one's eyes to the plain facts of psychology. It may well be, that in all its large outline human nature does not change. And yet our experience shows that our unchanging nature permits important changes in human conduct. Indeed under the stimulation of social enterprise human nature not only permits, but *demands profound changes.*

We cannot doubt that humanity will keep the great impulses which still lead to war, among which are the love of

wealth, the love of adventure, the love of honor, the love of mother country. Yet there can be a growing impatience, a growing abhorrence of satisfying these great impulses by the old methods. Nor is there in the science of psychology anything to assure us that in this one region no farther advance is possible; to assure us that here men have reached the limit of their inventiveness; that they can institute no shrewder, no more satisfying devices to express their devotion to their own nation's life and to the life of the world.

Thus when those who respect science ask, "What of those who assert that human nature is always the same?" the reply must be: "Yes, they are doubtless right. *Within wide limits human nature does not change. Yet they are wholly wrong if they suppose that, for the end we here have in mind, it needs to change.*" Great things have been done for humanity while human nature remained the same. Our civilization has been rid of human sacrifice in religion, of private blood vengeance in our civil life, of piracy upon the high seas, of slavery in all our leading communities. Every one of these social institutions has had the support of men's permanent passions, of men's deep impulses. To rid the world of these ancient instruments it has not been necessary to rid the world of men. Nor have we needed to wait until all sinners have been changed to saints. It has been necessary merely that men should be socially progressive, inventive, adventurous. Men have had to co-operate with one another untiringly to change the old habits of their life. New ways of justice and law and order have had to be viewed with hospitality, without a too-tenacious clinging to the cruder and less effective ways.

Human nature, indeed, plays a double rôle. It runs with the hare and hunts with the hound. It expresses itself by remaining in the old, by moving to the new. It has not

stood as a wall against progress. The advance, the untiring search for more effective institutions of justice, for more effective ways of meeting the rival claims of large groups of men—these changes also are an utterance of our nature. The deepest forces behind human conduct do not merely oppose civilization; they press us to be more and more civilized. Human nature resists progress; but in all leading lands it also overcomes its own resistance, its inertia and habits, its own conservatism. Out of our human nature have come the motives, the human instruments and leaders, the intelligence, the insistent urging, which have enriched and strengthened our civil life and made it replace its earlier and more savage institutions. And these same great forces, psychology in no wise forbids us to expect, will cause the more favored nations to coöperate in establishing a better institution than war to do the work of war. The task is difficult, but there is nothing which science knows of human nature that declares the task impossible. Three of the Four Horsemen and not two only, we may hope, will cease to scourge the world.

CHAPTER XXI

WAR AS A PRODUCT OF SOCIAL PLANNING

IN a publication by the government of the United States, used for the education of soldiers, it is said that the real man hidden in each of us is a savage. Let us taste the exact words of this official psychology: "There is an old saying (it declares): 'Scratch a Russian and find a Tartar.' Well may we amplify it and say 'Scratch a civilized man and find a savage.' Civilization is but skin deep."

Such a thought, accepted by many, closes the door to constructive effort. For according to this belief it is folly to hope that nations can ever be brought out of war, since in times of excited action the skin is sure to be abraded, only to reveal the brute reality beneath. "War is inevitable" is the conclusion quite logically announced by the official voice which we have just heard speaking to the soldier. Let us inquire as to the truth of this belief that war is a display of what is primitive, a revelation of the ease with which under excitement we forget our training and relapse into a condition of savagery.

RELATION OF INSTINCTIVE ACTS TO CULTIVATED ACTS

We have already seen something of the native endowment without which there would be no war. Armies are sent to the trenches in part by what Nature has given us. And a special combination of these native reactions, where with anger there is a violent impulse to break through some human opposition, may perhaps properly be called *an in-*

stinct of pugnacity. The quick angry opposition to another's interference with my impulse, is probably an inherited form of behavior, inherited by all human beings alike, men and women, white, yellow, brown, and black; a true instinct and close to the heart of war. Is there, then, anything else to say than that this instinct of pugnacity *is* war and that war is thus a simple return to a primitive mode of reacting to stimulation, as irrepressible as a tiger's spring upon its prey, or a dog's growl when a bone is taken away?

But we must hesitate here, whetting our thought for a moment to detect the close bonds between nature and education, and to feel the importance which may be hidden even in a small difference.

When a dog seizes a wounded bird, bites into it, tears, and eats it, he is behaving naturally and by instinct. But when he is trained to go with the huntsman, to hold himself back until the shot is fired, then to rush forward, find the wounded bird, seize it, bite it no more than enough to kill it, bring it to the huntsman's feet or hand, and there yield it up, he is behaving not naturally but according to his education. And yet this education which so far departs from nature is based, every whit of it, on instinct. Every last item of the dog's retrieving is a natural act: his standing, attending, running, seizing, more running, and letting go. But the special combination of these natural acts, the form into which they have been brought, the peculiar sequence given to them, the repressions and omissions of what the act in nature would have led to—the silent standing to heel, the refraining from the deep bite and tear and swallow, the surrender of the flesh already in the mouth and tasted, surrendered without a growl and snap of jaw—takes the whole out of the region of nature and instinct and into that of things learned.

Likewise a child will by instinct and nature sit up, look,

grasp, and carry to the mouth what is grasped. But when these natural acts are so bent and recombined that the child no longer grasps his food direct, but grasps instead a spoon and with this lifts the food to the mouth, swallows the food and removes the spoon from the mouth for further enterprise, this total is no longer a bit of instinct, a natural performance, but is a trained act. And yet the parts of the whole are each native and require no training. The acceptable combination which makes for table-manners, by due sequence and restraint and omission of what untutored nature gives, is thus culture, although every part of it is from nature.

Or again, there is a natural impulse to play, in men as well as in children and animals. There is, let us say, a true instinct for such activity, and every game from chess to golf is based upon it. But would it be correct to aver, because it is instinctive in men to play, that it is instinctive to play chess or golf? One would hardly feel inclined to say that whenever one moves a knight or takes a queen, in the chessroom of his club in the heart of town, that he is merely reverting to nature and is obeying the dictates of the savage play-instinct in his breast. He is giving to his native play-impulse an artificial form, amid highly artificial surroundings.

WARRIORS ARE IN THE GRIP OF CULTURE

And with war and the fighting instinct it is not otherwise. The reactions which enter into its full making—the central desires, the impulse to gratify them, the anger at opposition, the passionate attachment to one's familiar companions—are parts of man's native behavior. But it is not a part of his native behavior to combine these into strategy and tactics, into armies and sea power and air forces, all con-

trolled for purposes of State. Far more than the dog when he has become a retriever, has the man when made into a soldier been trained to recombine and repress his native reactions—to control his impulse to run away from danger, his impulse to yield to fatigue and the desire for sleep, to look first of all to the welfare of himself and his own family, to resent commands by strangers, to do damage instantly and individually to those he hates, as soon as they are within range of his weapons. All these things which he is naturally inclined to do, he has to learn not to do, and he has actually learned to do a thousand things, from salute to tail spin, that are artificial. And all these things are done, and all the other things are omitted, in obedience to a great political organization which is diameters of the earth away from nature.

For while the impulse behind social solidarity is natural, yet the actual groups of men that have been welded into the two opposing States which modern war requires have attained their particular sense of union only by an intensive social cultivation. This sense of union with one's nation was not given outright by nature, but was made by art, as truly as a bow and arrow are made by art. From the loose companionship by natural impulse, added to the natural impulse of association by sex and the parental bond, there is organized the community, compact and vital enough to call men together in arms and give them a common purpose and a confidence in one another. This psychic union is by no means the same as the bare juxtaposing of men, women, and children in considerable numbers; it is a cultural product no less than is a decorated and baked earthen jar, whose clay and pigment and fire, nevertheless, are all from nature. The men of old who fought for tribe and chieftain had taken their native pugnacity and let it be remolded by a social institution into warfare. Their society gave a new

form and direction to their native impulses; gave a new goal, a new motive, for their fighting instinct. They fought no longer for their private interests only, but for the tribal body and its attendant institutions.

And when men of our day battle for their nation, they are struggling to maintain and to enlarge the interests of the most complex of all the objects of culture they possess. No automobile, no airplane, no skyscraper in New York, no cathedral in England, no play of Shakespeare's, can equal the modern nation in point of art. And this it is which inspires armies and navies and all the men at war. To the uncareful eye the men at the front may seem to be driven only by a primitive savagery, as though they had lost touch with civilization and had reverted to something more elemental than barbarism. And in part this is true. They are behaving with a savage cunning and ferocity against the foreigner. But it is all carefully and culturally worked out. We discover that fundamentally *they are showing the grip which their culture has upon them.* It is their culture which is actually in control even of their savagery. Their civil connection, the political institution to which these men have been disciplined in loyalty, has called them to the front. The combatants on both sides, by their resistance to ten thousand promptings of instinct when bombs are bursting near by in the dark before dawn, and when they, wearing gas masks, have to clean out machine-gun nests, through barbed-wire entanglements—by their resistance to all these natural promptings, and by their obedience and loyalty to the State, *these men reveal how completely the natural instincts in them have been subdued to cultural uses; they reveal how far they have come from nature, and have traveled toward a complete civilization.*

Indeed war arises not because when you scratch the sur-

face of your New Yorker, your Londoner, your Parisian, you discover the cave man—the man jealously attached to his rocky overhang, his cracked marrowbone, his flint spear-head. Touch his national interests, and you find bristling at once the American, the Englishman, the lover of France, loyal to a strange social organization whose symbol is the Stars and Stripes, the Union Jack, or the Tricolor. Any injury to this communal life is his injury, although he may never have seen the injurer or the injury, but may have caught only some vaguest idea of them from hearsay and the newspaper. To your cave man, all this sensitive fury over something done by strangers to strangers a continent and an ocean away would have brought no shadow of meaning. He would have stared in blank incomprehension that men could have so far departed from the intelligible reactions of himself and all his associates. *Your citizen and soldier fighting for his country makes it clear that his civilization has gone far under his skin, into his muscles and spinal marrow, there beating the savage in him into submission to the State.*

RESHAPING OF ANGER'S EXTERNAL CONDUCT

The warfare of nations shows, as we have just seen, that when you scratch the civilized man you find the civilized man; that his civic culture has penetrated his nerve and muscle. We should now see more fully what this penetration effects.

When some strong desire of his is opposed, your civilized man will probably become angry. This tendency to a *rise of anger* in him is doubtless due to his native constitution. But precisely what he will *do to his opponent;* what will be his overt act by speech, teeth, nails, fist, or boot, will depend upon his training and personal experience; upon his dis-

cipline and the results of his earlier behavior when angry. A glance will reveal the social process.

Boys fight freely up to a certain age because they socially are permitted, indeed spurred on, to fight. Girls stop their physical fighting at an earlier age, not because they are disinclined to anger, but because when they punch and kick and scratch they find themselves under disapproval. But at a time when the passions of young men are fairly bursting into flower, their actual fighting in the upper social levels almost wholly disappears. Although they might still gain much by a pugnacious onslaught, they become aware of a certain social loss which more than offsets the gain. And even when fighting is still allowed to boys, it is governed by an invisible code which prohibits and prevents attack by a boy upon a girl or upon a boy not one's size or upon a cripple or a boy already "down"; and when the opponents are well matched, there are rules against certain manners of onslaught—against kicking, biting, scratching; against hitting "below the belt," and so on. The code here is a social barrier effective against both nature and private judgment as to what will be advantageous.

And when in earlier times a man was killed, his kinsmen as a matter of course went forth to avenge his death, if not on the slayer himself, then on the slayer's kin. To-day under a different social order the impulse of these kinsmen may be as before, but their actual conduct is wholly different; they look to the community, and not to themselves, to punish the offense; nor do they any longer demand, if the murderer himself cannot be found, that the murderer's son or brother or father be killed instead. Furthermore in earlier Europe and in a less degree in America, a gentleman, if insulted by a social equal, expressed his anger perhaps quite impulsively by a challenge to a duel. To-day in a like rage a duel may never enter his thought or muscles,

but he will have recourse to some totally different behavior aimed to hurt the offender in body or in mind, perhaps by injuring his business, or by preventing his election to some office. Not long ago in many a civilized land a man who was angry with his wife was impelled at once to beat her, and he actually did beat her; to-day his anger, no less hot, will usually run out into language or silence or sullen departure to his club, or into whatever else may be ready in his arsenal against an offending mate.

The social atmosphere, the public opinion, the habits and demands of our group, then, color and mold the muscular acts which our anger will impel us to perform. In the Italy of the Renaissance a gentleman could not be counted a man of spirit, could not stand well in his own eyes or before his city or his prince, unless he were himself quick with sword or dagger, or were an employer of bravoes. Those were the days of stout brawl and feud and stabbing in the back and from the dark. But even to-day Italians perhaps no less excitable and passionate have come out of this behavior and into a different utterance of anger.

The anger itself as a wholly inner thing is perhaps not to be modified in its quality. Its intensity may be changed or it may perhaps be trained not to appear at all. But if it arises, it has nearly or quite the selfsame character always: always the same surging mental and visceral tumult and its impulse to injure and to break through the opposition to one's will. But, if I may repeat in summary, the way in which this impulse to injure another and to break down his opposition shall express itself—the kind of behavior to which it will lead—is teachable, is highly sensitive to the attitude of one's present companions and to one's early training. The judgment of our associates, their expectation as to our conduct, their praise and blame, steps in and colors our own judgment and gives to our pugnacious

conduct now one form and now another. Popular thinking is apt to confuse the emotion of anger with the special behavior to which the anger leads; and is too ready to believe that, because anger is a native emotion, then anything which the angry man or the angry nation does is also a native and inevitable reaction.

This has of course its bearing direct on war. The anger which a nation feels when it sees its desire thwarted by another nation, is natural enough; but not the peculiar way in which it behaves toward the offending nation. This external behavior is not innate, it is not by nature bound up with the anger, but is variable, subject to choice, liable to be modified by the accepted standards of the angry nation, by the prevailing standards of other nations, and by the practical alternatives which seem open to the angry nation. War is not a natural thing like blushing or pallor or a quickened pulse, but is a practical means to an end, a social means to a social end, adopted because it promises certain results and because on the whole—at least as a means of defense—it is practically accepted and approved by the nations generally. As belonging to the outward conduct induced by the inner anger, war waging and war preparation are in a high degree subject to direct discipline and stimulation, as we should now more directly see. *Fortunately this outward conduct rather than the inner state is what the nations are immediately interested in. And it is precisely in this outer part that pugnacity is most submissive to discipline.*

WAR AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION

Besides the training with regard to private quarrels, there is a training directed toward international quarrels. There is a powerful and unremitting social effort to maintain war

as an ever present help in time of trouble. War becomes an institution, becomes an object of peculiar public solicitude, to be protected and fostered, with special reactions ready at hand to enlarge its scope and to oppose whatever threatens to weaken the national attachment to this institution.

This is true of almost all civilized countries to-day, as is shown in the nations' respect for their armies and navies; in the maintenance of these during peace; in the State-supported schools for the training of military officers; in the public satisfaction in war success; in the honor bestowed upon military leaders past and present; in the peculiar care and honor of those who have served in war. "We talked of war. *Johnson*: 'Every man thinks meanly of himself for not having been a soldier, or not having been at sea.' *Boswell*: 'Lord Mansfield does not.' *Johnson*: 'Sir, if Lord Mansfield were in company of general officers and admirals who had been in service, he would shrink; he'd wish to creep under the table.' "

And this cultivation of martial spirit is of ancient date; it is characteristic of savages as well as of the civilized. From its long lineage men have been tempted to think it a natural part of human life. Savages have their carefully wrought psychic war equipment, less visible but no less important than their spears and shields. And the acquiring of this psychic equipment begins in early life. In New Zealand, for example, the little children were taught songs and dances to form their minds to hatred and contempt of their tribal enemies. The American Indian likewise was trained in war from boyhood. Among the Omahas the boys were taught to strike or stamp upon some mutilated part of an enemy's body, to accustom them to such things and to stir them to valor. Children of the Iroquois contested with one another to discover who could longest endure a

live coal upon his bare flesh. Boys of the Mandans early took part in mimic battles and in scalp dances. And especially among the Aztecs there was a well-planned war training of the youth; besides instruction in special schools, the boys were distributed among the warriors on campaign, to give them practical acquaintance with warfare. From the age of twelve the sons of the Aztec nobles began this special schooling, and when they were twenty years old they went forth as actual warriors to win honors whose precise grade, based upon deeds, was the prime determiner of the youth's later rank and station.

And there were continuation schools and adult education of war, with wealth of war lore and of all the known means of exciting an ardor for war and battle, by songs, oratory, and dances. Unavenged injuries must not be forgotten by young or old; and no successful vengeance was left unsung. The American Indian, with all his supposed apathy, could rise to the very summit of emotion when things important to him were afoot, namely, war. Songs were ready, full of brave deeds for emulation; among certain tribes each warrior came forward in his turn to recount his achievements; drums and rattles sounded; dancing was continued until the braves, with flashing eyes and violent gesticulation, attained the very peak of passionate defiance and rage. The Omahas had songs to remove the fear of death; while their wolf dance was an appeal to the wolf to give them his predatory character and his power to roam and not be homesick; for homesickness was dreaded by the warriors. And while the men were away, the women had songs to give strength and courage to the absent braves. Among the Fijians and the inhabitants of Van Dieman's Land and many another country, there were songs to celebrate the war deeds of the tribal heroes and the tribal gods, which did for these peoples what the *Iliad* did for the Greeks, and what national war

history has done for France, Germany, England, and America, and what the tales of battle prowess have done for Japan. Boys and men were thus made eager for war honors; and for the ferocity and fortitude needed in war.

There were also games in times of peace to maintain and increase the preparations for war. In the South Sea Islands there were war games of boxing, wrestling, and throwing the spear, together with review of the land forces and sea forces, and mimic battles. In New Zealand there were practice fights in which the warriors appeared in full gear and went through all the movements of actual engagement. Among the Incas also, whose wars were wars of conquest and who could raise an army of 200,000 men, the war spirit was powerfully maintained; interest in war was brought to the point where it exceeded all other interests, even that of religion; an Inca who had shown cowardice was consigned to oblivion; his name must not be sung. Here, as with the Aztecs, the public attention was centered on the development of the art of war.

The honors paid the successful warrior indicate the permanent and high place which the war interest attains by cultivation. Among the Omahas there were six grades of war honor, which could be bestowed only by the tribe's formal action and were marked by decorations; and only those who held the sixth and highest honor were eligible for certain offices. And with the Pimas war honors were a distinct object and incentive of war. The Gallas of Africa considered no one a man until he had slain an enemy; the number of ivory rings he wore indicated the number of the foe he had killed. With them, as with their neighbors the Abyssinians, certain war trophies must be won before a man could marry. The Creek Indians compelled one who had not yet attained his war title to do the most servile work; and if he never attained it, they knew him as an "old wom-

an" or a "nobody." And among more than one people the women were educated to reserve their approval and their bridal favors for the men who had shown themselves brave warriors; no woman might marry one who had flinched and failed.

The foundations for the martial spirit are thus deepened by special social training and special social incentive. Nor is the actual fighting left to untrained unstimulated impulse. In Samoa before battle, the leader customarily delivered a highly emotional address. In Australia and Tasmania there was substantially a military revival meeting before battle: the warriors excited themselves by recrimination, threats, gesticulation, and shouting, while war songs were sung louder and louder, until there was violent involuntary jerking of their bodies.

Among the Tahitians there were battle orators appointed who rushed madly among the fighters during battle, recalling to them the ancient deeds of heroism of their people and inciting them to rage and to the utmost pitch of valor, the orators themselves so far beside themselves that they often died from their efforts.

The distance which even savage warfare is from natural action is indicated further by the distinction between what is honorable and what is dishonorable in fighting. Usually there are restraints upon the impulse to damage the enemy; there is some requirement that the fighting be "civilized." It is true that there were even here the analogues of poison gas and the bayonetting of the wounded on the field; there were atrocities enough and to spare. And yet leaders of the American Indians, like Tecumseh, worked against atrocities, which came to be discountenanced or even abolished among the Ojibways, Blackfeet, and Seminoles. One finds, not always, it is true, a notable approach to knightly honor. Thus when the Mandans met a war party of the Cheyennes

much larger than their own, the Cheyennes did not wish to use their advantage, but challenged their adversaries to a combat of champions armed and on horseback. The Mandan chief, at the first rifle shot, had his powderhorn pierced by a bullet and all his powder ran out. He holds up the empty horn, and throwing it away with his rifle, seizes his bow and arrow. The Cheyenne at once throws away his rifle and powderhorn, and the fight continues. Soon the Mandan's horse is struck by an arrow, and falls; whereupon the Cheyenne also dismounts. Fighting now on foot, the Cheyenne chief shoots his last arrow, holds up his empty quiver, and dashes it and his bow and shield to the ground. The Mandan does likewise, and there is left but one knife between them. They struggle for this, until the Mandan finally holds it free and the Cheyenne chief is slain. In a similar spirit, the Arkansas Indians once divided their powder with their enemies the Chickasaws. And when the Algonquins had entrenched themselves and had offered battle to the Iroquois, their attention was drawn by the latter to the oncoming darkness. Thereupon they stopped, and both sides gave themselves over to undisturbed sleep. So, too, there were sanctuaries, where all hostilities must cease, as at the Red-pipestone Quarry of Prairie du Chien.

BOTH SAVAGE AND CIVILIZED WAR ARE REMOTE FROM NATURE

These customs, together with the established ways of beginning war, of beginning battle, of ending battle, of truce or armistice, of parley, of confirming peace—these are all far from nature; they are elaborate products of human social life. But if savage warfare is a product of education, how much more is our international warfare to-day, with its elaborate art of strategy, its science of artillery fire, of

aviation, of battleship construction, its professionally trained officers, and all its fostering by recruiting sergeants and drill sergeants, and maneuvers, and acts of congresses and of parliaments.

It thus becomes perhaps still clearer that *warfare among civilized nations is no mere persistence of something inborn, but is a product and instrument of governmental art* —revealing to us, it is true, the present imperfection of that art, but revealing no less its masterly presence with us. For it is because of our deep political training that the nation when endangered or ambitious is able to summon from its citizens those profound and fateful responses wherein there is an absorbed attention, a continuance and heat of passion, a singleness of impulse, a concerted action, in war as in nothing else.

There may be those, however, who will still prefer to regard war as something essentially natural, because of its natural ingredients of anger and of angry impulse. But it may be well to remember, when drawn back to such a view, that the clearest products of social art—such institutions as the law court, the school, and the church—rest upon natural foundations and are built of natural materials. Even one's tailored coat is from nature's wool mingled perhaps with nature's cotton. And war itself has in it no more of nature, no less of human artifice, than have the most evident products of human patience and ingenuity. One may, if so inclined, reject the distinction between natural products and the products of culture. *But as long as one is ready to admit that anything is a work of art, then war must be recognized as a thing contrived by human skill.* Until we are ready to say that churches, marriage, courts of law, and kingship are not due to training and invention but are instinctive, then we should cease to say this of armed international combat. Although war is made by a society and

not by the individual alone, yet it is made, and is made for a purpose. And further, it is a made thing of a second order, twice removed from nature; it is an art product of an art product, since the particular society which uses war is itself a human device, and the warfare which it uses is in turn a device of this society.

CHAPTER XXII

WAR'S SOURCES IN INTELLIGENCE

IT is almost commonplace to hear how irrational is human conduct, how negligible is human reason, how all-controlling are our instincts or our conditioned reflexes. And this teaching bears importantly on war, which thus easily appears to be an illustration of our deep unreason, of our subjection to blind impulse, indicating that armed violence must continue, and that the most knowing nations will plan only to exceed other nations in a vigorous and skillful use of violence.

But we need to see that the unreason of anger and the fighting impulse can easily be overstated, as we can exaggerate the unreasonableness of emotional conduct generally. Let us for a moment look toward this wider field, from which we may return again to the place of anger and war.

CONCEALED REASONABLENESS IN EMOTION

In what was called shell shock the soldier showed great variety in his behavior; he perhaps trembled and one of his arms was rigid and contracted, he perhaps could not hear or see or speak. Medical examination revealed no physical wound to explain his disorder; the concussion of high explosive shells, that at first was thought to have caused the trouble, was shown not to be the cause at all. Nor was the trouble mere malingering. The entire disturbance proved to be due to emotional conflict, and superficially might seem entirely unreasonable. And yet as it became possible to

see below the surface of the soldier's condition into his emotional disturbance, there appeared a surprising degree of logic in his behavior. In the trenches he had been psychically torn by the forces which were violently in conflict within him. The cold, the filth, the rotting corpses, the screeching shells, the thrusting of bayonets into living flesh, the dismembering of his comrades, the imminence of death to himself—all this had at last become terrible and sickening to him, mind and body. He felt impelled to defy orders, to desert, to pretend serious illness. And yet there was something within him which resisted such an impulse. For his comrades were going through the same hellish nightmare, and he must show no streak of yellow; his fellow-soldiers, his officers, his family and friends at home who had seen him set out brave and determined, must not find him a coward and a "quitter." Thus things powerful in him blocked the way to desertion, mutiny, or malingering; and powerful things also blocked the way to his being reconciled with the soldier's task. To escape from this inner conflict, an unconscious way was found. Without consciously intending it, he becomes incapable of service at the front; he breaks down in body and in mind; and is of necessity sent to the rear and the hospital, where he escapes both an unendurable disgrace and an unendurable terror and disgust. He had not planned this result; and perhaps if he had had a deeper insight he would not have behaved as he did. Yet there was much intelligence in his behavior. A rat, a chimpanzee, or a gorilla could not work through so intricate a course of conduct. It is the behavior of a being, more intelligent than they, acting from a certain insight into a most complex situation. His incapacity, undesirable as this may be in itself, attains an end which he deeply desires. He takes a course which brings results, not accidentally, but because something in him knows that it will bring the re-

sults, and without the loss which he dreads. *He has not reasoned his conduct out, it is emotional, but it is also highly reasonable.*

Likewise the woman who must be nursed and coddled, who is weak and wearied although she has done no work, who suffers severe pain although the experts can find no physical condition to cause pain. This "nervous prostration," as it once was called, seems unreasonable enough; but is it really so? Her incapacity brings a result which is desired; she is escaping thereby from a situation which has become odious and distressing and which she is unwilling to face or is unable to bend or break. As an invalid, also, though she misses much, yet she gets certain positive rewards: she is the center of attention in the household; her whims are heeded; sympathy is poured in upon her from friends. She is behaving not as a being of emotion only and without intelligence. She has taken a course perhaps not fully understood by herself, but a course which brings results. She is behaving as only a person of human intelligence can behave who, aware of a multitude of imponderables, threads her way unadmirably through them to obtain what she wishes to obtain. *Her conduct is not reasoned out, it is emotional, but it is also highly reasonable.*

Nor are sick and unstable persons the only possessors of this reasonableness hidden in emotion. A friend of mine who is sound in wind and limb and mind had cheerfully accepted an invitation from an honored colleague to a luncheon where the guest of honor, so he learned, was to be one whom my friend disliked. And when the time came for the luncheon, my friend completely forgot his engagement. Now the forgetting intelligently served a desire to avoid the person disliked, a desire which could not so comfortably be served either by declining at the start the honored colleague's invitation or by intentionally refusing to go after

the invitation had been accepted. The forgetting was inspired by emotion, but it was not blind; it followed a course which could be followed only by intelligence.

And this is true of much that in the child seems utterly bereft of reason; in the child, who, when thwarted, throws himself on the floor with tears and kicks and screams. The conduct here is at once passionate and intelligent. The child has discovered that, with his particular parents, such conduct works; it brings results; it breaks through their opposition and lets him have his way. The "tantrum" is not consciously planned; it is not quite histrionic; it is at the moment impulsive and uncontrollable. Scolding, argument, and a spanking may have no effect except to make the uproar worse. But the storm can *indirectly* be controlled by making it regularly fail to bring the desired result; by having it only confirm the parents in their refusal; by the child's discovery that such outrageous conduct is the one sure way to lose a victory over them. The emotional tempest, though unreasoned, is substantially reasonable; it is a clever means for the child's purpose, and will disappear when the child by repeated and invariable experience discovers that it fails and that other ways are effective. But it will continue while it works, and perhaps for a while after it has ceased to work, and until the old habit is broken and the child is fully aware that it is a losing game.

INTELLIGENCE IN ANGER AND FEAR PARTICULARLY

Even our emotions, then, are not always bereft of their wits. But we should look a little farther especially into anger and fear, which are so close to the heart of war, to make sure that we are not deceived in believing that our intelligence is fused with them also. For we must see here, too, that the emotion and the outburst of action which goes

with it is a means to an end, a means whose selection is guided largely by experience and insight and not wholly by a blind mechanism of nerves and instinct and reflexes. These emotional outbursts are not useless explosions; they are emergency devices to overcome some opposition with which our calm ordinary powers seem unable to cope. Fear and anger are reasonable since they are means of reducing a danger that threatens to prevent our satisfying some desire.

But against such a view it may be urged that instinctively, innately, rather than by experience and insight, we fear and are angry at objects or situations—so we fear, for instance, the unknown. And it may be true, although probably it is not, that some things, quite apart from any harm experienced from them, cause fear or anger in animals or children. But usually it is clear that both the higher animals and men *have to learn at what to be angry.* We may recall that Darwin's birds and Amundsen's seals faced the unknown with equanimity; they had not yet learned the danger from men with guns or from dogs. The truth seems to be that we are afraid, not of all strange things, but only of those whose strangeness is of a kind that has proved dangerous to us. A strange tree, a strange lake, a strange mountain does not throw us into terror; whereas a strange large animal, a strange and dangerous-looking man, a strange portent in the sky or underground may frighten us. The one kind of object, even though the particular specimen is unknown, is harmless; the other kind has proved hurtful.

And whether we shall be afraid or be angry as we face another human being depends not wholly on our native nerves, but also in large measure upon our instant estimate of the power and purpose of the person who confronts us. If in this quick survey he seems intent to injure me and seems also to have power to which my own power is wholly

unequal, I shall be afraid of him. But if there seems a fair prospect that with my common powers eked out by my emotional reserves I can withstand his power, then I become angry with him rather than afraid. Whether I shall find myself in fear or in anger is not a matter of deliberate choice with me; I do not, as a challenged duelist might choose his weapons, carefully select anger or fear according as I find, after due consideration, that the one or the other emotion will be the more suitable defense. And yet the quality of my reaction has depended upon an intelligent, even though hurried and perhaps utterly mistaken, appraisal of the total situation.

And to linger amid these details for a moment longer, the reasonableness even in our anger and fear is the more evident if we look at what we overtly *do* when we are angry or afraid.

Now Nature has prescribed in large part the internal action, but not the external. If I am afraid, my heart, veins, arteries, and capillaries, my muscles of breathing, my digestive organs, my ductless glands—all these behave according to what is probably a foreordained pattern; and likewise if I am angry. But not so my overt conduct. In fear, my external behavior may take now one and now another very different form, according to my perception and estimate of the fearsome situation: in one case I may stand stock still, rooted to the spot; in another I may drop to the ground and crawl under some near-by cover; in another I may climb a tree or may wave my arms and call for help; in still another I may take to my heels. Or if it be anger, I may in one situation, as I see and appraise it, stand still and neither speak nor move, almost as in fear; in another, I may turn my back upon the offender and with chin high in air walk off silent; in another, I may face him and with clenched fists, set jaws, and glaring eyes, flood him

with vituperation; or, again, I may, rushing upon him in bodily attack, strike him and hurl him to the ground.

Which among all these and many other different forms of conduct I shall find myself adopting in anger or in fear, will be determined partly by my habits, but largely by what at the moment seems the course of action likely to bring the desired results. What I do is not the outcome of reasoning, and it may not at all commend itself to my later leisurely judgment; but it is nevertheless a choice based upon knowledge and rapid appraisal, being roughly calculated to pluck the least bitter, the sweetest fruit from an unchosen and unhappy situation. That Nature herself does not tell what a man must do when angry, is shown by his intelligent selection of means to damage his adversary's body, if damage to his body is what is aimed at. He will use his fists, if no weapon is at hand; he will use a club or stone if he has no knife; he will use a knife, if he has no pistol; if he has a pistol, he may use this.

The passions which immediately lead to war, then, are not what they usually are painted. *Neither the uprising of anger and fear themselves nor the overt behavior to which they lead are quite inaccessible to our intelligence.* It is true that in passion there may be a limitation in the scope of one's thinking; the field of consciousness may be narrowed as in hypnotism, so besetting is our present purpose and our bent to use the instant means. But once have it penetrate our mind that it is to our decided advantage to avoid issue with the other person, or to make some constructive accommodation to his desire, or to express our anger in some other manner than by killing him or by striking him down—once have such knowledge root itself in the mind, then the chances are as one hundred to one that we shall try neither to strike nor to kill him, hotly angry with him though we be. We know that something

else will better serve our interests; and our interests, as we see them, tend to dominate our conduct. Even anger thus has an eye to our advantage; with all the fire behind the pupil, it has a vein of understanding.

DOES INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR CONTRADICT ALL THIS?

But if pugnacity really has in it this reasonableness, why do nations act so unreasonably? Is it not clear as summer's sun, that war brings dire injury to both victors and vanquished? Do not the nations know of the war debts, the devastated regions of France and elsewhere, the fallen governments, the social disorder in all the chief countries, the millions of men cut off in the prime of life? Knowing all this, why do civilized nations still maintain the institution of war, preparing great armaments, and expecting to use them? Must it not be that pugnacity of men in nations is ready to fly in the face of interest? Must there not be a different psychology in the great political group from that which is found in the private person?

On the contrary there will be found in the nations, as in the individuals who compose the nations, a like readiness to use the means that seem best to serve their interests.

The civilized individual has abandoned physical onslaught as an habitual instrument of his will largely because in his society this method no longer "pays." He cannot obtain great and enduring satisfaction by means of armed violence. Even apart from any restraint imposed upon him by law and police, he usually cannot by a pistol or brass knuckles or hired bravoes obtain what are for him the chief prizes: he cannot become a banker or a captain of industry, a leader in law or medicine, a distinguished scientist, a bishop, a member of congress or of parliament, a president or prime minister of his country. If he con-

spicuously uses a bludgeon, he begins to feel some social hesitation, some closing of the door to his preferment. Habitual physical aggression here brings few and short-lived rewards and much oppressive loss.

But not at all so with nations. Their interrelations are such that physical violence, if only it be violent enough, still "works." It brings large and almost universally desired results; it brings as yet no oppressive disapproval from the international society generally, it clearly and consciously shuts the nation off from no great object upon which its heart is fixed. According to current international standards of value, war—and especially a victorious war—still "pays."

The opposite is often asserted. And by other than the current international standards—by the standard of personal conduct of the plain individual—the opposite is of course true. The conquerors, as was just said, are in nearly as bad case as are the conquered; perhaps in some respects they are in a worse plight. France to-day is perhaps in no happier mood than is Germany; nor economically is she greatly more fortunate. In proportion to her population she suffered a greater loss of men killed or maimed for life. And England, besides her loss in lives, has suffered for years a grievous impairment of her economic system.

But neither France nor England, even in their moments of deep depression, would exchange places with Germany or Austria. For with no one of the victors has there been such financial chaos as came to some of the defeated countries; has there been any like disruption of the entire political system, or any like frustration of political aim. Even with the incalculable loss of blood, treasure, and culture, the victors secured by the war a result dear to most of their hearts. They saw a once powerful rival politically humbled. Germany now has no growing navy to challenge Great Britain's power; she now has no army that could

sweep up France's armies as a gardener sweeps up leaves for the burning; Germany's colonies are wrested from her and are farmed out to her conquerors; her ally Austria, the once voracious eater, is now carved and picked to the bone; France again holds Alsace and Lorraine; Japan has gained territory and prestige; Italy, although indignant at getting no more, has become almost drunken with what she has acquired; to the United States is flowing the wealth of the world.

Thus it is foolish to say that war accomplishes nothing important, or nothing which the nations themselves count important. The wise may laugh at its results. It may make no final settlements, and its transient settlements may be at a staggering cost. But it brings to the victors much for which they long, and at a cost they are reluctantly willing to pay. It does not bring to them all that they desire, nor at a price which they themselves would have named. But they get much of the greatness they covet, and they ward off much that they dread. Indeed in a pinch they would perhaps be willing to pay even more for what they get and for their escape. Given the state of mind of the leading nations, given their standards of valuing, given also their attitude toward one another—though doubts are beginning to trouble them—*defensive private war still seems to them, even in their calm moments of political deliberation, to be a useful institution,* a "good investment"; for all its cost, it still seems to them to "pay."

This, then, is one of the factors of reasonableness in the pugnacity even of nations. We speak as though war were all improvidence and passion. It is passion and shrewd worldly wisdom combined. Passion here is in the service of a too-narrow judgment and of too-narrow "realistic" desires. The war instrument is seized upon and used against the adversary, not merely because of fear and rage

forgetful of practical interests, but also because there is an eye to practical interests and because war promises and often brings defense or enlargement of the interests in view. *According to the nations' minds as they are now trained,* and in spite of deep misgiving and renunciation, waging war for defense—and most wars, and indeed both sides in most wars to-day are for defense—is a carefully chosen and planned form of response by many of the leading nations; *it is an acceptable way to have the national will. It still appeals to the nations' limited calculation.*

THE PECULIAR INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

There is, however, another factor of reasonableness in the nation's emotional behavior toward its fellows. And this will appear if we examine for a moment longer the circumstances in which the nations hitherto have found themselves and which are so different from those in which the individual makes his choice for unviolent means.

For the individual not only feels invisible obstacles to a physical onslaught whenever his desire is seriously crossed; he not only feels the disapproval and actually sees the loss to himself because the door to opportunity and preferment is closed to him. He feels and sees more; he discovers all about him institutions to protect him in his orderly possessions and to offer him means of orderly increase. Powers have been organized for the security of his life and for the security and enlargement of his wealth and dignity, and for wealth and dignity in other persons who mount large in his interest. Orderly and relatively unviolent instruments lie ready to his hand, in a social fabric which includes courts, legislature, and police. So it is also with the larger bodies of men short of nationhood—with commercial corporations, churches, cities, and the States within a common-

wealth of States. Institutions stand there for them also and are accepted to adjust lawfully their more serious conflicts of interest and to bring a fuller protection, and to offer a larger freedom for advancement of their desires than would fists or bayonets in the hands of the persons aggrieved or ambitious.

Nations, in contrast to all this, have at hand no such institutions, or at most have but the recent beginnings of them. Until recently no State could count upon any established power, except itself, which would even attempt to secure its territory or its political life against violence from without. At most it might expect help from some limited alliance of its own contriving, since neutrality hitherto has been an honored attitude to assure when one nation was robbing or stabbing another. They have thus felt compelled to maintain each its own immense private armament for its own protection. A change is already to be observed, but war by the nation itself on its own initiative is still in large measure the only fully organized means of international security. As religion is "established" in some countries, so war is "established" in every country. And this is in part because there is no alternative establishment universally accepted and supported to do the work now done by these violent means. Nothing else is at hand in vigorous working order to guard the nations' interests.

It is not as though nations were committed by their very constitution of mind to this ancient institution. There is a certain jealous love, it is true, of private national war. But this attachment could not hold out against some clearly greater advantage offered by a rival institution. Given an alternative which is manifestly able to do for the nations' interests more than war does, and the old love will be looked on with growing coolness. For war is not waged to-day because war is preferred to any other means by

which the goal can be attained. The only object in fighting is to obtain results: *"On ne fait la guerre que pour ses résultats,"* said General Foch at one of the interallied councils. Belligerents and those who prepare for war shrewdly and frankly have their eye on a goal—undiminished or increased territory or population or trade or prestige or some other of the objects of national desire. If a nation can secure itself in what it has or can add to what it has, by other means than actual war—by clever diplomacy, by saber-rattling, or by a surprise-seizure unopposed—the nation does not feel aggrieved because its objective has been attained without armies in the field. It congratulates itself, rather, on its finesse.

Indeed few persons and no nations steadily want war itself. They want the results which war promises them and which nothing else seems to promise so well. The sword is a tool: a defense against aggression, a means of aggression, a means of opening the world-oyster. The Kaiser, one need not doubt, was both sincere and accurate in asserting before and since 1914 that Germany did not want war. Nor in fact did Russia, France, Austria, Italy, England, or the United States. They wanted what a war, and only a war, seemed likely to give them. They wanted certain results and accepted what they believed to be the most effective available means to their several ends. No nation need plume itself to-day because it does not want war. In this it is on a plane with all the rest.

This, then, is the other of the factors of reasonableness which join in causing war. The first of the factors is that war does actually and not infrequently bring results that are craved; and the second is, that no other instrument seems, to the nation whose interests are deeply involved, immediately available and so effective to get these craved results. It is idle to say, as some do, that whenever a

nation desires something earnestly she will always and inevitably in very madness go to war to get it. The nation, like the individual, is in fact influenced by the present outlook, by training of intelligence, by experience and such shrewd judgment as may be hers. She will try to avoid war if reasonably sure that it will not bring her nearer to her object, or that she can come nearer to this object by other means than war. If Germany could have clearly foreseen her defeat, or even could have faintly imagined it probable, or could have felt sure of winning all her glittering desires without war, then war would never have had her voice. If Italy could have "redeemed" all her neighboring Italian population and become possessed of the land they occupied; if she could have "rectified" her boundary elsewhere along the Alps, always by moving her line outward and never inward; if she could have taken a long step toward an Adriatic embraced by Italian power; if she could have attained all these without war, then nothing but a still larger promise of possession by means of war would have sent a single Italian soldier to the front.

Nor did the United States more than the rest go into the World War from very war madness. She had a purpose which the war and nothing but the war, in the nation's judgment, promised to fulfill. She wanted her ships free of repeated attack from submarines; wanted assurance that no victorious Germany would, when the European business was done, turn next on America her whetted anger; she wanted also—in spite of those who can see no disinterested purpose in the war—some righting of the wrong to Belgium, and an outcome that would open a door into a world where such another war would not occur. These and the like were the chief desires of the belligerents. And no other means than war seemed ready; no other tool seemed at hand to do the work.

The absence of effective instruments other than war, to further and to oppose the desires of nations, must then be counted among the important causes of war. Nations continue to go to war because they find or create and loyally support no better instrument for their purpose. Since they do not want war but chiefly war's results—indeed want the satisfaction of their principal desires already named, far more than they desire the merely emotional rewards which help to support the war effort—they will not long cling to war when once they find a more adept means to obtain the main results of war, and when those who wage war also see themselves shut out from world respect and from tangible world advantages denied to the violent and disorderly. Physical fighting is a trained servant of our interests; and when younger and better-trained servants are there to take his place, this old retainer will become a pensioner, sitting quiet on his bench in the afternoon sun.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE ARRAY OF WAR'S PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSES

THE procession of causes which has passed before us, were it complete, would—so far as psychology now may speak—be the explanation of war. And though incomplete, it may help us to understand the confusion of tongues when those come together who would explain war. Some of these speakers are assigning causes that are real, but are only fragments of explanation: the newspapers, the politicians, armaments, armament-makers, diplomatists, overpopulation, economic necessity, human unreason, human instinct, human nature. Some of these causes assigned are light realities, indeed, like bubbles that float away and burst. It is easy to offer too simple, too thin an account of this great international institution. For no one thing is *the* cause; the one thing must join with many another important force to make the complexity out of which comes war.

In the account just ended, there has been an attempt to lay bare some of the different depths from which the moving forces come. It will be well to see these forces now brought closer together, repeated briefly, to show something of their relation to one another.

IMPORTANT BUT INSUFFICIENT FACTORS

There are surface causes apparent to every one, the stirring events—such as the murders in Bosnia, and the ultimatum—which precede war and lead directly to it, being

the spark that falls on the powder and makes it explode.

Almost as obvious, and yet a little deeper in, is the tense sense of conflict of interest, which makes the spark effective. No armies would ever be mobilized if the nations had no powerful urgings of desire; and the satisfaction of these desires in one nation may restrict or prevent the satisfaction in another. And whenever some strong national desire is thus felt to be thwarted or liable to be thwarted by another nation, then an emotion of fear or anger usually comes stormily up to support the desire endangered.

It is not always that two nations must want some single object which only one nation can possess—some island or valley, or the foremost place in armament on sea or land. Often the clash comes because the one nation's striving for a particular form of satisfaction—for wealth or military power, let us say—presses hard upon a different desire in another nation, the desire perhaps for union with those of its own culture or for continued political existence. Desires may come and go, but desire remains, and no day passes without effort here withstanding effort there. Cross purpose in desire is thus in the upper ground of preparation for war.

This opposition by itself, however, is not war nor by itself does it cause war. It is an entirely normal part of social life that is quite pacific—in the family, in friendship, in neighborhood, in the city, and beyond these while still within the State. Crossing of desire, even of deep desire, is present in every stable community, and without physical violence and bloodshed by those who desire and are left unsatisfied.

Nor is the passion which comes to the support of desire in nations—this passionate fear or anger is not war nor of itself is it the cause of war. There has been passion

without war. These emotions help, but are quite insufficient, since they too, like opposition of desire, are an entirely normal part of social life that is pacific. International life, however, is peculiarly pervaded by mistrust at nearly all times; and as the conflict of desire becomes sharpened to a cutting edge, there is usually an outburst of fear and rage in those who are on the verge of violence. These emotions are a sign that an emergency is felt; and they also give added strength to face the emergency; but they do not usually cause the emergency. They strengthen the muscles and the impulses in favor of the desire which is opposed; they enrich and accelerate the thought, memory, and imagination to assist in carrying out these impulses. War usually needs and uses such reserves of emotion. But we should see that they of themselves do not cause war. Fear and anger are a normal part of social living that is pacific.

Those who look to the political events immediately preceding war, recorded perhaps in secret archives or in private journals, or who look to markets and trade balances and the clash of economic effort in this State and that, or who look only to the mistrust or fear or ill will which certain nations have long felt—such persons point to things important in explaining the final violence. But each of these things alone is not enough, nor when put all together are they enough. We must enlarge the picture and give it more depth if we would have the full explanation and would see a way of escape.

THE FORCE OF TRAINING

Around and behind all these is training, a training which has two courses, a roundabout way and a way straight as the crow's flight, toward war.

Nor does this deny the natural stuff in the training. Indeed every product of art leads back to nature. If men were not what they are by nature there would be no paintings in the Vatican, no Parisian gowns, no banks, railways, labor unions, courts of law, parliaments, or churches. But Nature does not turn out these things ready-made; nor does she create warfare. All these are man-made and not made even by natural man, but by men wedded to society and culture. Fighting even by two's, which is of course not warfare, is by no means the chief moving power even in animal evolution. Nor is large coöperative human physical fighting, which *is* warfare, the power which selects superior human groups. Human nature does not prescribe war; nor is war a reversion to a state of nature. Modern warfare is a violent reaction of men because of their culture, showing not how thin is their civilization but how thick it is. They have come to respond to national demands as though these were inbred, whereas they are largely due to training. A distorted importance in explaining war is often given to the natural and inescapable traits of men.

The one course of this training which prepares for war can be seen in the methods employed for national *morale*. To have national solidarity there must be regard for the nation. There must be corporate self-appreciation. The nations, each intent upon having for itself this necessity, have neglected other necessities, and have attained an uncorrected self-centering, a perfect and gigantic egotism. This self-regard leaves the purposes of the one nation without trained accommodation to the purposes of others, so that the self-importance of the one people is raised to a pitch where its corporate interests are of supreme and absolute importance, and require a narrow, tireless, and passionate heed. Racial prejudice is one of the ways of ex-

pressing this uncorrected self-regard in the group that exceeds the nation. The sense of freedom from corporate obligation to the foreign nation that is thwarting our own national desires is one of the ways of expressing this self-regard in the nation itself. The newspapers, politicians, and diplomatists who say and do things insolent to our humanity are symptoms of this cultivated spirit. The solidarity of an entire modern nation is an almost incredibly great achievement and we need not wonder that there is as yet no still greater achievement of a decent regard for neighboring nations. But our want of wonder at this must not blind us to the fact itself and to its effects. The intense moral education into nationhood and the present limits of that moral education in everything that relates to the nations outside must be recognized as one of the tap-roots of international violence. It is easy to be violent against those that have power to check and hurt us but who have not, as an organized body, won from us as yet even half-appreciation.

Without solidarity, without psychic fusion, without a sense of community of desire or interest, acquired by training, there could be no nation. But this great thing has been purchased at a great price. By reason of the very ardor and confinement of their loyalty most nations now have more than a touch of that insanity known as paranoia, with its delusions of grandeur and of persecution. Mildly or without mildness, each tends toward the delusion that it is a superior being, ringed round with creatures powerful, but morally inferior. Haggard care is felt lest that which is rightly held precious should be lost, and all because of others who call out from us but a slightest sense of moral obligation. Now if only one nation at a time were in this frame of mind the rest might easily meet the situation. But with nearly all of them in a like case, we

have a standing preparation for the kind of outburst and disorder which alienists have come to expect among the maniacal.

This prepares the atmosphere of violence in general. But further, there is the direct training for war itself. There is the creating, adoption, and cultivation of war as a State institution. Even with cross-purposes and fear or anger and an unlimited self-importance, war itself could hardly occur if the national mind were not schooled to it. There must be an army or a navy, or both; there must be the trained personnel and the physical instruments of fighting, and the long-garnered knowledge of waging war, and a national desire to have and use, when need be, all this great organization. These things do not come of themselves, but by the will and the careful education to have them. Warfare is thus given a high and enduring place in the social order. It is not that war occurs only suddenly and in passion. It comes partly in the quietest days of peace, when there is cultivated a readiness to maintain and use the institution of war.

And this spirit of readiness is witnessed in a peculiar national satisfaction in successes of war, a sense of oppression in defeat by war. The one kind of experience is recalled and celebrated; the other remains unsung and is remembered in sorrow and to be righted by revenge. There are high honors, sometimes even civic immortality, for personal distinction in war; and the military service as a whole is given a special worth and is more intimately and constantly associated than is any other service with the revered emblems of the national life. Only the service of religion in some great cathedral has an equal dignity. Warfare is thus fostered by being almost universally erected into a central public institution with its own honored profession surrounded with impressive ceremonial. Even where

condemned and renounced by governments, its use for defense is sacredly reserved.

REWARDS FROM THE WAR-INSTITUTION

This great State institution of war is maintained in every civilized country because of its usefulness; one might almost say, its too-easy usefulness. It appeals to political common sense that wants to see certain things done: and here by the army and navy is the way to do them. War is caused in part by its plain practical utility.

It appeals also, it is true, to what is not practical; it appeals to the human taste for prohibited excesses of experience, as well as for moral exaltation. In war, paradoxically, both of these can be had at once. Lapped as we are in our civilities and domesticities, we look wistfully toward the saturnalia. A child of mine once begged for Bible stories, from the Old Testament. And why? "Because the people there are wicked," the child said, "and I don't know any wicked people." Nothing quite equals war in giving this license to enjoy what we are shut away from by a stable order. We then are allowed, nay almost compelled, to partake of an immense adventure where certain impassable moral barriers may nevertheless be passed and yet without condemnation, indeed with a sense of being carried to a moral height. For in time of war and in certain definite directions the prohibition of hatred and deceit and arson and killing may be forgotten and also the limits set about oneself by one's own self-interests. We enter into something more than drama; the nation as a whole joins the hosts of the Lord to smite some towering wrong and to defend the right. This rare experience of escape from the commonplace, in which the bringing of ruin to fellow-men is somehow felt to be in harmony with

the loftiest aspiration—"Greater love hath no man than this," is repeated by poets in war time—this rare experience must be named as a force to maintain war.

But beyond all this carnival of experience is war's appeal to the nations' practical judgment. Given the state of mind of the nations—their hot desires, their egotism, and the envying and honoring of the successful violator of what law and order there is among nations—given this state of mind, together with the universal danger which comes of this state of mind, then war arises because of its crude adaptation to such conditions, because of its rough political utility. We hear that war is a surging up from the primal instincts and passions of men; and this is not wholly untrue. But in larger truth war comes from a restricted common sense, from expedience, from what is essentially impassive and pragmatic. War is an institution established for certain results, and is maintained because it is felt to "work." Especially does it seem to be a working institution for those who can manage to be victorious. No nation as a whole ever wants war; it wants things which can be had by war; and in order to have them, it is willing to use this ready instrument. Those who feel that they, of all nations, are the true haters of war, are often in fact among the most ardent fosterers of it as a practical device to defend what they have and to obtain more.

THE ABSENCE OF MORE-SATISFYING DEVICES

Into the full cause of war there enters also this further force and inducement. Not only does the State institution of war seem to the nations to "work," but they do not see at hand, and they are reluctant to establish, any other institution that will work. They want at the least to defend what they have. And for this purpose no other in-

strument than war has been forged and tempered and sharpened and heartily taken into hand by all the leading nations. No other way seems open by which a nation can reach the fruits held out by victory. And even to the vanquished, there is usually the conviction that at least something was saved by taking up arms in their own defense; that far more was saved than if there had been no armed resistance.

The other devices available are felt by each nation—although felt in different degrees—to be unfit as yet for that nation's own most urgent needs. And to meet these most urgent needs, the nation feels driven, even regretfully in many a case, to fall back upon and to strengthen the one practical device which it understands, namely, a powerful armament under its own private control.

The lack of some more effective means of national defense is thus an important part of the cause of war. As long as each nation feels that it has no other means as powerful and as available as is a stout army and navy and air force ready and waiting in its own private hands—costly and cumbrous and often inconvenient in its consequences though this system may be; so long will the nations incline to prepare their own military implement and to use it. And having in hand such an instrument and having in mind to use it only for defense, they will of course easily use it for aggression. Among the chief factors in causing war is this, that no other institution is accepted and effectively established to give to the nations what now they believe they can attain only by war.

This, then, is a rough pencil sketch of the cause of war. The swirl of war's many forces offers some excuse for different men giving so varied and so opposed accounts of it. For opposite things may truly be said. Schoolcraft, an early observer of American Indians, felt that their wars

sprang from the "evil and wicked propensities of the heart." And many persons have a like view, expressed in other language, of the wars of the civilized. Especially in time of peace and when considering the conduct of nations not our own—for our own nation's warfare is apt to seem due to stern necessity and to our loyalty to the ideal—then war seems to owe its continuance to the primitive savagery in us. But the high view which the nation is apt to take of its own warfare, and the low view which it takes of others', are both needed by the facts.

War, as we have seen, bursts forth from both the upper and the lower level of human living. *It is almost the crudest of institutional means to serve almost the highest of institutional ends.* War reveals the partial success and the partial failure of our social discipline: its success, in that men have been schooled out of the narrower life of mere individuals, families, and clans, and into a loyalty to the great communal life of the nation; its failure, in that this progress has stopped at the national border, leaving the nations but partially accommodated to one another, still in a state almost of nature, almost of anarchy with respect to one another.

CHAPTER XXIV

IS THERE A SOCIETY OF THE NATIONS?

WE have been observing, in what has gone before, the behavior of nations toward one another. And we have seen something of its character and sources. But the picture of their conduct will be more nearly adequate if we now view it from a slightly different point, asking ourselves—and this quite apart from the League of Nations or, as the French call it, *la Société des Nations*—whether the nations actually now live in an international society. A frequent opinion would be that they do not. They are too independent of one another, too reckless of one another, it would be held, for such a description. We may hope to form them into a society, but the realizing of the hope, some would feel, can come only when the nations are rid of their suspicion, their antipathy, their readiness to cripple one another. These are proof, many persons would hold, that the nations have not yet entered into really social relations.

It may be well to consider this important matter, where our finding will surely color our judgment of what can be done for international conduct in the next twenty or fifty years. And in attempting to view the matter aright, we should first view the facts of international behavior, not all, but some of their main kinds, seeing what there may be of mutual recognition, intercourse, and coöperation, which may serve us as evidence of association.

UNOFFICIAL INTERCOURSE

And, first, of the unofficial intercourse, continuing from a time long before the beginning of nations as we now understand the word. No study of prehistoric peoples but reveals the diffusion of culture beyond governmental limits—the diffusion of belief, custom, language, and trade, which declare that there was wide communication. And within historic time there has grown the most diverse exchange, by travelers like Herodotus and Marco Polo and the latest woman to visit Lhasa; by international missionaries like St. Paul; and by the world traders of to-day who from England, Germany, the United States, France, Japan, China, and many other countries send their agents as well as their wares abroad. International commerce in iron, coal, cotton, oil, rubber, fruit, grain, woven fabrics, machinery, and a thousand things more—these go with an immense system of international human intercourse for the exchange of the goods themselves and for the agents, banking, and investments generally which are required by international commerce.

Going with these is all the private enterprise for international communication by post, telegraph, telephone, newspaper, book, railway, steamship, and airplane, which keep the nations aware of one another. And further, these channels of communication also mean coöperation. For no great newspaper or publishing house or steamship line can carry on its work to-day—any more than could a great bank, or a corporation established for obtaining, refining, and selling oil—unless there worked together men of many nationalities in many lands. Knowledge, recognition, coöperation, of this private kind exist internationally.

Furthermore there are almost innumerable private international organizations for science, religion, and other

cultural interests beyond those already named. The breadth and vigor of the organized intercourse of this character is suggested by the fact that in a single decade there were nearly eight hundred congresses or conferences held by international associations composed of private individuals.

PUBLIC INTERCOURSE OF SMALL GROUPS

There is also an intercourse which is not private, but is public and official, an intercourse where perhaps two nations or some number of them far short of the whole are brought together by their governmental representatives.

Not only do nations officially "recognize" each other—a formality which often is of great practical importance—but they have an elaborate system of communication by their agents. The sending and receiving of ministers, ambassadors, and other diplomatic officers is not only a device for transmitting messages but it is also a public acknowledgment of the dignity, the worth, of the foreign nation; and it is an acknowledgment, too, that there is need of friendliness and accommodation. And coöperation comes in their train. For in every treaty there is cooperation already attained in arriving at the treaty by conference; and in the treaty itself is a promise of definite cooperation to come, stating that the contracting parties are to behave in a stated way with respect to stated matters—the common boundary, it may be, or the customs tariff, or the bonding or toll of goods in transit, or fisheries, or the tonnage and guns of warships.

The consular service which most countries maintain in the chief foreign cities is a further device added to the diplomatic, and intended to keep the home government informed and to assist individuals and private corporations in matters of foreign trade and other intercourse.

A peculiar quality of connection with other nations is shown also whenever there is arbitration. The nation submits its position to a judgment outside the nation; its own will in the region to be arbitrated is no longer declared independent of all other minds in the world. In theory a nation's independence is quite unaffected by arbitration, but in fact the submission to another's judgment implies some relaxing of the assertion and exercise of self-sufficiency; for the moment the nation entrusts an interest of its own to others.

And nations have been increasingly willing to have certain of their disputes adjusted in this manner. Decade by decade in the nineteenth century there was a fairly steady rise in the frequency of resort to arbitration, until in 1926 no less than two hundred and eighty-five treaties were in force between pairs of nations, which provided for arbitration of their disputes. And among these are a number of unlimited treaties of arbitration, where two nations agree that they will use this method to settle all their disputes whatever be their nature, provided only that they do not affect the constitution of either country. In such treaties there has disappeared the vague proviso that there is to be no arbitration of disputes which touch the nation's honor or its vital interests, phrases that can mean anything that an impatient government wishes them to mean.

NATIONAL GROUPS OF COWORKERS IN PEACE AND WAR

The intercourse of States has also this further character. They may together administer some region; as in the joint control, for a time, of Samoa by the United States, Germany, and Great Britain; or of the New Hebrides by Great Britain and France; or of navigation on the Rhine or the Danube or the Dardanelles and Bosporus. A

nation also may claim and express a special interest in a people beyond its own border, not only by assuming a protectorate over it, as over Cuba, Nyasaland, or Nigeria, but also as several of the powers have done with regard to China, or as the United States has done with regard to the other nations of the Western Hemisphere, an attitude known as the Monroe Doctrine. Or a group of nations may jointly "neutralize" another State, such as Switzerland of the present, or Luxemburg, Belgium and Cracow of an earlier day; or they may make neutral a waterway such as the Straits of Magellan, the Suez Canal, or the Panama Canal; or they may guarantee the integrity of a State, such as Norway. Or they may take counsel with one another concerning their special interests, as at Algeciras regarding Morocco, or at Washington and again at Geneva concerning the limitation of naval armament, or at Locarno with regard to territorial integrity, arbitration, and mutual support in western and central Europe. The Central American Federation and the Pan-American Union and the less formal beginning of a conference of States bordering on the Pacific Ocean would be examples of another type of association.

Nor should we neglect the relations which appear in war. For although war seems nothing but a rending of the connection between nations, it has also an opposite quality, since in war international coöperation reaches a completeness unknown as yet in time of peace. By treaty of alliance—as of Germany, Austria, and Italy—or by an "understanding"—as of Great Britain, France, and Russia—arrangement is made beforehand for mutual help. And when war has actually come, still other nations may join with the one or the other group of confederates. The coalition against Napoleon illustrates the coöperation of States. And in the World War the coöperation was of

unprecedented range. On the one side were Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey working together; and on the other were France, Great Britain, Russia, Belgium, Italy, the United States, Serbia, Brazil, Portugal, Montenegro, Japan, Rumania, Greece, China, and many more. And furthermore, the powers which finally were victorious in this struggle, gradually organized during the war an unequaled system of coöperation not only in military action but in the matters upon which the fighting depended—in matters of supply for the armies and for the civilian population of the nations united against Central Europe. Various intergovernmental and interdepartmental conferences led, through the agreement at Rapallo, to the Supreme War Council by which the armies, the navies, and the air forces of Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States came under a single command and could be used as a single force. And there were, besides, each with its special function for the common cause, the Maritime Transport Council, the Blockade Council, the Food Council, the Naval Council, and other international bodies.

In all this there is something far beyond the interchange and coöperation by private individuals or private corporations in different countries. Here a nation as a body, a nation in its political unity recognizes another nation and is recognized by this other; it communicates with the other government; it joins with this other in a common enterprise. Two nations or more thus act toward each other as fellows—by courtesies, by treaties, by conferences, and by uniting to wage war against their enemies.

WORLD-WIDE ASSOCIATIONS OF STATES

But even wider associations are to be seen. For while the war against Central Europe was the greatest division

the world had ever known—internationally more extended than the great schism centuries ago within Christendom—yet it was also the occasion of the greatest international concord the world had ever known. Never were so many nations divided; never were so many united, acting together so intently, dismissing so far as concerned their allies their pride of independence, forgetting their punctilios of national sovereignty and honor. The conjunction of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey was stupendous; but the coalition against them was even greater.

Still more remarkable for our interest is it when nations, with no rallying to opposite camps, come to some fairly universal agreement. Such—although, strangely enough, it has come largely out of war—is the gradual development of international law. Here are expressed the rights and obligations which the nations have generally accepted as their standard, even when, as with other law, they have been violators of the law. In practice there has come an almost unintended agreement as to the action which the nations thus far may properly demand of one another. This is the present stage of the developing law of nations.

Many States have also coöperated to establish such extended organizations as the Universal Postal Union, the Telegraphic Union, the Union for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Agricultural Institute, the Union for the Protection of Submarine Cables, and the International Sanitary Commission.

And with regard to war, there has been a movement far more significant than the familiar alliance and counter-alliance to wage war. To adjust competing interests at the close of a great war, there have been international conferences or congresses: of Münster in 1648 after the Thirty

Years' War; of Utrecht in 1713 after the War of the Spanish Succession; of Vienna in 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars; of Berlin in 1878 after the Russo-Turkish War. And international attempts have been made to restrict the freedom of a nation to begin a war whenever it saw fit to do so. Such were the leagues created by certain European States in 1648, 1711, and 1818—leagues that failed, being local and without administrative provision for carrying their general purpose into effect. A greater number of nations, not confined to Europe, joined in the Conferences at The Hague in 1899 and 1907. Here for the first time the civilized nations of the world took counsel with one another, not, however, to apportion the spoils of war, but to set narrower bounds to the danger and scope of war. And while little was enacted save the important founding of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, yet the world-wide official assembling to deliberate confirmed the thought that the nations have definite common interests and can consult about them if they will.

Even beyond The Hague Conferences in the range of its operation is the League of Nations founded in 1919, of which nearly all the countries of the world now are members. This League is a continuing organization with an established seat and body of officials at Geneva, with a Council which has now met over half a hundred times, and an Assembly, larger, and meeting regularly and as occasion may require. The older concert of Europe which at times displaced the factional alignment of the European powers has here been enlarged into a permanent organization for concerted action by the nations of the world.

The special bodies created or fostered by the League indicate some of its activity. Among these is the International Labor Organization which studies employment in many lands and suggests certain forms of agreement by

which the conditions of labor may be improved, suggestions which have been accepted by governments in over 380 cases. There is the Permanent Court of International Justice, to render judgment in disputes which do not yield to diplomacy, there being also a Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law to give a needed supplement to the work of the Court. The Health Organization collects and imparts information about diseases like cancer and tuberculosis; it makes known by wireless bulletins the presence of such diseases as cholera or plague in ports of shipping; and it facilitates an interchange of officers of public health. There are, besides, the Commission on Naval, Military, and Air Questions; the Economic and Financial Commission; the Institute of Intellectual Coöperation; the Permanent Mandates Commission which receives from each of the mandatory powers a report of the administration of its territory under mandate, and suggests improvement of the administration; along with organizations concerned, among other matters, with the traffic in opium, with the traffic in women, with the welfare of children and young persons; with the Saar Basin; with Greco-Bulgarian emigation; with the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations; with questions arising between Germany and Poland over Upper Silesia; with buoys and lights on coasts; with ports and maritime navigation and the measurement of maritime tonnage. And certain nations which are not members formally of the organization are ready upon occasion to act with it.

Thus the intercourse is more than among individuals, or between States by pairs, or among States of a narrow group. The official coöperation, whatever be the present limits as to quality, now extends over all the earth and is expressed and fostered by many means.

THE ANSWER TO OUR QUESTION

We cannot, then, be far from an answer to the question whether the nations are now in what may properly be called a society. Their private citizens are bound to one another across national boundaries by a network of commerce, news reports, exploration, touring, and adventure, and of scientific and humanitarian enterprise. States in smaller groups also officially confer with one another, and act together in peace and war. And still further, all or nearly all the States of the entire world recognize one another across lines of race and continent; they send their accredited spokesmen back and forth; they make contracts by treaty with one another, and they become confederates not only in war but in pacific administration and in decision through discussion. Thus the nations that consult and coöperate are limited to no one language, blood, or region.

To warrant us in saying that there is a society, we do not need to find the members unfailingly devoted to one another. In the highest national societies there is dissension and even violence; crime is always present, and occasionally riot or rebellion. That the nations make war upon each other must not obscure the reality of their social intercourse.

Nor may we hold doggedly to a particular degree or form of common life, and stubbornly refuse to call anything else a society. Society indeed is present in many different grades and shapes of association, ranging from a family or a coterie of friends, through a rural community or a local body of professional men where there is less acquaintance and friendship, on into a city or a nation where most of the members are strangers to one another but have their accepted methods of common action. Nor is

formal political organization essential; the essentials of a society are intercourse and recognition and common action, and a society is at hand wherever these are found, and to the degree in which these are found.

And these clearly are found in the body of nations of the world, more of these features being found in the intercourse of some nations than of others, but some of them being present in some degree universally. Nor is the interconnection completely broken for the world generally even by war. In war the allies still communicate; the neutrals still communicate; as do also the neutrals and the belligerent countries; and even the belligerent groups communicate with each other by many a secret channel. The connections which extend beyond national boundaries are far tougher than nations recognize when they stoutly proclaim their independence of one another. Their boasted independence is exceedingly limited even in political action, being curtailed by all manner of dependence. *A society of the nations, then, is not something to hope for, something to work toward, something to create or postpone at a meeting in Paris, London, or Washington.* There is much to hope for, much to work toward, much to create or destroy when men meet; the nations may take action for or against some new expression or instrument of their society. But the society itself is not waiting upon these acts, although its better character may be waiting. It exists regardless of any particular consent and judgment at the present moment, having been called into life long ago and now continuing by the actual practice of the nations.

And so to the characteristics already mentioned as belonging to the mind of nations we may add this, that every nation is a social creature, sensitive and responsive to other nations.

By sheer abstraction we can regard a nation as an isolated fact, as something complete in itself; and such an idea is fortified by conceptions of independence and sovereignty. But the nation's economic action runs beyond the frontier; even as does its political action, represented by treaties and by governmental intercourse through ambassadors, ministers, consuls, and other special agents. Its less formal behavior also—its life of opinion, knowledge, feeling, emotion, sentiment, and purpose; its science, art, technical progress, interests, moral standards, and religious faith—these are never without influence upon neighbors, nor can it ever insulate itself from the currents of its neighbors' excitement and ambitions.

It is part of this social framework that every nation is a giver of suggestion to other nations, and a recipient of suggestion from them. A nation that gradually and almost unconsciously becomes militarist, or sets its will toward commercial supremacy, tends to induce a like state of mind in other nations; and their response stimulates again by suggestion the prime mover. The interests, emotions, and purposes of nations are thus contagious; by one another their spirits become feverish for certain things, and apathetic toward others: as Germany's fervor during the Reformation moved her neighbors in religion; during the early nineteenth century moved them in literature and music; during the late nineteenth century, in science; and in the early twentieth century, in military and commercial power. So America taking with her from England an early interest in political liberty helped to incite the Revolution in France. So Japan receives naval and economic suggestions from Europe and America, and transmits suggestions in turn to the nations of the East and of the West.

No nation, then, that is not moribund is without constant psychic interaction with other nations. Whether it

recognizes or wishes the fact or not, it is in an international society perhaps ill ordered, but yet a society, with mutual stimulation, each with effect upon the behavior of the group. The direction in which a nation will move others and be moved by them is in part within a nation's own choice; but quite outside its own choice is the fact of this vital interaction. *The nations, then, are not called upon to create an international society, but only to civilize, to give law and order to the already existing society of the nations.*

PART III

THE ADVANCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT

CHAPTER XXV

GROUNDS FOR ENCOURAGEMENT

WE have long been at the work of seeing international things as they are, and of explaining why they are in their condition. And it is now high time that we lend our minds to a still more important aim. For to explain is not enough; things amiss are no longer cured, as in the Lapland myth, by singing of their causes. There must be further art to strengthen the international world in what health it has and to rid it of its worst disorders. And so we must quietly press forward, enquiring into the needed skill by which the knowledge here may become curative. How should we now use what we have learned? And while we shall find that the problem is exceedingly complex, yet it is not insoluble. There are many things to give us confidence. Let us see what some of them are.

THE UNJUSTIFIED FATALISM HERE

The first occasion of cheer is found in the character of the scene disclosed as our sight of it grows clearer. The undesirable condition of the world-society does not appear quite beyond all human control, does not seem quite irremediable. The more carefully the causes are studied, the less justified seems the tone of fatalism so often assumed by those who speak only of human nature, human instinct, the mob spirit, and all the forces that are irrational, improvident, and pitiless. We have been reviewing the evidence, and can have no doubt but that stern facts are there.

But to bring coöperation and good will into the place of distrust and conflict between nations one does not need to remove everything which helps to cause the conflict. A riot, for example, may be caused by the fact that a city exists and has a government whose policy has aggrieved ten thousand men. But to quell the riot and destroy its very roots obviously does not require that we jail, transport, or execute the ten thousand and tear down and then rebuild the city and its government. A slight change of policy may cure the trouble, while leaving city and government and men very much as they were before.

So those are too despondent who believe that, because desire and cross-purposes and passion and human nature generally are part of the causes of international disorder, we cannot hope for orderly behavior here until we get rid of all these things. These men of gloom forget that desire and cross-purpose and passion and human nature generally are ever present in our normal social living that is pacific; not destroying, although forever threatening, this normal pacific life. And such basic and dangerous traits can well continue in the affairs of nations, and yet permit them to become peaceable. It might to some seem desirable to change human nature and especially its innate desires and emotions; but it is not necessary. It is not prerequisite to order and justice in the international society. The psychological necessities are not so dismaying.

For we have seen that normally men hate one another for a cause, they are friendly for a cause, and will coöperate for interests which clearly promise advancement by coöperation. Intelligible causes are here in action—causes that can be spurred on, or else curbed until brought to a stop.

International ill will coupled with international private violence, which is one of the most portentous features of

the present world society, is therefore not something inexorable, like tides, or the stars in their courses. What we call the "state of nature" in which nations find themselves, therefore, is not ordained and inescapable. Even international attractions and repulsions follow known laws and are subject to intelligent intervention.

In these days of realism many keep their eyes fixed on the forces which resist a better international society, and these stubborn forces are often counted the stronger. A wider realism, however, will include the forces which work quietly against these and overcome them. Although men tend to have each his own private will and to drive impetuously toward his own gratification, yet among all peoples politically minded these hot impulses are stayed and are accommodated to one another. And this accommodation by which justice grows is of course a victory over certain natural desires, and yet by aid from other natural desires. The natural human impulses which drive men to associate with one another also drive men to invent methods by which this association will be less rasping, more gratifying. The basic forces which drive toward all these new and civilizing things are quite as natural as anger, fear, hunger, and sex, and are more numerous and less subject to fatigue and satiety. The forces which make for culture in certain races, year by year, century by century, patiently win through. They lose nearly every battle and win nearly every war. In particular communities they may show the white feather, but for much of mankind the victory is with the strong, and the strong here are the desires which become organized and disciplined into social order and justice. In a sense it is a victory over the disintegrative impulses by the powerful impulses which founded the family, and which have led on into the commonwealth and the nation. The enduring culture in our world is the product of steady

and tireless psychological forces which have held their own and forged ahead against the explosive, intermittent, and destructive expressions of our nature.

In working for a better international society, then, we are not setting the weak against the strong, but the stronger against the strong. Ultimately it is a struggle of nature against nature. Our own original human constitution gives the obstacles, but also the spur and means for overcoming the obstacles to a better civilization. We may take heart, having powerful allies on our side.

PROGRESS IN THE CONTROL OF PUGNACITY

And a cheering thing is the visible and great progress in controlling what seems the most obstinate and antisocial of human traits. Great progress has been made against *pugnacity*, and in two important respects, namely, in the behavior of individual toward individual, and in the behavior of group toward group.

As to individuals, there has come a remarkable control of one's impulse to violence against others of one's own society. It is not that the occasions of anger have all been removed. Each person is plentifully stimulated in ways which urge him straight to physical onslaught; he sees another possessing not only the woman he desires, but possessing food, clothing, ornaments, habitation, social rank, and office which he covets. Hostility in him has not been killed, since it shows its continued life by his becoming irritated, or angry, or enraged, or eaten by a settled malice. And his feelings remain by no means always unexpressed: he may be tart or even vituperative in his language; his eyes may snap, his lip curl, his fists clench; he may write letters about his enemy, or go to court against him. But usually in all this, he refrains from bodily onslaught upon

him: he neither strikes the man with fist or club, nor downs him with knife or pistol, nor fires his dwelling and maims his wife and child. Even the relatively well-ordered recourse to dueling has been abolished in many lands. Private blood vengeance also has been banned. A man in power no longer can use the high-handed methods once employed against individuals standing in his way—as when Agathocles the Sicilian, having called together the senators of Syracuse for a public discussion, has them all put to the sword; or when, in later Italy, Oliverotto da Fermo invites to a feast Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of Fermo, and has them all slaughtered; or when the Duke Valentino deceitfully brings together Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, the Signor Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, and after making them prisoners, has them strangled.

Anger, fierce anger, is still with us to-day, and is permitted to go to great lengths, but it may not go to the length that would manifestly cripple the communal life. The aristocrat's passions as well as the passions of the plain man, therefore, have undergone a change in their manner of expression. What has been accomplished is seen in the great contrast between the conduct of most and the conduct of the relatively few who have not responded to discipline—for example, the impulsive and untaught child, the rowdy in the frontier "saloon," and the criminal in the city. The degree of this check upon the combativeness of the individual with respect to other individuals may differ in different societies; but in any society, even the most savage, there has been progress, there has been a high degree of success.

And the same is true of the relation of group to group. A family as a whole has dealings with other families, a village with other villages, a city with other cities. Often

in the past these dealings have been hostile and have caused physical injury: there have been houses burnt, cattle driven off, women carried away for wives, and men for slaves; or men, women, children, and homes have been destroyed. Family feuds existed not long ago in the southern part of the United States, as they existed earlier in Italy and elsewhere, and as they exist in Syrian towns to-day. Municipalities used to fight one another, Athens with Sparta, Florence with Pisa. The clans of Japan fought one another, as did the clans of Scotland.

But with progress in its general organization, society has enlarged the area within which all human violence is prohibited. The first families of Japan, Italy, or Kentucky, no longer strike down at sight the members of a rival body. The Greek cities, the Italian cities, the cities of various other European countries no longer have their interurban wars. As the islands of the Hawaiian group that once waged war upon one another were brought to peace under the single rule of Kamehameha, so it has been in many lands, century upon century.

The trend has thus been to extend the circle within whose border it is prohibited to fight to the death and to violate property; the trend has been to drive fighting away to a region more and more distant from the center: to drive it from the quarter of the city to the city walls; from the city walls to the border of the petty kingdom; from the border of the petty kingdom out to the boundary of the greater kingdom or the empire. Great Britain, Italy, France, Spain —each of these countries was once an aggregation of Balkan-like states. Germany at one time had scores of almost independent powers that were repeatedly at war with one another. Many a German city was free and fortified, and possessed in its public storehouses enough food and drink and fuel to last a year. "They yield obedience

to the Emperor when it suits them." The barons of England with their organized followers were in recurring conflict with one another until the Tudors limited their power and brought them into order. The condition in older Italy and the change to-day may be illustrated by Rome, where the barons were divided into the factions of the Orsini and the Colonnesi, who stood with arms in their hands and had always some pretext for disorder, until Pope Alexander VI reduced these barons' power, and wiped out their factions. Five centuries ago, if America had been as populous in the same centers and with the same kind of people as she is to-day, we should have seen Baltimore warring on Washington, New York investing Boston by land and sea, California housing a dozen turbulent kingdoms.

The parts of the nation still have local interests and local loyalty; they can upon occasion show resentment toward one another; but their pride and bitterness have lost the ancient meaning; they no longer imply war cry and battle ax. The immense national area of the leading countries has been swept clear of frequent armed conflict between its own organized groups. As with individuals, so with the constituent groups in each leading country, the impulse to fight physically, violently, against one another has been brought under a high degree of control; vast members of such groups the world over no longer regularly fight with one another, but only with some group beyond their own national organization.

Nor does this internal accommodation of individual to individual, of group to group within the nation, merely transfer the old fighting to a new point, so that the amount remains the same and the progress is wholly specious. The fighting impulse is not repressed within the nation merely to burst out internationally. It has been shown, as there was opportunity, that in general the peoples that to-day

discipline themselves to be more orderly in their life within the nation are inclined to be, not more belligerent, but less belligerent toward other nations. And the facts of history strengthen this present indication. With the increase of internal order in the leading countries, as we watch them through the centuries, there has been a decrease of the time devoted by the particular nation to foreign wars. For all European nations, there has been generally a decline of belligerence since A.D. 1600. With certain nations this decline is less rapid; but even where war has been most ardently studied, the nations are clearly able to live at peace with their neighbors during a larger portion of their time now than three centuries ago.

We may take courage then from the world's practical headway in dealing with the impulse to fight. *For in respect to the fighting of men in their relations with one another both as individuals and as groups of great size, there has been marked and important progress. All government does in fact win a victory over man's pugnacity*— over his impulse to private brawls, as well as over his impulse to a collective fighting of his group against a neighbor group.

RELIEF FROM THE CROWD PSYCHOLOGISTS

This progress in the control of the fighting of men in groups gives occasion for one further word of cheer. Our minds can now rebound from those oppressive prophets who see in the nation nothing but a herd or crowd or mob. Nations, it is thought, must always drive at one another in senseless slaughter because of the laws of mob psychology or the herd instinct.

Now the mob psychologists, the herd psychologists, with all their help to our learning, have at times darkened coun-

sel. Human herds and mobs exist, and we need to know them; but not every group of men is a mob, nor is it always even a crowd. A holiday crowd is not controlled by its worst member—some pickpocket or anarchist possibly—nor by the worst passions of that worst member. The United States Army, the Brotherhood of Railway Engineers, the Republican Party, the House of Commons, the American Federation of Labor, the Methodist Church, the Standard Oil Company, the City of New Orleans, the London County Council and all that it controls—no one of these is a holiday crowd nor a mere crowd of any other quality, much less is it a mob. Each of these has a fairly definite and persisting purpose, and a store of experience; each has certain inhibitions, certain means of deliberation, and certain elaborate devices for passing from decision into action. And the action when at last it comes is no less prudent, no less intelligent, no more impulsive and emotional than the action of most individuals when they are behaving by themselves apart from their fellows.

Now this is true, too, of any leading nation. France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Denmark, Holland, England, the United States—each behaves in a fairly well-organized manner. Passion may at times prevail, as it does with most individuals when central objects of attachment seem suddenly imperiled. But usually there is some perception of the bearing of facts upon interest; there are certain steadily recognized aims of national effort, and an adoption of such means as the national habits and experience and imagination suggest to be useful for these ends. As with any of us personally, so with the nation, the very best that is available may not always come into control; some judgment based on ignorance and wrong-headedness may prevail. And especially when the nation sees some prized object slipping from its own grasp and into another's, is it apt to

be in a panic of fear or rage, and to take measures which are unwise and moblike.

But most individuals will do no better when they see wife or child or wealth suddenly on the verge of destruction. Even in lesser dangers sage wisdom may not always prevail. A neighbor of mine, a colleague ordinarily calm, as he looked from his window one morning saw an unusual sight, but a sight not world-shaking—saw the ash man treading upon some plants in the professor's private garden. For a moment reason in my neighbor tottered on her throne. With a cry at the incredible happening he thrust both his hands through the windowpane and received horrid gashes which required days of surgical care.

Now no nation, I imagine, need be less reasonable than such an overexcited individual. The panic, the rage, which comes upon the nation in times of stress must be attributed in large part to the situation and to the national aims and experience, and not primarily to some special "psychology" of human groups whereby they must always behave like a herd or mob. A nation will act now coolly and with judgment, and now with passion and unwisely. But this is true also of most individuals. Whatever may be the features common to a nation and a herd of buffalo or a lynching mob, many of these features are common also to the individual human being and to the herd or mob; and withal there are so many features in which the nation differs from the buffalo herd and the mob, that the comparison could hardly be more misleading.

There is clear evidence, then, that *those are mistaken who hold that men in large numbers, with their herd instinct and mob psychology, can never be brought under control.* We may recover the cheer snatched from us by these unhappy theorists. For groups of men can be as orderly as common individuals. The success may be longer delayed;

the problem of discipline here may be more complicated; but there is nothing psychologically absurd in the enterprise itself.

In this general region where there is clearly so much of difficulty, there is, then, no occasion for dismay. Clearly encouraging is the awakened interest, both West and East, in things international; and the deepening desire for order in them; and the clearer insight into the causes of the disorder. We may take heart, too, from the very character of these causes and from their pliancy, since to change them for our purpose no longer need seem an impossible task. Indeed we see great actual advancement made in the control of human contentiousness under most trying stimulation and in its deadly forms of expression both by men singly and in companies. Gains have been made in all parts of the world, even among the uncivilized; and in the civilized parts the gain has been great. The facts all show that, given the desire and the patient intelligent pressure, our human pugnacity is essentially responsive to what are seen to be the communal interests. It generally keeps within whatever bounds the organized society wishes to establish. A single person, a small body of men, a large body, are all amenable in the end to social engineering; they can be brought habitually to keep the law. The way forward, then, is not across a rainbow, as in the drama. It goes along ground rough but solid, with landmarks that can be scientifically measured and mapped.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE NEEDED REËDUCATION

KNOWING, then, that the facts are not adamant against us, how shall we move among them? What shall be our course to remake them?

First and at all times there will be education—indeed, a reëducation—addressed to our power of knowledge and to more than this power. In talking of these things recently with a distinguished physician and psychologist in New York, he from his wide experience in helping persons out of their mental difficulties said at once: "You will have to do more than make clear to them the cause of their trouble." He thus pointed to a false confidence which comes readily in a scientific age.

For while knowledge is a kind of map and compass, it is not the engine which drives us on. The motive power is in the desires, and in the emotions and sentiments which lend their strength to our desires. It is into the longings of nations, as well as into their knowledge, that we must penetrate, for we have seen that their trouble with one another comes not merely from a crossing of their desires, but from the emotional support and from the limited sympathies which enter into their cross-purposes. The moral education of a people into nationhood is as yet a very restricted moral education; respect, obligation, the sense of human worth, do in practice fall suddenly off when the national border is passed. The admirable self-appreciation of the nation is restricted into a misprising of other nations; they are regarded as inferior; we feel that we must

treat them as we would not have them treat us. This, as we have seen, is one of the roots of international fear and injustice and violence.

There is necessary, then, a special training, not only to deepen and widen the nations' insight, but also to modify the national desires, emotions, and sentiments. These all will have to be reëducated, to make possible a less unruly society of nations.

WHAT EVERY NATION SHOULD KNOW

There is need of continued scientific research in this region, for but a fraction of what is to be had here has yet been discovered. But there should also be a wider sharing of what is already known. In democracies where policy is so much affected by public opinion, the public generally should know, for example, the quality and significance of racial prejudice; the public should know what is now known as to the mind of different races and nations and as to their likeness and difference in intelligence and in other mental traits, including pugnacity. It should be generally known that the average level of intelligence is found to vary far less as we pass from one race to another than when we pass from group to group within any single race; that the peril in world relations is in the fact, not that races or nations are innately so different in their minds, but that they are innately so much alike, and have desires so much alike; that the chief source of international difficulty is not in racial contrasts, for the nations most alike racially have in general proved to be politically as dangerous to one another as the nations racially different. These things should become common intellectual property by education.

It should also become common intellectual property, that nations themselves are not born but are trained into nation-

hood, and that in the process they acquire traits both beneficent and sinister. More widely, the peoples need to see the generosity, the sterling loyalty, the illusion, the shifty partialities which each nation gives to its own citizens, whether these be Italian, German, Chinese, Japanese, British, or American. Such an understanding works for tolerance and a sound intolerance, and is a step toward good riddance to some vices in national morale.

But it should also be more widely heralded that nations are not alike; that some that are of the same race and of similar culture give to their citizens a very different discipline for civic and international order; that while no nation as yet gives adequate training for civic and international decency, yet the citizens of some are individually more orderly, and certain nations as wholes are more ready to adjust their own national desires to the aspirations of others and are less ready to get into serious quarrels with others. A knowledge of this may help to humble for a moment the disorderly nations and then to brace them for a better discipline. Like schoolboys, they will gain from a happy emulation.

There should also be a popular freeing from the illusion that the danger between nations generally will disappear merely by the shrinking of distance and by familiarity. Contact brings not only safety, but risk; it is preliminary to friction as well as to friendliness, and one need not be a cynic to see that close national neighbors usually like each other least. All the day's miracle of intercourse, then, by a whirling exchange of thought, goods, and men almost as though there were no national boundaries, will not of itself bring a right attitude of nation to nation. This intercourse can usher us to ill will almost as readily as to good will. A special discipline will have to stand behind it to make the outcome fair.

Especially is there need for a wider knowledge of the causes of international fear and suspicion and the ill will that ends in war. Men should all see that the grounds of war are not in militarist nations only, but in a certain admirable but too-narrow loyalty which exists in many a peace-loving people. The people of each nation need to know that wars do not spring from some strange obliquity in other nations, from which, praise Heaven, their own nation is free; but mainly from a training and a situation and a lack for which all have been responsible. These things which have long been, do not have to be, and they are already beginning to be changed. For history is a crowded tale not only of failure to learn but also of discovery and of social inventions and adventures that ended well. In general, the plain man's imagination needs to be prodded so that he will leave his mental rut and think of new possibilities and new modes of behavior between nation and nation. On no subject is there more of crystallized prejudice; on no subject of practice is there a steadier faith that good intentions are enough, and that an unenlightened conscience is all that a nation needs.

REËDUCATING THE ACQUISITIVE DESIRES

But with map and compass, education must also look to our driving energies. The national desires or interests and the national emotions must be taken in hand.

And perhaps before all else we should give heed to the economic interest. We shall not, however, be so unwise as to dream of any general uprooting of it, although pruning and a brace here and there may be well. The present form taken by the interest in wealth notoriously endangers right international relations. While most individuals in a nation would despise to make their gain by dishonorable con-

duct toward another individual, in their corporate behavior as a nation they would rather be rich than honest.

And yet the acquisitive impulse even in national affairs, need not run amuck. We shall either succeed in accommodating it to our other interests, or we shall have 1914 again. And there is nothing incontrollable in it. Bakeless on page after page of his book, where he deals with the clash of economic interests of different nations, speaks of the conflict as inevitable, necessary, and inexorable. Economic conflict is described almost as though it were a struggle between a railway locomotive and a steam shovel, each turned loose without an engineer. This is more picturesque than accurate; whatever its value as economics, it is not good psychology. For after all, the desire for wealth is a human desire, existing always in a person who has other desires, and it is not inexorable, but can upon occasion be put down by the other desires or be enlarged by them. In China where economic interest clashes with economic interest the situation moves, it is true, according to laws, but they are psychological and not mechanical laws, they are not so simple as those of steel machinery. A wild locomotive and a wild steam shovel have no interests of their own. There is no starting point for education in their case, as there is with nations. So that all talk about the economically inevitable, as though economic interests were as detached from human interests generally and were as humanly incontrollable and uneducable as Halley's comet, belongs to rhetoric rather than to science. Nations do not have to make scrap iron of one another because of their economic interests. Just because of their interests, as these become educated, they will be ready to keep one another off the scrap heap. The educated locomotive will pull some coal for the steam shovel; with the understanding that the steam shovel will make easier gradients for the locomotive.

We might well have a saner appreciation of the commercial spirit. It brings its own danger into the intercourse of nations, but no necessary enmity. Trade is normally of mutual benefit to those who do the trading, and therefore is not essentially divisive. Said Dr. Johnson, "There are few ways in which a man can be more innocently employed than in getting money." In this he was moderate; for most men are seldom more helpfully employed than when making money. They are in fact then doing an acceptable service to others as well as to themselves. And it can be more and more so with nations as their desire for wealth gets farther away from the undisciplined rapacity of Spanish *conquistadores*. Trading nations fight each other chiefly because as nations they are still economically ignorant and ill-bred. Their desire for gain is unschooled, like a pirate's.

THE LOVE OF SECURITY AND OF RISK

Besides disciplining the desire for wealth, we must discipline the desire for security and for risk and adventure. No one need be called upon to love peace unduly. But while we may well remember that there is something more precious than peace, we may also well remember that there are few things less precious than injustice coupled with bayonets run into fellow-men, and bombs dropped on women and children. We may rightly love more passionately the things that are better than peace, but also we must not forget to hate more passionately to obtain them at such a price. Honor and our rights should be had honorably, and we should be restless until we can have them so. Education needs to round us into this kind of discontent and inventiveness.

If the commercial spirit is dangerous and yet helpful, so is also the spirit which is for national defense and security.

The love of national defense calls for no reprimand but rather for education. The nation's security is an interest which no people should be asked to surrender. A proper education will indeed strengthen the desire for defense and security. But uneducated as it is, it puts up with insecurity and with the clumsiest makeshifts for defense. Nations that are proud to assert that no foreign power can force anything upon them, are miserably content to live where in fact any weakling can force war upon them. The national pride needs to be sensitized to resent this defenselessness. Our emotions need training, so that we are no longer unhumiliated by the fact that any whimsical dweller in the international back alley can at a moment upset for years all our ordinary plans of national living. We are not ignorant of this fact, but we are emotionally callous to it.

And also at present the desire for security, being uneducated, hinders needlessly the desire for wealth. The nations make unnecessary sacrifices of wealth in order to guard the national wealth. A national defense more effective than we now have can be had at a fraction of the present cost in money, indeed at a net gain in money. Thus the wealth-getting interest and the wealth-guarding interest along with the interest in guarding the national culture, rights, and political integrity—interests that in some respects now quarrel with one another—can with training live together amicably.

With the love of security must go a readiness upon occasion to hate it and to delight in risk. Citizens do not in general need to be taught to be untimid. In business and certain forms of sport and in the exploration of the land and sea and air, and in the cause of science and in the cause of religion, men throw their fears to the wind. Your plain man in the trenches and going over the top does not need to be given bravery. This great attribute is so com-

mon that nations can count upon its presence in nearly all their citizens. But the nation organized and with its terrible front of armament seems at times as timid as a rabbit. It trembles at the mention of some untried way. Awful especially is the thought of coming upon defeat in war. Men speak of it as though it usually meant both death and dishonor to a people. But it usually means neither. Few nations die in war; death comes in less dramatic form. Peoples have their victories in war and die of enfeeblement; they have their defeats in war and live on. Russia was humiliated by the Japanese, but was not killed by them; she came nearer death from internal injury by her own Czars and by her own Bolshevists. Germany nearly perished by her victory in 1871, when it would have been a better fortune for her could she have been defeated; for in nearly all the things in which she still is great, she was greater before than after Bismarck and Moltke gave her the victory. The tragic air we assume when contemplating the possibility of not winning a war would be the better were some of Falstaff's humor thrown into it. We shall some day look at it with a crooked smile. There are several things besides military defeat to be afraid of. The national body needs at times a nip of moral brandy for its courage. It should be ready to face some danger even of military defeat for the sake of a solider security and a steadier possession of the plain human goods that go down in the dirt before the victors and vanquished alike.

THE TRAINING OF LOYALTY

If citizens do not need to be given courage, neither do they need to be given loyalty. They have it and it is trained, but not well-trained. It goes as far as the national border and there shakes its head. We must acknowledge

that it is an amazing bit of higher education that any devotion can have been led so far beyond the own skin of each of us. For there was a time when the limit of voluntary devotion seemed to be that a man lay down his life for his friend. But to-day under national discipline men lay down their lives for those who are not their friends at all, but who are only their fellow-nationals unknown by name. We shall not need any deeper loyalty, but only a broader loyalty. While keeping its home residence, it must be encouraged upon occasion to travel into foreign lands. The patriotism or nationalism of small or great nations must be stimulated to assume a form which other nations can live with and can bid welcome. The bigotry, the chauvinism, in it must be purged out.

Now loyalty to country, which is a high spiritual possession, can be retained and yet enlarged. History would illustrate the schooling of which this powerful sentiment is capable.

For loyalty once burned fierce only for the clan or tribe. Men bred in the old Highland feuds and forays felt an allegiance which it would have seemed impossible to widen, impossible to transfer to any larger body of men that would include those who were actually hated to the death. In the days when Campbell and Fraser and Macdonald were names for hot fealty and mortal anger, how visionary would have seemed any effort toward a wider devotion! And yet with an enlarging education the love for the Highland clan widened into a love for all Scotland, Highland and Lowland. But the education did not stop there; the love of Scotland passed over into a loyalty to all Britain, including the hated Southron, men largely of another race. Nor did the discipline end even here; the feeling of loyalty became a passion for a commonwealth of peoples scattered over all the world —living in ice and tropic heat, under the pine and palm—

New Zealanders, Canadians, South Africans, Australians, and many more. The education of loyalty does not require it to change in its intensity and peculiar quality, but only in its breadth and in the objects over which it shall brood.

And the facts declare that such a change can come at more than a snail's pace. The attachment of the American colonists for Old England soon withdrew to New England. The loyalty that in the sixties of the last century was for Virginia and the slave-holding states is now for all the states of the Union, including those that fought Virginia and the rest and abolished the slavery and the "rights" without which the southerners felt they could not live. The old particular affection for Bavaria and Saxony and Prussia was not destroyed in the second half of the nineteenth century; but it was led out into a love of Germany entire. Likewise the love of Tuscany, Lombardy, and Venezia became a love, above all, for a united Italy. Such a widening of attachment indicates that in the world of men in masses an education for an ever larger political association is not utopian. Greater mental distances than still are needed have already been traversed. "I know that most of my contemporaries regard this idea as a dream," said Bluntschli many years ago when speaking of a possible organization wide as humanity, "but that cannot keep me from expressing and defending my conviction. Later generations, perhaps centuries hence, will finally decide the question."

THE MEANS OF SUCH EDUCATION

These, then, would be some of the educational aims, aims which can be taken by many persons, and by many kinds of persons beyond those we call teachers. It is no enterprise

for the schools alone, but for the home, the publishing office, the bookshop, the fraternal society, the labor union, the club, the lecture hall, and the church. What each man knows must be known by all, and his best desires must become contagious for others, to form a right public judgment and feeling directed straight toward better international affairs. Only in this way shall we escape what the ancient Persians called "the place of the ever-stationary."

Much also can be got by travel and by residence not too long in foreign lands. What is most desirable can come without this, by special attention and by reflection upon talk and reading; but it is acquired more readily by travel. And, so, greater strength to all those who bring about personal intercourse across national boundaries—international assemblies of physicians, lawyers, legislators, clergymen, scientists, editors, and others.

We must in the end lean heavily on editors. Lord Bryce felt, as have many, that our international life receives especial harm from the newspapers. And doubtless it does; even as it receives from many a newspaper especial benefit. But as for the various classes and professions, it will hardly do for any of them to cast the first stone. For all classes and professions have been responsible for the traditional state of things—the rich and the poor, the uneducated and the educated, teachers, merchants, clerks, artisans, military and naval officers, politicians, lawyers, statesmen, clergymen, and many more besides the editors of newspapers. And it is hardly fair now to catch a scapegoat. The education must go through the nation entire to better its thinking and its purposes, and must come from many different kinds of organizations, among which the most important will be the newspapers, the schools, the churches, and the clubs or assemblies for address and discussion.

A right education for international affairs, then, is not to

be an education by dreamers or to make dreamers. It is to make us aware that we have long been seeing reality in a half sleep. Nor is it expected that nations are going to become angelic. They will continue to be composed of human beings with human nature at the back of their behavior. At their best the nations will continue to jostle one another; and having many sensitive surfaces, there will be pain and passion. But they can learn to jostle each other less and to be less excited over the injuries they receive. And they can learn to do more that will be of common benefit, and in general to let natural friendliness run a freer course. Such an education will not attempt to uproot nor radically to oppose the main purposes and interests of any nation—more than if we were to suggest to a woolen manufacturer that he "scrap" his old engine for a dynamo and make goods with no shoddy in them. We should not be asking him to turn saint nor to stop making woolens and to begin making paper flowers, but only to become a more capable manufacturer of woolens. And finally *this education* is hospitable to nearly all manner of means, and *keeps in view the full nature of the nation, body and mind, reaching through its intellect and its emotions and sentiments back into its desires, and thus capturing the citadel of its will.* Only in this way can we have a public opinion ready to take form in a right foreign policy.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR PROBLEM

THERE can be no more important aim of coöperation than to make war improbable. One need not expect to make it impossible—for lawlessness exists even within the best-governed communities—but to make it as improbable as burglary or murder by the plain citizen who lives in the house next door. The policy of governments which mix wisdom with their desire for better relations will be to drive directly and practically against this form of national behavior, to drive directly against the institution of war which is still established politically so long as nations continue to prepare for waging war.

To strike successfully at this institution will evidently require more than was in the mind of the American Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, at Paris in 1919—that each nation declare its decision to refrain thereafter from aggression. It will require more than the treaty of 1928, renouncing war as an instrument of national policy, exceedingly important as this is. For the nations that signed and ratified that treaty accepted a new ideal, not only in condemning war for national purposes, but in declaring that they would settle by pacific means all disputes, of whatever nature or origin. Such agreements indicate the great distance traversed and the preparation for still farther advance. But urgent things remain to be done.

Nor can these deeper needs be met merely by defeating the latest nation that happens to be strongest in its naval

or military power. Such a nation seems to itself pacific while being reasonably prepared; all others call the nation militarist or navalist. But whatever may be true, defeating the nation is no cure. War was not ended in America when the Spaniards were victorious over the Aztecs who were militarist to the bone; nor in the world generally when Spain's power was broken; nor in Europe by the final overthrow of Napoleon, nor by the defeat of militarist France in 1871, or of militarist Germany in 1918. The war against war merely by military methods no longer can seem hopeful. The opening attack on war may begin in a war, but the serious campaigns against it can come only after the actual fighting is over.

War prevention is a peace-time enterprise and requires, besides the work of the scientist and all the arts of education, certain constructive work in international politics. For we saw that some of the main causes of the trouble were in the peculiar international situation, where no sufficient substitutes for war had been heartily adopted, and where war was still felt to "pay."

LOYALTY TO THE MEANS OF JUSTICE

A part—some would say the whole—of this constructive work will be to *establish and loyally to use better means of international justice.* There must be some established means of rendering an effective decision when each of two nations believes that its boundary should be where the other knows that it should not be; or when they disagree as to the control of certain ports or waterways; or disagree over raw materials, privileges of trade, or the influence which each should exert over some other people. There is need of decision when interests clash; and when the clashing interests seem vital, war is for many nations the established

means of decision. To abolish war will not be possible, without putting something better in its place. There must be some deft instrument to do what war does clumsily. Nations will hardly give up war in practice except as the community offers them the means to a larger justice than is offered now by war.

Among the means already at hand are diplomacy, mediation, arbitration, and judicial decision. An international court giving decisions according to international law now exists and must be regarded as an essential part of the adequate instrument here required. But there is also needed an extension of international law, and a consent and communal pressure that all conflicting national claims, even those that touch national honor and vital interests, shall be judged in court by law or equity. That equity as well as law must here be heeded is clear; for Lord Bryce in reviewing some eighteen wars since the treaties of Vienna in 1815 found that the conflict in only two or three of them would have been open to legal decision. Fifteen of these wars were over matters that came under no principle of law as yet established.

Of a court and other means for justice one may say that these will not have to be quite perfect in order to mete out justice more adequately than does the war system. A long-established principle, only now beginning to be applied to things international, is that the party whose interests are affected makes a poor judge. By his passions he has decided beforehand in his own favor. In the war system of meting out justice, where the stronger of the two litigants appoints himself judge, true justice is sometimes uttered, as it sometimes was uttered in trial by fire or by combat or the duel. By war there is a just decision perhaps as frequently as by a method used in Babylonia at the time of Hammurabi. Then if a man made accusation against an-

other, the accused was thrown into the sacred river, and if he could swim ashore his accuser was put to death. If he drowned he evidently had lost his case. Such an institution must, among other virtues, have encouraged in young and old the art of swimming, even as nations now study martial strength, as a sure way of being in the right.

We must admit that a few nations gain some of their rights by war. But many lose their rights by this system, and all nations lose their one great right to live at peace so long as they prefer to live at peace. Under the war system of international justice any nation can instantly throw any other nation into utter confusion by declaring war. Certainly a sovereign State might claim the right to be free from this arbitrary power held by another suddenly to bring chaos upon all its normal living. Think of proud sovereignties submitting to this state of things! A war into which any one of them can be forced even by some despised neighbor may bring years of profound disturbance in the actual fighting of it, years also of anxious preparation for it, and still other years of recovery and readjustment when the war is over. The amount of justice which almost accidentally is had by the war system of justice is purchased at a great price. The present estate of nations is pitiable. Subject as they are to be haled at any moment to the ordeal by war, they are indeed in a worse case than under the system of Hammurabi. There only the accused had to submit to the ordeal. With nations to-day both the accused and the accuser are thrown into the sacred river; and with them, often, are thrown bystanders as well. Just and unjust alike, many of them spend much of their lives breasting the treacherous currents, with only scant moments between, when they lie on the bank gasping to regain their breath before being thrown again into the swirling flood.

An ordeal has its crude usefulness, and war is an ordeal.

But there are ways to justice which are so much better, that this judgment-giving function of war cannot forever keep it in the world. To assist in establishing the more effective means of international justice by impartial judges controlled by law and equity, to resort to these means and loyally to support them, will be an initial part of the policy of any nation that is wisely opposed to war.

TAKING NATIONAL PROFITS OUT OF WAR

The national profits must be taken out of war. Besides the needs to be met by waiting courts and the other means of rendering a just judgment, there is need of meeting those crises when some nation is carried away by desires which have hardly a thread of connection with justice. The international situation will need to be such that self-enlargement by military violence will seem a clearly unprofitable move. War, even victorious war, must have the profits taken out of it; it must appear obviously not to "pay."

It is not enough to say, and rightly, that war even now does not pay. It is true that when judged by right standards and with due account of the interest of the community of nations, there is no profit in war. But leaving out of account for the moment the individuals who make private profit out of war, yet war still may bring to particular nations what they greatly desire. It often is a successful means of policy; it often assures to the victor great national rewards. It still is a tempting instrument for use in obtaining what a nation wants. In this sense, war still seems in the cold judgment of many nations an institution worthy of support; it still seems a profitable political investment; in this sense, war seems to them upon occasion to "pay." If a nation can prepare and be victorious when its own deep interests are affected, it can obtain important satisfactions

by war; it obtains these satisfactions at a great cost, it is true, but in the nation's sober mind they are worth the price. France to-day, sobered regretful France, would not, if she could, recall her soldiers slain in the World War and say "Let the Boches have their way with us. They cannot in their utmost arrogance take from us what would equal these brave sons of ours." Some of the French fathers and mothers perhaps might whisper this in their hearts, but never the nation as a whole. Even nations not victorious may feel that a war has paid, in the sense that they are better off than if they had not gone to war at all: their losses are less (they believe and often rightly) than if they had let their opponents ride over them roughshod. By a brave fight, though defeated, they saved something from destruction. By their stout resistance they wrested some concessions from the adversary.

The need of taking the monetary profits out of war is seen by men like Baruch and Shotwell. Indeed it would appear wholly reasonable to confiscate or prevent so far as possible all commercial gains to private individuals or corporations. This would weaken some of the motives for war. But we need to attend even more to the great national profits which come immediately to no particular individual or corporation but come directly to the nation as a whole, and only gradually and later become a private gain to individuals. Such was the case in the taking of Spanish possessions by the United States, or in the taking of the German possessions by various victorious nations. Nor is the national war profit here wholly commercial; it is in a wider sense political: the nation acquires a more prominent place among its fellows; it acquires not wealth alone, but also naval bases, or a population from which more soldiery can be drawn, or the national satisfaction in having strengthened the home government or in having weakened

a proud rival. These political war profits are not touched by taxing war profiteers or by taking the profit out of private war industries; and they are more varied, subtle, and dangerous as national temptations into war than are the private monetary profits. The task of statesmanship is to make war clearly a losing political venture, regularly, inevitably, and most of all to the aggressor. War, which has so often "worked" and which still promises to "work," must have this promise torn out of it, and an ominous threat to the chooser of war must be put there instead.

This will mean in general that a nation that thinks of waging war as a means of enlarging her interests must, as she does not now, confidently count upon suffering from the outraged community of nations losses both tangible and intangible, far in excess of all gains to be expected even from victory. In the end she must be made to lose—perhaps in one or more of the following, and in amount according to her offense: in raw materials, markets, mechanism of credit and exchange, capital, products, freedom of intercourse; in her territory, colonial or of the homeland; and in her prestige. She must be made to lose in one or more of these, until her humbling is sufficient and the lesson has been taught to her and to others who may be or become of a like mind. We have seen the degree to which the fighting impulse is amenable to practical considerations, how teachable at core it is. A step forward already has been taken, in that a practical way has been found of determining which of two warring nations is the aggressor. And now if the privileges which a nation commonly enjoys; if the wealth and other forms of power which give prestige should, for an aggressor, regularly be diminished, there would soon be a different passion with regard to war. There would be less temptation to enter upon a course of violence. For while nations pour out their blood and treasure improvidently,

it would seem, yet this is done for what the war may be counted on to bring. The nation has been fired with lust for a larger place in the world, and expects to attain this by victory. The other nations must see to it that the very opposite may be expected, and that the nation which breaks forth for its own private enlargement shall fill a smaller place.

There is, of course, sufficient power in the other nations to effect this. And they have a real interest in effecting it. For with our international life constituted as it is to-day, the nation that uses violence for its own national enlargement is a disturber and injurer of all, and should be disciplined by all. A necessary part of an effective plan for law and order among nations therefore is coöperatively to bring loss and never to permit gain to a nation that uses violence, except as an expression of the general will.

COMMUNAL DEFENSE

Finally there must be the political aim *to give to each nation a defense stronger than can be had by the nation warring single-handed, and stronger than by any usual war alliance.* For some moments we have dealt with the cupidity and ambition of nations, with their desire to enlarge their interests. But we must also deal with their desire to protect their interests, and with their fear and ill will when these seem in peril. No plan is adequate that takes no account also of these protective reactions.

The fears of nations are not to be dispelled by suggestion or autosuggestion—by asserting to oneself or to one another that fears are groundless, that there is nothing to be afraid of; or by saying that if there is anything to fear, the best thing to do is not to fear it. The fears of nations are not groundless; they are well grounded. Nor are they useless.

International fears will continue and will be of utility so long as the perils from other nations continue to be so common and so great; they will continue until there are better means to meet the peril than are now provided by any nation's own resources against violence. We fear because we feel our insecurity; because we feel that our present protection is not equal to the danger we are in. And we fight, among other reasons, to defend ourselves against danger.

Now instead of the insufficient protection by each nation looking out for its own security, there must be provided something that gives more security and at less cost. And when this is provided, solitary defense by the nation's own armament will disappear as the horse-drawn truck disappears before the railway and the automobile.

A nation looks out upon its neighbors and upon the larger world nervously because its present defenses are always inadequate—inadequate seemingly to the nation itself and in fact. No nation bent upon protecting its interests by its own single power ever feels that it has reached its goal of security. Nor should it feel so. The experts are always right who in every nation come forth periodically with awful revelations of the defenseless condition of the land. Defenseless America has her counterpart in defenseless Britain, defenseless France, defenseless Japan. There is always a point of fatal weakness in the national armor—in the soldiery or coast defenses, or battleships or cruisers or submarines or naval bases or air power. These deficiencies are real. The only error is in speaking as though this kind of deficiency could become unreal, as though there were some definite quantity of military defense that would suffice. No amount of it ever can suffice. A nation's own military strength never can have a safe margin beyond any possible combination of strength against her. Germany's unparalleled armament proved quite inadequate.

The inherent difficulty can be illustrated by America's quest of security in the Pacific. After a local "revolution" the Hawaiian Islands were annexed because, among other reasons, they were counted "the key of the Pacific." Were any other nation possessed of them, the entire western coast of the United States would be in danger. But how was the nation to protect this "key," after it had it on its ring? Only by a foothold still farther in the Pacific. Almost absent-mindedly, as England is said to have acquired her imperial territory, America came into possession of the Philippines and of Guam. And now was all secure? Not at all. The power that held Yap would have at its mercy Guam and the Philippines. And even with the problem of Yap solved, the United States felt and still feels no entire security in its position at Manila. And so it is universally; security by separate national power requires always an impossible progress into infinity. The situation has awakened humor in many lands, an instance of which we owe to the Earl of Cromer, so happy that its use a second time will be forgiven. When he had before him the question of giving up to Turkey some forts garrisoned by Egyptian troops on the coast of Midian, Lord Salisbury wrote him: "I would not be too much impressed by what the soldiers tell you about the strategic importance of these places. It is their way. If they were allowed full scope, they would insist on the importance of garrisoning the moon in order to protect us from Mars."

But besides the inadequacy in any single nation's armament, a further difficulty is, that in so far as the fears felt by the nation possessing a powerful armament are lessened, the fears felt by others are increased. Separate arming for war gives no security that can be received by all at once. Only one nation at a time by this course can be strongest and feel reasonably safe; and often no nation will be clearly

strongest, and none will feel reasonably safe. But in any event the safety is never a common safety, a shared safety. Some one nation seizes upon a security that puts all the rest in peril, and for this reason the interest of nations generally is against it and they need to revolt against it.

This method of seeking security is objectionable in two other respects. It is too costly for each separate nation to maintain, since it is as though each householder in a city were to have his own fire company, with private water supply, ladders, men, and fire engine. Coöperative defense against attack, like coöperative defense against fire, is the only economical defense.

Moreover, if by defense we mean victory over the aggressor, a separate defense defends perhaps half the time. For aggressor nations are often strong; they become aggressive by reason of their strength and strong by reason of their aggression; they win probably no less than half the time. Consequently in our present system we have a form of security insurance that pays no more than fifty per cent of the claims against it. A commercial insurance company that did no better would go into the hands of a receiver.

Security that is effective and economical can come only by an international coöperation similar in its method to that which protects the individual against violence in a civil community. The international community must undertake to free the individual nation from the dread that it will be attacked by some other nation and will have no defense but its own solitary power. Each nation must receive from the community of nations a pledge of assistance against an aggressor nation. Only thus can there be a fair degree of security, and a consequent weakening of distrust and fear, and a strengthening of good will.

Let us grant that coöperative defense would not defend infallibly: the society upon which it would depend might

break down, as a State breaks down during civil war; or the needed communal decision and power in crisis might be withheld. But the idea of a coöperative security will not rightly be rejected because we can imagine a situation in which it would fail. It would rightly be rejected, not if it might sometimes fail—indeed if it might often fail—but only if it promised to fail oftener and more disastrously than the present system; if it promised less protection, not to the most powerful only, but also to the weak; and promised this protection at a cost in excess of the present cost of defense by private war. A coöperative protection would have to be inefficient indeed to fall below these requirements.

Nor should we be dismayed could we expect no greater success than comes in the usual enforcement of law. To many persons it seems only right to condemn any proposal for law and order among nations, if it can be shown that some nation would still have power to violate the law. But a city does not decide that a coöperative protection of individuals against burglary and murder is an utter failure because burglary and murder continue to occur even in a well-governed city. The city does not hold up its hands in despair, and declare that henceforth each person must rely solely on his own pistol; that on Tuesday next the law courts will be closed and the police dismissed, the idea of communal security having proven itself a mistake. The city holds to its coöperative defense and tries to strengthen it, knowing that with all its defects such a plan is immeasurably better than separate individual defense with all its virtues. Any baron in his stronghold on the Rhine must have hated—and we know that he resisted—the new order whereby he and all his surrounding people must look to a larger coöperation to protect them in their rights. It inspired in him no confidence; he preferred to look to his

own power for such protection. And in some respects he was right; the old order served him fairly well. But not so the burghers and peasantry whose goods and lives, whose wives and daughters, were ever at his mercy, and too often at the mercy of any common ruffian. The new order, unwelcome though it was to some of the strongest, was clearly for the interest of the community at large.

But since security against aggression would mean ultimately some police power in reserve against an aggressor, there will be those to say, "But this is no way *out of war; it is a way to remain in war, to maintain war.* It approves and establishes the use of force among nations. Such a plan can never be accepted."

Now we shall have to deal gently with those to whom all compulsion is abhorrent. They usually do not mean quite all they say. They rarely vote to abolish the policeman on their own street. They can in time be brought to see the deep difference between force as an instrument of law and order, and force as an instrument of private and arbitrary will; between the compulsion by the community, passionate to protect its members, and the compulsion by the highwayman. By war let us mean, then, the use of military violence by a nation upon its own initiative and unsanctioned by the communal will. When the community of nations, expressing by lawful methods its united will, exercises compulsion by soldiery or battleships against a violator of the law, then there is not war but police action. However much the surface of the action may appear like war, the substance now is different. Even though there still be men in military uniform and bearing military banners, the conduct itself has been transformed within and has a different origin and result.

In proposing communal repression of the lawless we are not substituting war for war; we are substituting law for

war. Moreover the security against aggression, the security that will rid nations of so much of their distrust and fear, need not in the end depend mainly on physical force. The force of public approval and condemnation is already recognized by nations. No nation enjoys isolation; much less does it enjoy condemnation. At the opening of the World War, the leading countries, bent as they were upon using physical force, yet appealed to the world for approval or for a stay of judgment. And beyond this sanction when once aggression is clearly recognized for what it is, there are unused resources for coöperative compulsion by reducing or completely cutting off communication and trade. There is the boycott and devices like it and perhaps better than it. There may, then, be coöperative guarantees of many kinds against the aggressor. Physical force is by no means our sole reliance.

Mutual confidence in some degree is of course necessary before nations can give this mutual security. But the initial confidence does not need to be greater than that which brings allies together against a common enemy. A very little confidence suffices, so long as the danger common to them is clear. In such a situation difficult unions become possible, as of Germany and Turkey, and of the United States and Japan. It will only be necessary for nations generally to see that war—to see that the right to wage war by a nation whenever it pleases—is one of their greatest common dangers, and can be averted only by united action. And whatever gain is actually made toward mutual security will smooth the emotional way for still less distrust and still more confidence and still more coöperation toward security.

An intelligent effort against the present war system requires, then, a combined attack upon war's several sides of usefulness. One side of its utility will be gone when

there is loyally established the means of impartial decision, since the claimants themselves are the least able to see what is required by justice in their case. Another side will be gone, when aggressive war is made to have an unrosy look; the violent must be convinced that they will lose and not gain by violence. A third side of its use will disappear when there is a better national defense. Coöperative, communal defense must be thought upon by all who are deeply concerned with the national defense. *Nations intelligently bent against war must work together politically to undermine the war system by rendering it useless in comparison with what will be put there instead; by making it look uninviting both to the just and the unjust,* until it appear as inappropriate for its main purposes as would an ox team in Times Square or the Strand.

SOME STRANGE CONSEQUENCES OF SECURITY

To apply law and equity to disputes, to impose penalties upon aggression, and to come unitedly to the assistance of a nation attacked—these are all bound together in the aim to lessen the chances of war and to free the nations from their besetting anxiety lest war come upon them unprepared. And once freed from this fear, a host of baffling problems would be nearer solution. It will be interesting to see some of the curious results which will follow upon security.

The vexed problem of limitation or reduction of armament, for example, waits upon security. National heavy arming, it is true, is a contributing cause of insecurity; but, even more, it is an effect of insecurity. Although the nations are insecure partly because each of them is armed and because the leading nations are heavily armed, yet they are armed largely because they feel themselves unsafe.

Were private national armies and navies no longer needed for defense, then peoples would not long tax themselves heavily for instruments obviously for aggression and swagger. Yet there will be need of a police force, and this for some time to come will probably be in scattered national hands. Lingering distrust would keep it there. And with it so disposed, nations would still be dangerous to one another, though far less dangerous. For this reason safety cannot be guaranteed solely by a limitation of armaments, although a limitation would make for safety. Will not the wise course, then, be not to drive mainly against armaments? With some attention to them, but with attention principally on the causes of armaments and on removing their causes by giving communal security, such armaments will diminish almost of themselves.

And other problems than that of armaments will be eased as nations find themselves relying not on their solitary strength for their security, but upon security coöperatively attained. *Population is such a problem.* The increase of population, and the desire for territory to hold the growing number of men, women, and children in a nation and to supply the materials they will use and the markets they will need for their products—growing population and the desires which spring out of a growing population are regarded by many to-day as the source of all serious international difficulty. War is thought to spring from the fierce drive for advantage in trade, and this impulsion in turn derives its energy, so the thought runs, from the never failing increase of population.

There is, we have seen, a fair amount of unconscious self-deception in this view of the cause of war. For in its increase of population many a government feels less grief than exultation. The added number of its citizens is a contribution to national power, to potential military

strength, and is secretly or openly encouraged. And at the same time it is used to justify some aggression against a neighbor. The nations most ambitious, most military-minded, are the ones that assume the most tragic attitude toward the problem of population, and yet are most apt to stimulate the increase. Germany before the World War, the United States of Roosevelt's day, Italy and Japan today, are good instances of nations that drive hard against every just means of meeting the difficulty. The evil of race suicide, the duty of having large families for the Fatherland—such ideas are at the front in nations most interested in national power, as they were in the ancient days of militarist Persia. The desire for a large and still larger population arises in large part from the justified desire for security. Security, according to the common political practice, is to be sought by the superior military power of the separate nations, and this requires population.

Security once attained would consequently reduce the political motive for excessive population. But it would do more. *It would reduce the political rivalry for raw materials.* There would be less need that these materials and the source of these materials should be in the control of the nation itself and especially of the powerful nation. One must grant that raw materials are necessary for industry. But in time of peace it is not necessary that any one nation should hold against all others the lands from which the raw materials come. It is in war and for war that a complete control is necessary. In war, if our own nation does not possess them and the enemy does, we are lost. The powerful motive for the national elbowing for raw materials is only secondarily industrial; primarily it is political, and springs from the justified fear aroused by national insecurity.

Furthermore, security is connected with the system of

protective tariff. A protective tariff still maintained long after infant industries have grown to be grizzled giants is powerfully supported by the thought of war. Even at great monetary loss to the nation itself, the nation feels that it must manufacture and grow and mine a host of things which some other nation could more suitably produce and sell to us, while we put our energies to more profitable use. All this is done largely to be self-sufficient in case of war. The desire for security is not the exclusive motive, but it is a powerful motive for buying from the foreigner reluctantly, while selling to him gladly. We fear to be dependent upon him, while we are undismayed to have him dependent upon us.

Let them find true security, then, and nations will have a key to many locks. Make them safe from war, and not only will there be less insistence upon competitive arming, but less anxiety over surplus population, over insufficient territory, over raw materials, and over a protective tariff—over all these things which do so much to make nations suspect and fear and counterplot against one another.

Surplus population and all these other vexing things, instead of leading inexorably to war, lead inexorably against war. They are an imperative reason for effort day and night against the war system and for better substitutes to do its work. Nations will be unable to solve some of their most vexing problems until they hit the institution of war and hit it hard.

CHAPTER XXVIII

INSTRUMENTS NEEDED BY THE INTERNATIONAL MIND

EXPERIENCE has taught us that any important results in the external world can rarely be had by inner desire alone without help from hands, or can be had by hands without tools. Man joins instruments to his brain and intelligence—joins the telescope or microscope to his eye and to his curiosity; the telephone to the lips of one person and to the ear of another and to the thought and emotion of both.

SPIRITUAL TOOLS FOR USE WITHIN THE NATION

And in our intercourse with one another there are less apparent, less heralded, instruments without which our thinking and feeling, even with help of telescope, telephone, airplane, and steam would be of little avail.

There are certain creative novelties of behavior of persons toward one another which are caught up and repeated and supplemented until they become collective habits in a society, become institutions. These collective habits, these institutions, stand ready for the use of the individual and ready to stimulate and restrain him and to increase his social reach and finesse. By institutions the vital responses of person to person are extended, rounded, and given an unexpected power, so that a word said quietly in Washington or London can shape the lives of a million men in the Orient. It is not alone the radiogram that does it, but the institutions that begin working at the word.

It is almost needless to illustrate these social artifices, deftly constructed to serve our will. The language, customs, laws, and moral standards of a people; the family, the school, the commercial corporation, the court of justice, the church, the political government—each of these is an achievement to meet a want, to satisfy a craving. Each is an assistant to the individual, strengthening his arm, introducing him to companions, rubbing away the roughness between him and them, offering a proven way for him and them to live and work together more effectively and to lessen the pain, disgust, and anger which are so ready to arise among them. These social devices never come perfect out of hand, nor do they become perfect, but are always being perfected. They are constantly being rewrought to our purpose, and we constantly are becoming more skillful in their handling. These institutions grow to be so much a part of our brain and mind that no normal man would think of attempting the least of social results without their help. Without them he does not expect to meet the delicate difficulties of living with his fellows. Justice in any community is known to require the instruments of justice; public order, it is known, requires the instruments of order. And so it is with commerce, education, engineering, and healing; each of these arts has need of its special institutions found in the customs, rules, and organizations which are a living part of the art and the success itself.

INSTRUMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL LIVING

Now all this which is commonplace in the life within the nation, requires rediscovering in the region beyond. As your sensible man of affairs moves out into things international he is apt to lose touch with hard reality and to become a dreamer. In this wider realm, he believes, law

and order are to be had somehow without special and stable devices for law and order. He loves justice and would have justice between nations, but not by means of institutions of justice. He prefers to have it come by bare heart and will. Right feeling, right thinking, good will toward one another, which surely are indispensable, now seem all that is required.

We need the means, however—the institutional means—for justice and security against those who would use national violence either for justice or for cupidity or for ambition. And we must accept means which promise partial success along with a partial failure, as the only practical way toward more success and less failure. Not Britons, only, have to muddle through. With clear knowledge, then, that whatever we can now construct will necessarily be imperfect and in some respects dangerous to live with, and will need to be changed as defects become evident, *there must be erected the suitable institutions* for international ends. The nations even when they have good will are not enough; they must also have organs for strengthening and giving effect to their good will.

ACHIEVEMENTS PAST AND PRESENT

There have been centuries of thought as to what these institutions should be, with plans by statesmen, philosophers, and churchmen; by Henry IV and his minister Sully, by Saint-Pierre, Kant, Penn, and others. But the region has not been left to thought alone; there has been an increasing rate and depth of political action. And in the international coöperation described earlier there has already been much that looks directly to security and justice. Besides the beginnings of a body of international law from the time of Grotius, there has come especially in

the nineteenth and twentieth centuries an increasing governmental use of arbitration as a means to adjust disputes between nations; and some governments now have standing agreements beforehand to submit certain kinds of dispute, while a few governments have agreed to submit all disputes to arbitration. There were, besides, the two world conferences at The Hague for the limitation of armament, and the conferences of several powers at Washington and at Geneva for the limitation of naval armament. And at the close of the World War there was instituted the League of Nations with its agreement for the pacific settlement of disputes and for reducing the causes of conflict and for joint action in certain times of crisis; and, to deal with international questions to which a principle of law can be applied, the League has created a special institution, the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. These are important achievements toward government in the field of international relations, forming an orderly development, the later based upon the earlier, and each embodying the experience and courage of its particular time.

The need here obviously is for institutions supported by the leading powers. A general organization of such powers —indeed of all nations, powers and weaknesses together— is far better suited to the purpose than would be several separate regional organizations. For the world is no longer merely regional: Europe borrows from America and repays America; America sells to the British Empire; and America's nearest neighbor, Canada, is a vital part of that Empire. Asiatic affairs bear weightily upon both Europe and America; and the affairs of Europe and America bear still more weightily on Asia. Separate organizations in Europe, Asia, and America would not of themselves be the means to solve the problems of conflicting interest which span the Atlantic and the Pacific. China would hardly find

full relief by such an arrangement, nor would Japan. America and Asia need a common safety and justice in dealing with each other, even as Europe and Asia, and Europe and America, need them. The interests, the interplay of power around the Pacific and around the Atlantic, do not keep within continental divisions but cut straight across them. Three mutually independent organizations might be better than none, but would clearly be worse than one.

A single organization, however, might well include subordinate international bodies. It would of necessity include States and federations of States, since it would wisely dismiss the thought of a single world-State; and it might also include local bodies of nations that were not parts of a federation or empire, such as appear in the Locarno treaties. A wise development of the Pan-American Union, which now is hindered politically by the later form of the Monroe Doctrine, might lead in a like direction, wherein the regional body becomes an organ of the larger whole, giving strength to it and relieving its attention from what can be done well by those more immediately interested.

The present League of Nations and the institutions it is creating are the farthest steps yet taken to meet the plain psychological need as we have just been seeing it. They of course do not bring the world to its journey's end, and many another step must follow. For whatever is constructed by the nations laboring together will reveal the limited wisdom of the coworkers. But at the close of the World War the nations accomplished what would have been impossible before the war, in voluntarily entering, nearly all of them, into a great organization for many just aims, including mutual protection against the cupidity or ambition or mistaken sense of justice of any powerful people.

It is improbable that the world as a whole will ever

consent to a position far short of what it thus has reached. It may discover some better way of holding a still more advanced position. Particular nations may long hesitate to join with the others in the great enterprise; and some from time to time will feel aggrieved and will withdraw. But a world-wide body of nations assuredly—the present League itself, it is earnestly to be hoped—will be there to grow with the world's growth, becoming more and more able to fulfill the purpose of its founding, as the nations themselves gain a steadier aim toward a world made orderly by law.

The present League is born of the discipline and experience of the World War. Nothing short of the experience of that war's devastation and disruption, and yet also of its unprecedented coöperation, could have overcome the distrust of a permanent political organization which should include the victors themselves and their friends and enemies alike. This that the war accomplished may be set in the balance against some of its waste and embittering. The Treaty of Versailles and the other main treaties which closed the World War had this in them which no earlier treaty of peace ever included, to combat some of the very injustices they imposed.

The League thus signifies much more than can be found even in the lengthening catalogue of the things it has done. Like a newborn child, it is a promise and a preparation, to be valued not alone for what is there now and actually, but for what is there potentially. The League means that for the nations generally the old system of aloofness and of enthusiastic injury of one another has at last become intolerable, and that they consent, even though timidly, to a plan of coöperative justice and coöperative security.

At no one point do we ever enter fully into security and justice; there must always be a continuing and widening

progress. *But our present time seems to promise distinctly the close of an old epoch in world relations and the opening of a new, with new ideas and new instruments by which these ideas can be realized.* Nearly all the nations have in their very practice consented to the thought that the novel spirit which is entering into their attitude toward one another requires invisible hands and tools in the form of institutions.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE BREADTH OF THE ENTERPRISE

BUT lest we pin too much faith on a single means or method, let us in closing come back to the fuller design of what is needed. For there is no one key to what we seek, but several keys which are not duplicates. The stubborn lock is like that of a bank's treasure vault, where men must come together and consent to use their different keys at once to throw the bolt.

Politics, education—and in this must be included idealism, faith, and loyalty—and scientific research must here go together. None of them can be effective alone; none can afford to wait until the task of the other is finished, seeing that the task will never be finished. The experts will never know all; the nations will never be educated in all that should enter into their education; political action will never be abreast of what the best minds conceive in this great realm.

POLITICAL MACHINERY AND A RIGHT SPIRIT

In general there can be no confidence in governmental machinery alone. Intelligent good will must support and animate the political forms adopted. The organized body of nations will need a spirit and a right spirit, lest seven devils enter into the international arrangement. Better relations will require incessant care to maintain a purpose to have better relations, a purpose enlightened and dis-

ciplined in its desires and emotions. The organization can hardly for long be better than the nations and the men and women of the organization.

That political institutions extended to embrace many nations will not be enough, but will need vigilant education and research, is shown by civil wars—such as that of England in 1688; of the larger England in 1776 when she and her chief American colonies, hitherto organized together, turned against each other; of the French in their several revolutions; of the United States in 1861 when North and South went through their deadly struggle; of Ireland and Great Britain; of Russia and of China yesterday. Governmental forms of union are not enough; nor is the trouble always because the forms themselves are faulty; but at times it is because the people have lost or never have acquired a readiness to adjust their desires to the larger welfare. To the machinery of compromise and adjustment there must be added a special discipline to create and keep strong a spirit of accommodation, of seeing that rights be not pushed too far or too impatiently. The education of the will for international association must therefore penetrate all effort here, including the machinery of adjustment itself.

The education must, however, lead to a respect for this machinery, along with a sane desire for its improvement. There must be an education directed definitely to the need of international institutions. It is easy to be educated to see only defects and to wash one's hands of a good project because of its imperfection. This type of emotional reaction will require care quite as much as will that of uncritical enthusiasm, or of apathy. There will be need of care for a while, too, of those who are deeply interested, who believe heartily in government within the national society but who are all for a high-minded anarchy in the

society of nations. And the political organization as it is tried will give new matter to be used for education, to understand its problems and its hesitations, its disappointments and its success.

SCIENTIFIC INSTRUCTION AND RESEARCH

And likewise of science which must guide and attend the education and politics of the international society, and must receive fresh commissions from them. New knowledge will be discovered for use in politics and education, and each political decision will give new problems to the scientists. For were nations frankly to accept, for example, their economic interdependence instead of attempting economic self-sufficiency—were this to be accepted in principle, it would require endless investigation to know how best to carry it into effect. And there would be needed a continuous reinvestigation which would use the returns from the trials made. What would be the most effective economic measures to be taken internationally against an aggressor nation, furthermore, would never be fully known; they would have to be restudied periodically in the light of new world conditions and of the results from attempts at such economic pressure. And similarly, there would be need of continuous reinvestigation of the best means of cutting off communication not strictly commercial—communication by passenger service, mail, telegraph, telephone, and radio.

But at the back of all, there must be an unending study of the entire system of causes of international fear and ill will and war and of friendliness. We need to have in mind with increasing accuracy the factors which bring the worse and the better features in our international life and to see these in their due proportion to one another. We should

have exact maps of all these; a molehill must not be sketched in as a mountain, nor a single peak appear as though it were a range or as though it did not exist.

Especially do we need untiring research into the psychological condition which makes fog in this region. For we here lie off the intellectual Banks of Newfoundland. Now it is hard enough to see the truth under a clear sky; but truth about the behavior of nations and especially of foreign nations and most especially about foreign nations of an alien race has an exceedingly low visibility; it is as though it were painted in fantastic patterns for camouflage. Science is needed here to give a deeper knowledge of the illusions, the repressions, the amnesia, and the "rationalization" which are produced by the very passion of fealty. Loyal membership in a nation, which is not easily treasured too highly, brings to a whole people something like the "personal equation" which the astronomer studies and for which he must make correction. The constant errors due to patriotism should be more fully investigated and allowed for, to steer the nations to their port. Nations are even less able than are individuals to see themselves as others see them. Yet the gift is possible through science. And then we can avoid self-flattery and the tarring of rivals, which breeds truculence in us and awakens the foul fiend in them. Persistent scientific research can make good a hundred lacks.

GOVERNMENTAL POLICY

But we can trust too much even to science and education and the enlightened public opinion which must issue from them. All these are needed imperatively; and Lord Esher in England, and Root, Hadley, and Pritchett in America have spoken as though these were enough. In part, how-

ever, the international conduct we have been considering is governmental, is political, and will not be so much as half right until science and education fuse with politics and become expressed in its form of life. The trouble is not wholly that the international society is without science and is undisciplined in its desires, but in part it is that such science and good will as are in the society do not find utterance in governmental policy. And our present policy in its turn stands in the way of a better knowledge and appreciation of international affairs.

The facts encourage an attitude midway between pessimism and optimism. The forces which cause ill will and armed conflict are still under so ineffectual a control, that Marshal Foch could foresee only a gigantic war involving men, women, and children to come within the next fifteen or twenty years. Not every leading nation, certainly, is straining muscle and sinew to avert this possibility. Some nations still cling to the old system which brought the great disaster.

There is ground for grave anxiety but not for despair. Although the world is learning too slowly, it is learning, and it is putting some of its knowledge into conduct. The World War, with its unprecedented loss, brought also an unprecedented impatience of the old system of narrowly used science and of words of good will, while governments were all the while bound to hold what they had and to get more, and were deliberately left with instruments for little else than injustice and violence. Under the solemn teaching of the War, most of the nations have made political commitments which are of signal promise for international discipline and for still further and more effective governmental acts.

Thus the three enterprises—of science, education, and politics, striving to make the international world a place of

law and order—are not three, but are one. They move together, each coming to the other's help, each fairly useless—each certainly incomplete—without its fellows; all three of them, like the Musketeers, bent upon the common adventurous enterprise.

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